How executive pay has soared

Executives have enjoyed pay increases of nearly 5,000 per cent in the last 30 years.

Thanks to the High Pay Commission, no one can now deny that Britain has a problem with executive pay. The body's final report was published today and it contains some remarkable data. In the case of Barclays, for instance, top pay is now 75 times that of the average worker, compared to 14.5 in 1979 (see table below). In the last 30 years, the lead executive's pay in Barclays has risen by 4,889.4 per cent - from £87,323 to an extraordinary £4,365, 636, while average pay has risen from £6,474 to just £25,900. The commission argues persuasively that excessive pay at the top has increased inequality, damaged trust in business, distorted the market and created instability.


So, to quote Lenin, what is to be done? The body makes 12 recommendations to tackle high pay, including employee representation on remuneration committees, publishing the top 10 executive pay packages outside the boardroom, forcing companies to publish a pay ratio between the highest paid executive and the company median, and establishing a new permanent body to monitor high pay.

The initial response from the government is encouraging. Vince Cable, who launched a consultation into the issue in September, said:

Many of the options we are consulting on are reflected in the High Pay Commission's final report and we welcome their contribution to this important debate. The government will announce next steps early next year. In the last decade we have seen extreme increases in top executive pay which appear to be completely unrelated to the performance of companies. They are therefore acting against the interests of shareholders and consumers.

There is widespread consensus, not just among the public but in the business community, that this is unacceptable and is undermining the credibility of our markets-based system.

What I'm working towards is responsible capitalism where rewards are properly aligned with performance.

You don't have to be a Cuban communist, as corporate headhunter Dr Heather McGregor absurdly claimed on the Today programme this morning, to believe this is a problem. Should the government fail to act, Britain will become an even more unequal society. As the shocking graph below shows, based on current trends, the top 0.1 per cent will take home 14 per cent of national income by 2035, a level of inequality not seen since Victorian times.


We know from The Spirit Level that the most unequal countries do worse on almost every quality of life indicator. They suffer from higher levels of violence, mental illness, obesity and teenage pregnancy, and lower levels of trust, child well-being and happiness. If Britain is to avoid even greater social unrest, the government must call time on the era of runaway rewards.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

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7 problems with the Snooper’s Charter, according to the experts

In short: it was written by people who "do not know how the internet works".

A group of representatives from the UK Internet Service Provider’s Association (ISPA) headed to the Home Office on Tuesday to point out a long list of problems they had with the proposed Investigatory Powers Bill (that’s Snooper’s Charter to you and me). Below are simplified summaries of their main points, taken from the written evidence submitted by Adrian Kennard, of Andrews and Arnold, a small ISP, to the department after the meeting. 

The crucial thing to note is that these people know what they're talking about - the run the providers which would need to completely change their practices to comply with the bill if it passed into law. And their objections aren't based on cost or fiddliness - they're about how unworkable many of the bill's stipulations actually are. 

1. The types of records the government wants collected aren’t that useful

The IP Bill places a lot of emphasis on “Internet Connection Records”; i.e. a list of domains you’ve visited, but not the specific pages visited or messages sent.

But in an age of apps and social media, where we view vast amounts of information through single domains like Twitter or Facebook, this information might not even help investigators much, as connections can last for days, or even months. Kennard gives the example of a missing girl, used as a hypothetical case by the security services to argue for greater powers:

 "If the mobile provider was even able to tell that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the phone had been connected to twitter 24 hours a day, and probably Facebook as well… this emotive example is seriously flawed”

And these connection records are only going to get less relevant over time - an increasing number of websites including Facebook and Google encrypt their website under "https", which would make finding the name of the website visited far more difficult.

2. …but they’re still a massive invasion of privacy

Even though these records may be useless when someone needs to be found or monitored, the retention of Internet Connection Records (IRCs) is still very invasive – and can actually yield more information than call records, which Theresa May has repeatedly claimed are the non-digital equivalent of ICRs. 

Kennard notes: “[These records] can be used to profile them and identify preferences, political views, sexual orientation, spending habits and much more. It is useful to criminals as it would easily confirm the bank used, and the time people leave the house, and so on”. 

This information might not help find a missing girl, but could build a profile of her which could be used by criminals, or for over-invasive state surveillance. 

3. "Internet Connection Records" aren’t actually a thing

The concept of a list of domain names visited by a user referred to in the bill is actually a new term, derived from “Call Data Record”. Compiling them is possible, but won't be an easy or automatic process.

Again, this strongly implies that those writing the bill are using their knowledge of telecommunications surveillance, not internet era-appropriate information. Kennard calls for the term to be removed, or at least its “vague and nondescript nature” made clear in the bill.

4. The surveillance won’t be consistent and could be easy to dodge

In its meeting with the ISPA, the Home Office implied that smaller Internet service providers won't be forced to collect these ICR records, as it would use up a lot of their resources. But this means those seeking to avoid surveillance could simply move over to a smaller provider.

5. Conservative spin is dictating the way we view the bill 

May and the Home Office are keen for us to see the surveillance in the bill as passive: internet service providers must simply log the domains we visit, which will be looked at in the event that we are the subject of an investigation. But as Kennard notes, “I am quite sure the same argument would not work if, for example, the law required a camera in every room in your house”. This is a vast new power the government is asking for – we shouldn’t allow it to play it down.

6. The bill would allow our devices to be bugged

Or, in the jargon, used in the draft bill, subjected to “equipment interference”. This could include surveillance of everything on a phone or laptop, or even turning on its camera or webcam to watch someone. The bill actually calls for “bulk equipment interference” – when surely, as Kennard notes, “this power…should only be targeted at the most serious of criminal suspects" at most.

7. The ability to bug devices would make them less secure

Devices can only be subject to “equipment interference” if they have existing vulnerabilities, which could also be exploited by criminals and hackers. If security services know about these vulnerabilities, they should tell the manufacturer about them. As Kennard writes, allowing equipment interference "encourages the intelligence services to keep vulnerabilities secret” so they don't lose surveillance methods. Meanwhile, though, they're laying the population open to hacks from cyber criminals. 


So there you have it  – a compelling soup of misused and made up terms, and ethically concerning new powers. Great stuff. 

Barbara Speed is a technology and digital culture writer at the New Statesman and a staff writer at CityMetric.