On the edge

If the UK is to turn its economy around, the two key factors will be exports and productivity.

Is the UK back in recession? The OECD, a think-tank that governments love to have on their side, believes that the economic recovery has gone into reverse over the last six months. For once, most other economic forecasters disagree, and think the OECD is being far too gloomy; the consensus seems to lie with Mervyn King's "zig-zag" rather than the OECD's "double dip".

Does any of this matter? Hardly. There will be a media storm on 25 April if the GDP figures show that the economy has slipped back into recession, but the question is largely academic. For the 2.7 million Britons looking for a job, and the further 1.4 million unable to find full-time work, it will make very little difference whether the UK is technically back in recession or not.

The fact is that the UK economy is in a far more serious state than the odd double dip can do justice to. The economy has not grown for 18 months, while unemployment has increased by over 200,000 - that is far more serious than a temporary, technical recession. Flatlining is not what is supposed to happen after a recession; we were expecting faster-than-normal growth to make up some of what was lost after the financial crisis. At the Budget in 2010, the Office for Budget Responsibility forecast that the economy would grow by 2.3 per cent in 2011. It has been downgrading its forecasts ever since.

And there is little chance that the economy will ever regain the ground lost during the recession. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, the recession will eventually leave an 11 per cent scar on the UK economy, almost five years' worth of growth that we will never get back. What we are dealing with is not just an economic slump - there is a serious problem with the way the UK economy works.

The most alarming symptom has been a dramatic slump in productivity. The value of what we produce per hour of work has fallen by 3.3 per cent since the end of 2007 - it should have increased by about 9 per cent. I don't expect many people feel they have become less productive or hard-working since the recession hit, but the value of what we collectively produce has fallen nonetheless. Of course, that productivity shock translates into a wage shock, which is why real incomes have fallen. (There is a silver lining, in that this drop in wages has stopped unemployment climbing even higher).

Now falling incomes mean that we have less money to spend, which means there is less opportunity for firms to make money in the UK, which is likely to mean further falls in incomes and fewer jobs. And that's not all we have to contend with - there is also the household debt burden left over from the financial crisis that we need to deal with, which further reduces spending. (There has been some debate in recent weeks over whether it is household debt or bank debt that causes the problems, but again this debate is academic - either way, consumer spending is squeezed).

As a result of this squeeze, the UK's domestic demand fell by 0.8 per cent during 2011. Had it not been for exports, the economy would have shrunk last year, and we'd have already had first-hand experience of a double dip recession. There are plenty of reasons why the UK economy remains in such a precarious position.

But there is some good news amidst the gloom: we are finally beginning to see exports grow significantly, several years after the devaluation of sterling in 2007. This export boom saved the economy from recession in 2011, and remains our best hope for a speedy recovery. It might also help to solve one of the core problems with the British economy; since 1997, we have consistently imported more than we export, and haven't been able to pay our way in the world.

If the UK is to turn its economy around, the two key factors will be exports and productivity. These two issues go to the heart of the underlying changes the economy needs; we need to increase the value of what we do, and sell more of it to the world. Overseas markets are the only place Britain can look to for growing demand at present, and exports are already helping to drag the economy out of the mire. But if any recovery is to be sustained, it must be accompanied by solid growth in productivity, on which the signs are much less encouraging. Reversing the UK's productivity shock will be a longer and more laborious project.

If they are to have any realistic plan for recovery, politicians of all stripes need to worry less about short-term fluctuations, and more about the key underlying factors that will make or break the economy over the next decade. There is little we can do to treat the after-symptoms of the financial crisis, but there is plenty of scope for re-making the UK economy.

Andrew Sissons is a researcher at the Big Innovation Centre at the Work Foundation

David Cameron at a GSK plant. Photo: Getty Images

Andrew Sissons is a researcher at the Big Innovation Centre based at the Work Foundation.

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Find the EU renegotiation demands dull? Me too – but they are important

It's an old trick: smother anything in enough jargon and you can avoid being held accountable for it.

I don’t know about you, but I found the details of Britain’s European Union renegotiation demands quite hard to read. Literally. My eye kept gliding past them, in an endless quest for something more interesting in the paragraph ahead. It was as if the word “subsidiarity” had been smeared in grease. I haven’t felt tedium quite like this since I read The Lord of the Rings and found I slid straight past anything written in italics, reasoning that it was probably another interminable Elvish poem. (“The wind was in his flowing hair/The foam about him shone;/Afar they saw him strong and fair/Go riding like a swan.”)

