Post-flood Pakistan is recovering, but issues still remain

The international relief effort has worked — but it has thrown up new problems.

Flying over Pakistan's Swat Valley, you can see encouraging signs of post-flood reconstruction. Where bridges had been destroyed, temporary structures are being put in place, where roads had been washed away now hardened dirt tracks are appearing, and where schools had been flattened, makeshift buildings are being erected.

I had deliberately held off visiting Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the devastating floods this summer to avoid becoming another spectator getting in the way, but finally arrived in Islamabad just over a week ago. The purpose was to use my position as chair of the European Parliament's delegation to south Asia to highlight the ongoing humanitarian situation and reconstruction needs at a time when initial public attention had waned.

In the area we visited in the north, Swat Valley, the response has been swift. However, the irony was not lost on me that this was due in large part to the existing presence of the army and NGOs, in situ because of the ongoing conflict and the enormous number of people recently displaced from the area. In the south, in areas such as Sindh Province, where the army and NGOs have not been as active because they have not needed to be, the situation is not so encouraging.

Indeed, the relief effort has thrown up new problems.

We heard from Unicef about the discovery of pockets of extreme deprivation, abject poverty and bonded labour that the authorities had not even known about until after the floods. This discovery is a symptom of a larger problem – a severe lack of baseline information. The last census was some time ago, so accurate information is lacking about where people are and, indeed, who they are, which makes it all the more difficult to reach the most vulnerable. Population movement in response to the state of flooding has also made it more difficult to deliver aid effectively.

There had been initial concern whether aid money would reach those in need or be diverted en route. The Pakistani government set up a special committee to ensure transparency and most of the overseas aid money has been distributed through international agencies and seems to be getting through.

General Nadeem Ahmed, in charge of the overall disaster management effort, was also keen to stress how the efforts of ordinary Pakistanis, rallying to provide food, water and shelter to those in need, as well as assisting in reconstruction efforts, had made the progress we witnessed possible. However, it is also clear that the entire operation is severely stretched and many of the agencies are reporting that initial donations have already been spent.

Next week, Pakistan will host a conference of international donors and the conversation will turn to long-term issues. Should disaster recovery build back or build better? And how is this reconstruction programme going to be financed?

There is no doubt that the amount of interest paid on Pakistan's debt is more than the money that the Asian Development Bank has offered in loans. Yet I certainly heard some scepticism around reducing debt repayments while the Pakistani government is writing off debts owed to the state and remains unwilling to take action to make its tax collection more efficient and effective. Recent statements from President Asif Ali Zardari are sounding more positive.

It should not be forgotten that this is a relatively new democratically elected government, and one that is facing enormous challenges. We met some extraordinary people inside and outside parliament. But there is a clear view that the government also needs to be taking action on corruption and moving the pace of change more quickly – the reconstruction effortdemands it, and winter is coming on.

Jean Lambert is an MEP for the Green Party.

Photo: Getty Images
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Cameron needs to decide what he thinks about Russia

David Cameron's words suggest one thing, his actions quite another.

David Cameron needs to decide whether he takes Russia seriously.

He certainly talks a good game, calling Vladimir Putin to account for crimes against Ukrainian sovereignty and for supporting the wrong side in Syria, claiming credit for bolstering the post-Crimea sanctions regime, and demanding that Moscow’s behaviour change. And the new Strategic Defence & Security Review, published last week, puts Russia front and centre among the threats Britain faces.

The problem is, his government’s foreign policy seems calculated to make no one happier than Putin himself.

At fault is not a failure of analysis. It has taken Whitehall 19 months since Moscow annexed Crimea to develop a new Russia policy, replacing the old aspirations of “strategic partnership based on common values”, but the conviction that Russia be treated as a significant threat to the U.K.’s security and prosperity is solid.

Five years ago, when the coalition government published the last Strategic Defence & Security Review, Russia was mentioned once, in the context of rising global powers with whom London could partner to help solve planetary problems, from nuclear proliferation to climate change. The new SDSR tells a very different story. Russia gets 28 mentions this time around, characterised as a “state threat” that “may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO allies.” Russia’s annexation of Crimea and instigation of a separatist civil war in eastern Ukraine are mentioned in the same sentence with Assad’s chemical weapons attacks on Syrian civilians and the rise of the Islamic State as key examples of how the world is becoming a more dangerous place.

