There is devilish detail in the new euro pact

Forget use of EU buildings, the threat is members of the new fiscal union cooking up deals that affe

The issue of David Cameron's "phantom" European veto has fallen out of the headlines pretty quickly, ousted from the agenda by the news of Fred Goodwin losing his Knighthood. (The announcement landed yesterday, by remarkable coincidence, within moments of the Prime Minister getting a bit duffed up in a Commons statement on Monday's European summit and after a weekend of bad headlines around banker bonuses.)

Conservative Eurosceptics, however, will not forget how the gesture of anti-Brussels defiance they so celebrated in December has turned, as they see it, into a supplicant bow to the forces of continental integration. It doesn't help that the Lib Dems are conspicuously pleased by Cameron's restoration of normal diplomatic service with regard to the EU.

As I wrote last week, upholding the spirit of the "veto" to the satisfaction of Tory back benchers and doing what it takes to secure British influence in European Union diplomacy were mutually exclusive demands. In fact, it seems, Cameron has done neither.

The sceptics have concentrated on the Prime Minister's failure to prevent signatories to the new Fiscal Union (FU) treaty using EU institutions to enforce their agreement. That was always a bizarre and unrealistic fixation. If Britain's position is to support other countries pursuing their plan, why would we sabotage the obvious mechanism for making it work. (There is an argument that says Britain should be opposing FU on the principle that any countries surrendering control of their budgets to a central European authority and insisting on choreographed austerity in the middle of a downturn is bonkers - but that is a different matter and definitely not government policy.)

The real issue for concern, as far as British influence is concerned, is not the use of institutions by the FU members, but the prospect that they will crowd the UK out in discussions of the single market. This is the problem that euro-wonks refer to as "caucusing" - the danger that plans will be hatched, positions agree, alliances cemented within the FU members that can then be presented at European Council meetings as faits accomplis.

This is not a threat for today or even tomorrow, but it is clearly a problem and potentially a very big one. If Britain struggles to build alliances in the Council it can get outvoted on things that matter deeply to our economy - on tax and regulation policy, for example. In the past, this hasn't happened too often, but the new FU structures, including regular summits (combined with some ill will generated by the whole "veto" episode) make caucusing much more likely.

Thus, as I have written before, the eurosceptic prophecy is self-fulfilling. Marginalisation diminishes influence leading to bad deals, suspicion of a conspiracy and more marginalisation. Onward towards the exit. Cameron told a press conference in Brussels that the government would "take action" if there was any sign of the FU members "encroaching on the single market". And that he would watch out for such encroachment "like a hawk". He didn't say what action would or could be taken.

The main safeguard in the draft fiscal union treaty appears to be in the preamble:

NOTING, in particular, the wish of the Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to benchmarking best practices.

Yes, I know that isn't even a sentence - such is the language of European treaties. Anyway, in something approximating English, this seems to be saying that the FU treaty is recognised as a special deal between some but not all existing EU member states - "enhanced cooperation" - for which a legal framework already exists in the much revised founding treaties of the EU.

The key passage on "enhanced cooperation" in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union says:

Such cooperation shall not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor shall it distort competition between them.

In other words, cooperation between FU members mustn't formally skew the single market against the non-FU members (Britain and the Czech Republic). In practice, however, some or all FU members could end up deciding on things that would subsequently be put to a full EU Council and comfortably outvote Britain.

To what extent this will happen and what Cameron could do about it are the real questions that should be asked about the changing nature of Britain's status within the EU after Monday.

Rafael Behr is political columnist at the Guardian and former political editor of the New Statesman

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7 problems with the Snooper’s Charter, according to the experts

In short: it was written by people who "do not know how the internet works".

A group of representatives from the UK Internet Service Provider’s Association (ISPA) headed to the Home Office on Tuesday to point out a long list of problems they had with the proposed Investigatory Powers Bill (that’s Snooper’s Charter to you and me). Below are simplified summaries of their main points, taken from the written evidence submitted by Adrian Kennard, of Andrews and Arnold, a small ISP, to the department after the meeting. 

The crucial thing to note is that these people know what they're talking about - the run the providers which would need to completely change their practices to comply with the bill if it passed into law. And their objections aren't based on cost or fiddliness - they're about how unworkable many of the bill's stipulations actually are. 

1. The types of records the government wants collected aren’t that useful

The IP Bill places a lot of emphasis on “Internet Connection Records”; i.e. a list of domains you’ve visited, but not the specific pages visited or messages sent.

But in an age of apps and social media, where we view vast amounts of information through single domains like Twitter or Facebook, this information might not even help investigators much, as connections can last for days, or even months. Kennard gives the example of a missing girl, used as a hypothetical case by the security services to argue for greater powers:

 "If the mobile provider was even able to tell that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the phone had been connected to twitter 24 hours a day, and probably Facebook as well… this emotive example is seriously flawed”

And these connection records are only going to get less relevant over time - an increasing number of websites including Facebook and Google encrypt their website under "https", which would make finding the name of the website visited far more difficult.

2. …but they’re still a massive invasion of privacy

Even though these records may be useless when someone needs to be found or monitored, the retention of Internet Connection Records (IRCs) is still very invasive – and can actually yield more information than call records, which Theresa May has repeatedly claimed are the non-digital equivalent of ICRs. 

Kennard notes: “[These records] can be used to profile them and identify preferences, political views, sexual orientation, spending habits and much more. It is useful to criminals as it would easily confirm the bank used, and the time people leave the house, and so on”. 

This information might not help find a missing girl, but could build a profile of her which could be used by criminals, or for over-invasive state surveillance. 

3. "Internet Connection Records" aren’t actually a thing

The concept of a list of domain names visited by a user referred to in the bill is actually a new term, derived from “Call Data Record”. Compiling them is possible, but won't be an easy or automatic process.

Again, this strongly implies that those writing the bill are using their knowledge of telecommunications surveillance, not internet era-appropriate information. Kennard calls for the term to be removed, or at least its “vague and nondescript nature” made clear in the bill.

4. The surveillance won’t be consistent and could be easy to dodge

In its meeting with the ISPA, the Home Office implied that smaller Internet service providers won't be forced to collect these ICR records, as it would use up a lot of their resources. But this means those seeking to avoid surveillance could simply move over to a smaller provider.

5. Conservative spin is dictating the way we view the bill 

May and the Home Office are keen for us to see the surveillance in the bill as passive: internet service providers must simply log the domains we visit, which will be looked at in the event that we are the subject of an investigation. But as Kennard notes, “I am quite sure the same argument would not work if, for example, the law required a camera in every room in your house”. This is a vast new power the government is asking for – we shouldn’t allow it to play it down.

6. The bill would allow our devices to be bugged

Or, in the jargon, used in the draft bill, subjected to “equipment interference”. This could include surveillance of everything on a phone or laptop, or even turning on its camera or webcam to watch someone. The bill actually calls for “bulk equipment interference” – when surely, as Kennard notes, “this power…should only be targeted at the most serious of criminal suspects" at most.

7. The ability to bug devices would make them less secure

Devices can only be subject to “equipment interference” if they have existing vulnerabilities, which could also be exploited by criminals and hackers. If security services know about these vulnerabilities, they should tell the manufacturer about them. As Kennard writes, allowing equipment interference "encourages the intelligence services to keep vulnerabilities secret” so they don't lose surveillance methods. Meanwhile, though, they're laying the population open to hacks from cyber criminals. 


So there you have it  – a compelling soup of misused and made up terms, and ethically concerning new powers. Great stuff. 

Barbara Speed is a technology and digital culture writer at the New Statesman and a staff writer at CityMetric.