The real difference between the Milibands

What the brothers really disagree about is why Labour lost, and how it must change to win again.

For the first time in Labour's history, party members will return leadership ballots, which hit their doormats yesterday, without knowing who will win. That is because Ed Miliband rejected a Bobby Kennedy role, seeking to influence his brother's leadership from a kitchen-table seat. A significant political disagreement with his brother gave him reason to believe that his advice would seldom be taken.

That argument has finally moved to centre-stage as the campaign closes. It is not about different world-views -- both are social democrats who believe that Labour's mission is to narrow the gap in life chances, albeit with mildly different instincts about how to get there. And the brothers have resisted excessively personalising their fraternal battle, to the mutual frustration of some supporters.

What the Milibands really disagree about is why Labour lost and how to win again. Couching the argument in psephological number-crunching about the shifting class structure, they are playing out a deeper existential question about the party's strategy and public identity. What does "moving on" from New Labour mean, and how deep should it go? David Miliband warns that throwing out too much of a recently successful formula could mean a long spell in opposition; Ed Miliband fears that it is failing to recognise the scale of change needed which would keep the party from power.

David Miliband's campaign presents the election as a "head versus heart" choice. The idea that Ed Miliband is a "comfort zone" candidate irks John Denham, the Southampton MP who has focused most on Labour's southern challenge and who is leading on future policy development for Ed Miliband's campaign.

Denham warns that what he calls the "New Labour establishment" could fatally underestimate how much must change. "It is Ed Miliband who is the brave choice, who says 'we are going to have to change again as we changed before' against those who think we have still pretty much got it right and need to tweak things a bit to return to our winning formula," he says.

The sharpest argument in the party's inquest into May 2010 is not about this May but Labour's last victory five years earlier. Whether to treat that as a triumph or near-disaster could determine whether "change" is in a major or minor key. For Liam Byrne, the main election number cruncher backing David Miliband, the "simple fact" about 2005 is that "Labour won", with the historic 1997 New Labour coalition "sustained to carry Labour to victory once again". Byrne's Progress paper on the 2010 defeat argues that the lessons of 2005 were "much misunderstood", alluding to fierce internal arguments over the analysis he produced at Tony Blair's behest that autumn, just as New Labour factionalism hit new lows.

Contrast 2005 with 2010 and the message is "carry on New Labour". The recession, Gordon Brown's brooding presence and the MPs' expenses crisis all deepened a "time for a change" mood after 13 years in power. These one-off factors shall pass. Even in soberly assessing Labour's 29 per cent share, Byrne declares "our coalition was cracked but not broken".

Denham is unconvinced. A focus on the one million votes lost after 2005 "misses the point" of the four million votes lost before 2005. Thirty-five per cent could just be enough under first-past-the-post, if votes fall happily, but how often should Labour expect as unattractive an opponent as Michael Howard? In this view, Humpty-Dumpty cannot be put together again: the deep fracturing of New Labour's electoral coalition demands a more fundamental reappraisal.

New Labour already had a "one more heave" victory in 2005 and surely experienced a "one more heave" defeat in 2010. Gordon Brown ran on "change" yet failed to define it. Why? Ultimately, because he could see no viable alternative to the New Labour election playbook.

"We quickly defaulted to a textbook New Labour campaign," says Patrick Diamond, who worked at No 10 for both Blair and Brown. "Brown never took the chance to recast New Labour: was it that the opportunity didn't really exist, or was it a failure of imagination or courage?"

Diamond, who has not endorsed a leadership candidate, believes that the next leader must realise that a strategy of "consolidating New Labour modernisation" will fail. "It simply leaves too many questions unanswered" about a very different world, he says, and underestimates the coalition, too.

Core votes?

Premature obituaries for Labour now date back a half-century to the Must Labour Lose? Penguin special of 1960. New Labour escaped death by sociological treatise, yet now finds a sting in the tail. A party on 29 per cent is assumed to have "retreated" to its "core vote". Yes, even as Labour's vote fell across 2001, 2005 and 2010, each election produced the most balanced cross-class pattern of votes in the party's history. New Labour's professional support proved much more resilient than the so-called core vote, which collapsed.

"The core Labour vote that some thought could be taken for granted became the swing vote that went Conservative," wrote Ed Miliband in his recent Fabian essay. The dramatic post-1997 slump in DE share alone cost Labour 40 marginal seats in 2010: the difference between opposition and government.

But the former Scottish secretary Jim Murphy, co-chair of the David Miliband campaign, tells me: "A core vote strategy guarantees you opposition. It fails the Downing Street test. The road back to power isn't inverting the mistake of New Labour and describing that as a strategy." Yet the pejorative expression "core votes" is misapplied to those voters most likely to switch.