How that threat will be countered, however, is not a question Whitehall can answer: it is a question for Westminster, and it gets to the heart of where this government sees its place in the world, and in Europe in particular. What Whitehall cannot say – but what the politicians must recognise – is this: the best bulwark against the Kremlin is a strengthened European Union, with more integrated markets and the force to push a concerted foreign policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood. And that recognition requires Cameron to decide whether Putin poses a greater challenge than Nigel Farage.

The SDSR is right to note that the danger of a military confrontation with Russia is remote. Just in case, the Government has committed to bolstering aerial defences, contributing to NATO’s rapid reaction capabilities and maintaining the sanctions regime until a full settlement is reached that restores Ukrainian sovereignty. These are all reasonable measures, which will go some distance to ensuring that Moscow understands the risks of further escalation in the near term. But they do nothing to address the longer term problem.

From a hard-security perspective, Russia is a nuisance. The real danger is in the threat Moscow poses to what the SDSR calls the “rules-based order” – that system of institutions, agreements and understandings that underpin stability and prosperity on the European continent. That order is about more than respecting national borders, important as that is. It is also about accepting that markets are impartially regulated, that monopolies are disallowed and political and economic power reside in institutions, rather than in individuals. It is, in other words, about accepting rules that are almost the polar opposite of the system that Russia has built over the past 25 years, an order based on rents, clientelism and protected competitive positions.

Russia, after all, went to war over a trade treaty. It invaded Ukraine and annexed part of its territory to prevent the full implementation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that was designed to make Ukraine function more like Europe and less like Russia. From Moscow’s point of view, the European project is a very real geopolitical threat, one that promises to reduce the territory in which Russia can compete and, eventually, to increase the pressure on Russia itself to change. In somewhat less pernicious ways Moscow is seeking similarly to derail Moldova’s and Georgia’s European integration, while working hard to keep Belarus and Armenia from straying.

This is not a problem of vision or diplomacy, a failure to convince Putin of the value of the European way of doing things. For Putin and those on whose behalf he governs, the European way of doing things carries negative value. And unless the basic structure of politics and economics in Russia shifts, that calculation won’t change when Putin himself leaves the Kremlin. For the foreseeable future, Russia’s rulers will be willing to go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the widening of Europe, at the cost of instability and dysfunction in the region.

European willingness is another question. A chorus of euro=sceptics both left and right have demanded that Europe stop provoking the Russian bear, leaving the Eastern Neighbourhood countries to fend for themselves – sacrificing Kiev’s sovereignty to Moscow in order to bolster their own sovereignty from Brussels. Cracks, too, are emerging in the centre of the political spectrum: as French President Francois Hollande pledged to work with Moscow to fight ISIS in Syria, Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared that such an alliance would necessitate the lifting of sanctions on Russia, thus trading stability in Syria for instability in Ukraine.

As a member of the EU, London has a role to play. Together with Berlin, London could exert pressure on Paris and keep the margins of the political spectrum marginal. London could through its weight behind a common energy market, forcing Gazprom to play by EU competition rules. London could bolster anti-corruption systems and ensure that ill-gotten gains have no safe haven in Europe. London could insist on the legitimacy of the European project from one end of the continent to the other.

Instead, London is threatening Brexit, relinquishing any leverage over its European allies, and seeking EU reforms that would eviscerate the common energy market, common financial regulation, the common foreign and security policy and other key tools in the relationship with Russia.

In their February 2015 report on EU-Russian relations, the House of Lords raised the question of “whether Europe can be secure and prosperous if Russia continues to be governed as it is today.” To be sure, Europe can’t change Russia’s government and shouldn’t try. But by insisting on its own rules – both in how it governs its internal markets and in how it pursues its foreign policy – Europe can change the incentives Russia’s government faces.

The question, then, to Cameron is this: Whose rules would Westminster rather see prevail in the Eastern Neighbourhood, Europe’s or Russia’s?

Samuel A. Greene is Director of the King’s Russia Institute, King’s College London.