China and Iran vie for the subcontinent
Iran’s destabilising influence in Afghanistan is just the tip of a geopolitical iceberg.
By Catriona Luke Published 28 October 2010 18:49
It emerged this week that Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, has been accepting "bags of money" from Iran, reportedly as transparent aid to help cover palace expenses. Although Iranian money and weapons for use against Nato forces have been pouring for many years into Herat, in western Afghanistan, the nonchalance of President Karzai's response to Iranian cash in Kabul raised eyebrows in the media.
Perhaps they weren't looking far enough afield. The worry is that Iran has similar designs on Pakistan and that the methods will be the same – drip money into the Pakistani Taliban in a long-term effort to destabilise the state. Even if the tactic doesn't work – and there are strong arguments that it will not – it may make things more complicated.
For one thing, it is not known the extent to which Iranian money is swishing around in Pakistan, though much of it will be linked to drugs. From an Iranian point of view, too, their neighbour to the east may look vulnerable.
India's bulwarks
Sectarian and political violence has reared up over the summer in Karachi – both the starting point of Isaf supply lines and the region's major drugs port. Pakistan is also dealing with the aftermath of catastrophic flooding; much of the agrarian economy is destroyed for this year. And the government is constantly portrayed as weak, even if things may not be quite as bad as they seem.
The fragility of Pakistan comes with caveats, something that the Iranians may not have observed. AP reported in September that there had been 3,600 deaths from extremist Taliban attacks in Pakistan since 2007 – the majority of them chronicled in the western press – a relatively low figure, given Pakistan's population of 175 million. In Karachi this year alone, the city's sectarian and political violence has claimed 1,100 lives.
However, the country is resilient. David Pilling wrote perceptively last week in the Financial Times (registration required) that it's a country that refuses to fail. It is unlikely that Iran will be able to further their ambitions for aggrandisement this year or next. But, as with China, which has invested $248m in Balochistan's Gwadar port to protect its oil and gas supply routes in central Asia, the Iranians are in situ.
The concern is that, over the next decade, they will continue to stay there and that the western and eastern regions of the subcontinent – India's bulwarks – will find themselves under pressure.
Reversing the hostility of decades, India began negotiating with Bangladesh in 2009 to wrest the country out of China's insistent clutches. Delhi cannot budge on Kashmir, of which Arundhati Roy spoke bitterly this week, not because it fears Pakistan, but because it has long-term territorial concerns about China.
The building of an empire
Kashmir is India's land corridor to the borderlands of the Himalayas and there are four disputed areas, three of which border Tibet. The fourth, Arunachal Pradesh in the north-east, next door to Bhutan, is claimed by China. India's state security headache prima inter alia is the Maoist/Naxalite rebellion in the north-east, which quite possibly receives funding from Beijing.
Historically, the Persians and the Mongol Chinese have been at it before, because the subcontinent is fertile, and has abundant land as well as the advantage of prosperous seaports. The ancient tribal and Dravidian people of the subcontinent had to put up with wave after wave of Arya peoples from central Asia over 3,000 years ago. Colin Thubron in the Lost Heart of Asia states – wrongly, I think – that five million died in India as a result of Tamerlane's incursions from 1398.
At the start of the 16th century, Babur, the quasi-Persian prince from Transoxiana, began his progress into the rich and properous lands of northern India which heralded the Moghul empire.
The subcontinent has a habit in the past of splintering under outside pressure. However, this time, in the 21st century, if Pakistan, India and Bangladesh can recognise the external threats, they might see that their future is bound up with each other.
Catriona Luke is a freelance writer and editor.
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10 comments
Interesting article.
Not sure w.r.t the Pakistani Taliban, but certainly Iran has developed some contacts with the Afghan Taliban, as unlikely as it may sound. The Asia Times carried this article earlier this year:
"How Iran and al-Qaeda made a deal"
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD30Df01.html
Basically, the article states that in 2009 in exchange for the release of an Iranian diplomat (taken hostage by the Taliban), Iran released some senior al-Qaeda members whom it had been holding since they fled to Iran after the US invasion of Afghanistan.