"It is dangerous to pretend that we don't need the middle classes," warns David Miliband. His brother could hardly disagree, but he does argue that New Labour has also understood the loss of middle-class support -- too often dismissing liberal critics as a noisy, unrepresentative Guardianista niche, though AB and C1 voters have been twice as likely to go yellow as blue. Labour's working-class and middle-class challenges mirror each other, in the scale of substantive policy change and symbolism required on both economics and social liberalism to reconnect.

This argument between the Milibands is often narrower than that between their supporters. David Miliband would represent more continuity than his brother, but knows that the next leader must credibly substantiate the claim to "change". His argument that "an alphabet analysis can lead you backwards into the triangulation politics which led to our downfall" signals his own critique of New Labour.

If the coalition lasts until 2015, the next election -- coming 18 years after 1997 -- would take place in a Britain as distant from Tony Blair's first victory as that landslide was from Maggie Thatcher's defeat of Jim Callaghan. The new leader might find inspiration in the history of how Labour built a broad winning coalition in 1997, 1966 or 1945. But they will have to build Labour's next governing majority for themselves.

Sunder Katwala is general secretary of the Fabian Society.

Sunder Katwala is director of British Future and former general secretary of the Fabian Society.

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Ansbach puts Europe's bravest politician under pressure

Angela Merkel must respond to a series of tragedies and criticisms of her refugee policy. 

Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, is supposed to be on holiday. Two separate attacks have put an end to that. The first, a mass shooting in Munich, was at first widely believed to be a terrorist attack, but later turned out to be the actions of a loner obsessed with US high school shootings. The second, where a man blew himself up in the town of Ansbach, caused less physical damage - three were seriously injured, but none killed. Nevertheless, this event may prove to affect even more people's lives. Because that man had come to Germany claiming to be a Syrian refugee. 

The attack came hours after a Syrian refugee murdered a pregnant Polish woman, a co-woker in a snack bar, in Reutlingen. All eyes will now be on Merkel who, more than any other European politician, is held responsible for Syrian refugees in Europe.

In 2015, when other European states were erecting barriers to keep out the million migrants and refugees marching north, Merkel kept Germany's borders open. The country has resettled 41,899 Syrians since 2013, according to the UNHCR, of which 20,067 came on humanitarian grounds and 21,832 through private sponsorship. That is twice as much as the UK has pledged to resettle by 2020. The actual number of Syrians in Germany is far higher - 90 per cent of the 102,400 Syrians applying for EU asylum in the first quarter of 2016 were registered there. 

Merkel is the bravest of Europe's politicians. Contrary to some assertions on the right, she did not invent the refugee crisis. Five years of brutal war in Syria did that. Merkel was simply the first of the continent's most prominent leaders to stop ignoring it. If Germany had not absorbed so many refugees, they would still be in central Europe and the Balkans, and we would be seeing even more pictures of starved children in informal camps than we do today. 

Equally, the problems facing Merkel now are not hers alone. These are the problems facing all of Europe's major states, whether or not they recognise them. 

Take the failed Syrian asylum seeker of Ansbach (his application was rejected but he could not be deported back to a warzone). In Germany, his application could at least be considered, and rejected. Europe as a whole has not invested in the processing centres required to determine who is a Syrian civilian, who might be a Syrian combatant and who is simply taking advantage of the black market in Syrian passports to masquerade as a refugee. 

Secondly, there is the subject of trauma. The Munich shooter appears to have had no links to Islamic State or Syria, but his act underlines the fact you do not need a grand political narrative to inflict hurt on others. Syrians who have experienced unspeakable violence either in their homeland or en route to Europe are left psychologically damaged. That is not to suggest they will turn to violence. But it is still safer to offer such people therapy than leave them to drift around Europe, unmonitored and unsupported, as other countries seem willing to do. 

Third, there is the question of lawlessness. Syrians have been blamed for everything from the Cologne attacks in January to creeping Islamist radicalisation. But apart from the fact that these reports can turn out to be overblown (two of the 58 men arrested over Cologne were Syrians), it is unclear what the alternative would be. Policies that force Syrians underground have already greatly empowered Europe's network of human traffickers and thugs.

So far, Merkel seems to be standing her ground. Her home affairs spokesman, Stephan Mayer, told the BBC that Germany had room to improve on its asylum policy, but stressed each attack was different. 

He said: "Horrible things take place in Syria. And it is the biggest humanitarian catastrophe, so it is completely wrong to blame Angela Merkel, or her refugee policies, for these incidents." Many will do, all the same.