You win nothing in politics just for being right

If the Tories were a private company, their shareholders would be furious. So why are voters more le

Imagine you are a management consultant called in by shareholders to appraise the performance of the management team of a large business. They were recruited a couple of years ago and, although inexperienced, took over with a highly controversial strategy for reducing the company's debt. The workforce has since been radically reduced as have the pensions and benefits of those employees who remain. The hugely popular childcare scheme has been axed and the equally successful company healthcare scheme put out to tender.

Corporate morale is, not unsurprisingly, at an all-time low. Even worse, all of this sacrifice has not only been in vain but has proved positively counter-productive. The company's growth has stalled, annual losses have increased and the corporate debt is higher than ever. The management team has itself recently had to admit that its flagship strategy (let's call it Plan A) lies in tatters.

That is not all. Even the execution of their plan has been inept. Through almost laughable naivety and arrogance in their preparation for, and conduct at, a crucial meeting of the business's European partners, the management team found itself isolated, tactically outplayed and unable to achieve any of its negotiating goals. At home, its management style has been characterised by poorly considered proposals which have, more often than not, been reversed at the first sign of trouble. Those with which they persist have been subjected to so many unforeseen amendments and variations that they have been rendered of Byzantine complexity making them not only incomprehensible but impracticable.

How then would you, the management consultant, rate this team? In what terms would you report back to the shareholders? Would you tell them that the company was in safe hands, that management was doing a good job in difficult circumstances and that their interests as shareholders were best served by letting this team carry on? I thought not. And yet that is precisely the current judgement of the electorate of this administration. Why?

The unfortunate truth is that politics isn't a talent competition any more than it is simply a question of being right. If it were, then the fact that Labour consistently and accurately predicted the failure of Plan A - a plan whose corollary has been wildly unpopular cuts to valued public services - would have led to it now enjoying a 15-point lead in the polls and Ed Balls being feted as the economic seer of his age. While all of this may lead one to conclude that the electorate is irrational or capricious, I would argue that it merely continues to behave as it has always done. It has now, and ever has had, two primary criteria, to which all else is subsidiary.

Firstly, and as ever, it's the economy, stupid. Everyone wants a world class health service, a state education system that realises the potential of every child and decent pension provision for all -- and the polls tell us that the voters consistently trust Labour more than the Tories to prioritise, and to deliver, them. However, those same voters also know that without a stable, growing, economy, they will not happen, regardless of who is in power. And for so long as the electorate believes that Labour was responsible for, and has no credible solution to, the country's current economic predicament, they will not trust it with the reins of government.

The polls tell us that this is precisely what they do believe and you could hardly blame them for doing otherwise. As I suggested in an article which I wrote in these pages nearly a year ago, the Tories' greatest triumph since the election has been the embedding of the twin myths that it was the profligacy of Labour ('the maxing out of the credit card') that caused the deficit to balloon and that the only sensible response is therefore savagely to cut public expenditure.

It pains me to reflect that Labour has done so little since then to disabuse the public. Now that Osborne's Plan A has been exposed as economic illiteracy, it may find a more receptive audience for its message of 'too far too fast' but it needs to work far, far harder to deliver its own narrative. Labour must explain both the cause and its solution in straightforward terms that we can all understand. Do neither and we may as well all sit back and wait for the Tories to win a majority at the next election.

Secondly, and no less importantly, the country likes its leader to look the part. Whatever one's view of Cameron - and, believe me, mine could not be much more negative - he looks like a prime minister. He is telegenic, charismatic, confident and assured. He is seen (paradoxically given his administration's record) as decisive, even ruthless. These are qualities which the electorate likes and admires. To prove my point, and without naming names, I invite you to consider the characteristics of those party leaders who have achieved electoral success in the last thirty years and those who have not.

The sad truth is that unless your leader has, and is seen to have, those qualities - in short, unless he looks the part - you are whistling in the wind. That is why a stock question of the pollsters is whether you can visualise candidate X standing outside Downing Street. We cannot ignore the fact that Ed Miliband is currently failing that acid test. He can console himself that, for some time after she was elected Tory leader, so did Margaret Thatcher. It took a lot of time, hard work and the magic of Gordon Reece and the Saatchi brothers to mould her into a plausible prime minister - but it worked. Time, however, is not on his side. We live in volatile times and we cannot assume that a general election is years hence. Ed, and those around him, need to recognise the problem and act on it, urgently and effectively.

