Why the Afghan surge will fail
The Taliban will bide their time and emerge undefeated.
By George Eaton Published 14 February 2010 16:28
As the "surge" begins in Afghanistan, we are told that there are early signs of success in the Nato coalition's final attempt to defeat the Taliban. But while it is true to say that in some areas -- such as the town of Marjah, in Helmand -- the Taliban appear to be giving up land without a fight, the weaknesses of the US military plan remain clear.
As the US ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, pointed out in leaked cables to President Obama, the sanctuaries that matter most to the Taliban are not in Afghanistan at all, but just across the border in Pakistan. So long as they can hold on to these strongholds, the Taliban will bide their time and regroup once US troops begin to withdraw in 18 months' time.
The group's oft-quoted boast that "Nato has all the watches, but we have all the time" rings truer than ever.
The Taliban have learned from experience to avoid costly hand-to-hand combat, but as the assault proceeds they are likely to return and target the new Afghan security forces with roadside bombs and suicide attacks.
The surge in Afghanistan is closely modelled on that in Iraq, but is unlikely to meet with similar success. The key factor in the success of the Iraqi surge was the US recruitment of Saddam Hussein's old Sunni militias to police some of the most violent enclaves. After several years of vicious sectarian warfare, Iraq's Sunni minority had come to fear Shia militias and Iran more than the US occupation forces, and formed the "awakening councils" in response.
Yet such conditions and incentives do not exist in Afghanistan, where the Pashtuns, who dominate the Taliban, are by far the largest ethnic group and face no major sectarian or regional threat to their interests. Any attempt to "buy off" the insurgents is likely to fail, as anti-occupation sentiment shows no sign of diminishing.
At best, the surge will provide the political cover necessary for Barack Obama to withdraw with some semblance of dignity. In the meantime, the Taliban are content to sit this battle out, aware that they can strike back at a more opportune moment.
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7 comments
A war is not winnable if the Strategy is wrong.
David Straherne documents how the buildup to Iraq in Washington was a response to Peak Oil fears (in The Last Oil Shock) with minutes from meetings.
One thus has to ask, What if the $6TR that Jo Stiglitz calculated as being spent on this war had been spent on renewable energy research?
Most likely a problem solved rather then a problem created.
Why is there hardly any mention of the TAPI pipeline in the mainstream media. Am I wrong in thinking that the main reason for securing and dominating the ground is to allow construction of the TAPI pipeline to begin.
My name is R and I am from south Afghanistan. Half my family still in Helmand, the way the writer said is absolutely true. It is almost opposite of Iraq, here Pashtun were taken out of power because as he is rightly mentioned that Shia scared that Sunni would be again gain power as the used to in past.
There is no doubt that the Americans will not captured this so called Marja but the problems once the captured it, then it will be hard to maintain it secure.
Good article. I'm not at all convinced that the Taliban is beaten or that it won't continue to be a threat for quite some time to come. Very depressing.
what happened to your second paragraph?
We are fighting an undefined force without uniforms. In the eyes of our enemies in the middle east we are infidels that are defiling their land. Their war is a holy war with a resolve far greater than ours. Our precious men and women are nothing more than targets while the invisible enemy has every advantage of stealth and time. We may win an occational battle but we will never win this war.
There is another important reason why Britain won't "win" the Afghan military campaign. It is illegal under UK law.
Government lawyers have been asked to look at a crucial question that Goldsmith overlooked before the Iraq War.
The pivotal point in understanding the Government's current difficulty is considering the terms we use for violence with political motives. One is "miliatary action". Another is "terrorism".
And there lies the UK Government's problem. The Afghan campaign meets the tests for "terrorism" laid out in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Consequently a range of serious offences have, arguably, been committed by UK politicians, civil servants and military personnel.
I consider that no UK Government in the 21st Century can indefinitely sustain a military campaign knowing that it is acting unlawfully in terms of UK law. In time Truth will out.
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