Commons confidential

Miliband loses the X factor

The mystery of who will head Labour's election campaign has been solved by Gordon Brown's conduct in private sessions. A snout muttered that Broon bestowed control on the assassin-turned-praetorian Lord Mandelson by opening the inaugural gathering with: "Right, Peter, what's our strategy?" Lord Mandy of Epithets has more titles than the darts champ Phil "The Power" Taylor, but I hear he fancies another bauble to announce his campaign status.

Dome-headed Eric Pickles is known to Cameroon Doctor Who fans as "the Sontaran". Disloyal Tories wonder if their chairman and the stocky humanoids were separated at birth. A Sontaran's weakness is a "probic vent" on the back of the neck; Pickles's weakness is meat pies. Dave's pet northerner is still the shadow cabinet's undisputed heavyweight after his latest diet ended like all the rest -- in failure.

Are the whips going soft? The Rasputin-like Nick "Newcastle" Brown recently allowed Labour bruisers to hold a charity cake sale in the party's Lubyanka. Jokes were being made about the MP for Eccles and about the Tory John Butterfill, until in wandered the West Midlands whip John Spellar. Spellar, who sees the dark cloud in every silver lining, declared that the office was supposed to cook votes, not sell cakes.

Zac Goldsmith, Tory playboy, has hired the PR manager Ian Monk (whose clients include the Band of the Coldstream Guards) to salvage his election attempt. After his tax-dodging revelations, Goldenboy may need the marines to win the seat in Richmond Park.

David Miliband, the MP for South Shields, has lost the X factor. The Foreign Secretary refused to add his name to a motion hailing the local hero Joe McElderry's singing success. Milibanana said constitutional convention dictates that very important ministers don't sign Commons motions. But Westminster's inner workings went over constituents' heads. At a Tyneside hostelry, one disgruntled drinker accused the MP of a heinous Geordie crime: favouring Strictly over X Factor.

Best wishes for a speedy recovery to the carrot-crunching farming minister Jim Fitzpatrick, who has undergone a face operation. An unkind colleague opined that the veggie was lucky to have a spare, having been born with two.

Kevin Maguire is associate editor (politics) of the Daily Mirror

 

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Kevin Maguire is Associate Editor (Politics) on the Daily Mirror and author of our Commons Confidential column on the high politics and low life in Westminster. An award-winning journalist, he is in frequent demand on television and radio and co-authored a book on great parliamentary scandals. He was formerly Chief Reporter on the Guardian and Labour Correspondent on the Daily Telegraph.

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Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

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