Labour can theorise as much as it wants about the mythical centre ground of politics and how to capture it. It can do good work, and make transient headlines, on phone tapping, Murdoch, bankers' bonuses and executive pay. It can echo public anger about pensions, austerity and cuts to public services. But without a coherent and compelling narrative on the economy and a leader who genuinely looks like a prime minister-in-waiting, Labour will not only fail to win the next general election, it will become a political irrelevance.

John Whitting is a QC and member of the Labour Party.

Photo: Getty Images
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I'm far from convinced by Cameron's plans for Syria

The Prime Minister has a plan for when the bombs drop. But what about after?

In the House of Commons today, the Prime Minister set out a powerful case for Britain to join air strikes against Isil in Syria.  Isil, he argued, poses a direct threat to Britain and its people, and Britain should not be in the business of “outsourcing our security to our allies”. And while he conceded that further airstrikes alone would not be sufficient to beat Isil, he made the case for an “Isil first” strategy – attacking Isil now, while continuing to do what we can diplomatically to help secure a lasting settlement for Syria in which Assad (eventually) plays no part.

I agreed with much of David Cameron’s analysis. And no-one should doubt either the murderous barbarism of Isil in the region, or the barbarism they foment and inspire in others across the world.  But at the end of his lengthy Q&A session with MPs, I remained unconvinced that UK involvement in airstrikes in Syria was the right option. Because the case for action has to be a case for action that has a chance of succeeding.  And David Cameron’s case contained neither a plan for winning the war, nor a plan for winning the peace.

The Prime Minister, along with military experts and analysts across the world, concedes that air strikes alone will not defeat Isil, and that (as in Iraq) ground forces are essential if we want to rid Syria of Isil. But what is the plan to assemble these ground forces so necessary for a successful mission?  David Cameron’s answer today was more a hope than a plan. He referred to “70,000 Syrian opposition fighters - principally the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on Isil”.

But it is an illusion to think that these fighters can provide the ground forces needed to complement aerial bombardment of Isil.  Many commentators have begun to doubt whether the FSA continues to exist as a coherent operational entity over the past few months. Coralling the myriad rebel groups into a disciplined force capable of fighting and occupying Isil territory is a heroic ambition, not a plan. And previous efforts to mobilize the rebels against Isil have been utter failures. Last month the Americans abandoned a $500m programme to train and turn 5,400 rebel fighters into a disciplined force to fight Isil. They succeeded in training just 60 fighters. And there have been incidents of American-trained fighters giving some of their US-provided equipment to the Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

Why has it proven so hard to co-opt rebel forces in the fight against Isil? Because most of the various rebel groups are fighting a war against Assad, not against Isil.  Syria’s civil war is gruesome and complex, but it is fundamentally a Civil War between Assad’s forces and a variety of opponents of Assad’s regime. It would be a mistake for Britain to base a case for military action against Isil on the hope that thousands of disparate rebel forces can be persuaded to change their enemy – especially when the evidence so far is that they won’t.

This is a plan for military action that, at present, looks highly unlikely to succeed.  But what of the plan for peace? David Cameron today argued for the separation of the immediate task at hand - to strike against Isil in Syria – from the longer-term ambition of achieving a settlement in Syria and removing Assad.  But for Isil to be beaten, the two cannot be separated. Because it is only by making progress in developing a credible and internationally-backed plan for a post-Assad Syria that we will persuade Syrian Sunnis that fighting Isil will not end up helping Assad win the Civil War.  If we want not only to rely on rebel Sunnis to provide ground troops against Isil, but also provide stable governance in Isil-occupied areas when the bombing stops, progress on a settlement to Syria’s Civil War is more not less urgent.  Without it, the reluctance of Syrian Sunnis to think that our fight is their fight will undermine the chances of military efforts to beat Isil and bring basic order to the regions they control. 

This points us towards doubling down on the progress that has already been made in Vienna: working with the USA, France, Syria’s neighbours and the Gulf states, as well as Russia and Iran. We need not just a combined approach to ending the conflict, but the prospect of a post-war Syria that offers a place for those whose cooperation we seek to defeat Isil. No doubt this will strike some as insufficient in the face of the horrors perpetrated by Isil. But I fear that if we want not just to take action against Isil but to defeat them and prevent their return, it offers a better chance of succeeding than David Cameron’s proposal today. 

Stewart Wood is a former Shadow Cabinet minister and adviser to Ed Miliband. He tweets as @StewartWood.