The EU questions Salmond must answer

The SNP leader should come clean on the euro before lecturing others.

With the exception of Paddy Ashdown, astonishingly few politicians and commentators have made the link between Scotland and Europe. But Cameron's decision to isolate the UK has significant implications for the Scottish National Party [SNP], which has long campaigned for "independence in Europe". As Ashdown wrote in the Observer, "If England is to be out of Europe, why should Scotland not be in?"

From one perspective, Cameron's stance strengthens Alex Salmond's argument that Scotland needs independence to pursue its own policy of European integration. As the SNP leader wrote in his letter to the PM:

Last week's developments in Brussels demonstrate that Scotland urgently needs a voice at the top table when our vital national interests are being discussed, by becoming an independent member state, instead of being shut out of the room.

He followed that up with "six crucial questions" for Cameron on Europe and Scottish interests. But if you strip away the rhetoric, Salmond is avoiding some inconvenient questions of his own.

Until recently, the SNP leader proudly declared that an independent Scotland would join the euro. In 2009, he quipped that sterling was "sinking like a stone" and argued that euro membership was becoming increasingly attractive. "There is no doubt that the plummeting pound and parlous state of the UK economy has caused many people in the business community and elsewhere to view membership favourably," he said. That, to put it mildly, is no longer the case and, consequently, Salmond has changed tact. Like Gordon Brown circa 2003, he now states that Scotland will retain the pound until it is in the country's "economic advantage" to join the euro.

Whether or not that day comes, there is no majority for Salmond's stance. Polling shows that the Scottish electorate is only marginally less eurosceptic than the UK electorate as a whole. According to a recent YouGov poll, 44 per cent of Scottish voters want to leave the EU (38 per cent want to remain) compared to 47 per cent of UK voters. Similarly, 45 per cent of UK voters think that Britain's EU membership is a "bad thing" and so do 41 per cent of Scots.

Even if Scotland were to join the euro, would Salmond sign up to a fiscal union? Having finally won autonomy over spending and borrowing would he happily submit his annual budgets to Brussels for approval? How would he respond if the EU blocked his long-promised cut in corporation tax? Until he answers these and other questions, Salmond has little right to lecture others.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

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Theresa May missed an easy opportunity on EU citizens' rights

If the UK had made a big, open and generous offer, the diplomatic picture would be very different.

It's been seven hours and 365 days...and nothing compares to EU, at least as far as negotiations go.

First David Davis abandoned "the row of the summer" by agreeing to the EU's preferred negotiating timetable. Has Theresa May done the same in guaranteeing the rights of EU citizens living here indefinitely?

Well, sort of. Although the PM has said that there have to be reciprocal arrangements for British citizens abroad, the difficulty is that because we don't have ID cards and most of our public services are paid for not out of an insurance system but out of general taxation, the issues around guaranteeing access to health, education, social security and residence are easier.

Our ability to enforce a "cut-off date" for new migrants from the European Union is also illusory, unless the government thinks it has the support in parliament and the logistical ability to roll out an ID card system by March 2019. (It doesn't.)

If you want to understand how badly the PM has managed Britain's Brexit negotiations, then the rights of the three million EU nationals living in Britain is the best place to start. The overwhelming support in the country at large for guaranteeing the rights of EU citizens, coupled with the deep unease among Conservative MPs about not doing so, meant that it was never a plausible bargaining chip. (That's before you remember that the bulk of the British diaspora in Europe lives in countries with small numbers of EU citizens living in the UK. You can't secure a good deal from Spain by upsetting the Polish government.) It just made three million people, their friends and their families nervous for a year and irritated our European partners, that's all.

If the United Kingdom had made a big, open and generous offer on citizens' rights a year ago, as Vote Leave recommended in the referendum, the diplomatic picture would be very different. (It would be better still if, again, as Vote Leave argued, we hadn't triggered Article 50, an exit mechanism designed to punish an emergent dictatorship that puts all the leverage on the EU27's side.)

As it happens, May's unforced errors in negotiations, the worsening economic picture and the tricky balancing act in the House of Commons means that Remainers can hope both for a softer exit and that they might yet convince voters that nothing compares to EU after all. (That a YouGov poll shows the number of people willing to accept EU rules in order to keep the economy going stretching to 58 per cent will only further embolden the soft Brexiteers.)

For Brexiteers, that means that if Brexit doesn't go well, they have a readymade scapegoat in the government. It means Remainers can credibly hope for a soft Brexit – or no Brexit at all. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to domestic and global politics.

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