Iranian intelligence, through intermediaries in Afghanistan, made contact with the Haqqanis who helped to facilitate the hostage swap. In return Iran provided the Haqqanis with anti-aircraft guns that were used to shoot down a few drones in North Waziristan.
Thus, even though the Iranians may despise the anti-Shia Taliban/al-Qaeda for the horrendous crimes they have committed against shias (in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), behind the scenes the two adversaries are in cahoots, to some extent.
The question is: supposing Iran has established reliable, long-term links to the Taliban, why would Iran want to use those links (or any other means) to destabilize Pakistan? Ties between the Iran and Pakistan are improving. Recently the two countries signed a multi-billion dollar gas pipeline project (IPI) which will be extended to either India or to China. A stable Pakistan is in Iran's interest if it wants to use Pakistan as a conduit for delivering engery resources to India and onwards to Bangladesh.
One can accept, however, that Iran wishes to destabilize Pakistani Balochistan where a new deep-water sea port named Gwadar has been built by the Chinese. This port is in direct competition with the Iranian Chabahar port which was developed with the help of the Indians. Both ports will compete to provide access to the Arabian Sea to the vast Central Asian oil/gas resources.
I thought the Iranian leadership didn't like the Taliban very much.
* The Taliban have a different interpretation of Islam.
* The Taliban killed 9 Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif on 11 September 1998
See "Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for 9 Diplomats' Deaths" at: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/11/world/iran-holds-taliban-responsible-f...
Dave C. 28 October 2010 at 18:17. I thought the Iranian leadership didn't like the Taliban very much.
Like you, I am very sceptical about the Iranians providing aid to the Taliban. Also, Iran is in a pretty dire economic state: it just doesn't have enough money to buy significant influence in these areas.
I think that the Iranians probably dislike the Taliban as James & Dave above pointed out, but...realpolitik trumps everything. And Iran might be in a pretty dire state economically, but that's down to misuse of the country's vast wealth.
What we tend not to see in the west is the split at the heart of Iranian society: to put it crudely, it's between Persians and Muslims. If you ever visit the National Museum in Tehran, you'll notice that it's split into two buildings-a small pre-Islamic collection, and a much larger collection exhibiting artefacts post the Islamic conquest: that's a source of real resentment amongst many Iranians who see their history as an ancient civilisation brushed over. It's also interesting that many educated Iranians are very, very pro-Western-there's still a huge reverence for Khomeini, but contempt (at best) for his cynical and demagogic successors. And this pro-Westernism isn't because the Shah is missed-but, a lot of older Iranians are pretty nostalgic for the time when a woman could leave house without a headscarf.
"...the Maoist/Naxalite rebellion in the north-east, which undoubtedly receives funding from Beijing."
Really! Do you have proof?
Crikey you really do have a scoop on your hands if you can prove that Beijing funds the Naxalites. Not even the great historian Ramachandra Guha has suggested such a link.
WOW Catriona either you are a first rate investigative journalist ...or you a vaccuous no-nothing imbecile. I'll leave the readership of NS to make up their minds.
Iran is just copying the US. That is sticking your nose in other countries' business.
Both are not very popular.
What a huge difference Masood would have made to his country. Such is life.
It seems that anyone who believes in liberty has only one choice - to support and ally themselves with India - imperfect though she may be, she is still a functioning democracy with an independent judiciary.
The alternatives - Islamicists of Iranian or taliban stamp, or a bunch of Communo-Fascist dictators speaking from Bejing - are too awful to contemplate.
John.
It was popular enough when the Japanese were knocking on your door.
This comprehensive summary of local geopolitics seems to have omitted a few of the key protagonists, the ones currently launching drone attacks and occupying Afghanistan, the ones rattle sabres at Iran. For them accusations of 'insistent clutches' are out of the question of course.