Anyone who writes about politics encounters this; I call it Subclause Syndrome. Smother anything in enough jargon, whirr enough footnotes into the air, and you have a very effective shield for protecting yourself from accountability – better even than gutting the Freedom of Information laws, although the government seems quite keen on that, too. No wonder so much of our political conversation ends up being about personality: if we can’t hope to master all the technicalities, the next best thing is to trust the person to whom we have delegated that job.

Anyway, after 15 cups of coffee, three ice-bucket challenges and a bottle of poppers I borrowed from a Tory MP, I finally made it through. I didn’t feel much more enlightened, though, because there were notable omissions – no mention, thankfully, of rolling back employment protections – and elsewhere there was a touching faith in the power of adding “language” to official documents.

One thing did stand out, however. For months, we have been told that it is a terrible problem that migrants from Europe are sending child benefit to their families back home. In future, the amount that can be claimed will start at zero and it will reach full whack only after four years of working in Britain. Even better, to reduce the alleged “pull factor” of our generous in-work benefits regime, the child benefit rate will be paid on a ratio calculated according to average wages in the home country.

What a waste of time. At the moment, only £30m in child benefit is sent out of the country each year: quite a large sum if you’re doing a whip round for a retirement gift for a colleague, but basically a rounding error in the Department for Work and Pensions budget.

Only 20,000 workers, and 34,000 children, are involved. And yet, apparently, this makes it worth introducing 28 different rates of child benefit to be administered by the DWP. We are given to understand that Iain Duncan Smith thinks this is barmy – and this is a man optimistic enough about his department’s computer systems to predict in 2013 that 4.46 million people would be claiming Universal Credit by now*.

David Cameron’s renegotiation package was comprised exclusively of what Doctor Who fans call handwavium – a magic substance with no obvious physical attributes, which nonetheless helpfully advances the plot. In this case, the renegotiation covers up the fact that the Prime Minister always wanted to argue to stay in Europe, but needed a handy fig leaf to do so.

Brace yourself for a sentence you might not read again in the New Statesman, but this makes me feel sorry for Chris Grayling. He and other Outers in the cabinet have to wait at least two weeks for Cameron to get the demands signed off; all the while, Cameron can subtly make the case for staying in Europe, while they are bound to keep quiet because of collective responsibility.

When that stricture lifts, the high-ranking Eurosceptics will at last be free to make the case they have been sitting on for years. I have three strong beliefs about what will happen next. First, that everyone confidently predicting a paralysing civil war in the Tory ranks is doing so more in hope than expectation. Some on the left feel that if Labour is going to be divided over Trident, it is only fair that the Tories be split down the middle, too. They forget that power, and patronage, are strong solvents: there has already been much muttering about low-level blackmail from the high command, with MPs warned about the dire influence of disloyalty on their career prospects.

Second, the Europe campaign will feature large doses of both sides solemnly advising the other that they need to make “a positive case”. This will be roundly ignored. The Remain team will run a fear campaign based on job losses, access to the single market and “losing our seat at the table”; Leave will run a fear campaign based on the steady advance of whatever collective noun for migrants sounds just the right side of racist. (Current favourite: “hordes”.)

Third, the number of Britons making a decision based on a complete understanding of the renegotiation, and the future terms of our membership, will be vanishingly small. It is simply impossible to read about subsidiarity for more than an hour without lapsing into a coma.

Yet, funnily enough, this isn’t necessarily a bad thing. Just as the absurd complexity of policy frees us to talk instead about character, so the onset of Subclause Syndrome in the EU debate will allow us to ask ourselves a more profound, defining question: what kind of country do we want Britain to be? Polling suggests that very few of us see ourselves as “European” rather than Scottish, or British, but are we a country that feels open and looks outwards, or one that thinks this is the best it’s going to get, and we need to protect what we have? That’s more vital than any subclause. l

* For those of you keeping score at home, Universal Credit is now allegedly going to be implemented by 2021. Incidentally, George Osborne has recently discovered that it’s a great source of handwavium; tax credit cuts have been postponed because UC will render such huge savings that they aren’t needed.

Helen Lewis is deputy editor of the New Statesman. She has presented BBC Radio 4’s Week in Westminster and is a regular panellist on BBC1’s Sunday Politics.

This article first appeared in the 11 February 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The legacy of Europe's worst battle