Will to power

Keith Pearson explains how Nietzsche went about overcoming the prejudices of the philosophers

Nietzsche devotes a lot of his intellectual energy to exposing and attacking what he takes to be the philosophers’ naive trust in immediate certainties: the ‘I’ that thinks, the ‘I’ that wills and considers itself a miraculous causa sui, and so on.

His theory of will to power is designed to work against these immediate certainties even though it itself sounds like an immediate certainty.

In Human, All too Human, published in 1878 Nietzsche had declared that all is representation and that no intuition can take us any further. From this it follows for him that all is to be understood in terms of mechanical necessity and causal determinism.

Ethics (practical reason) is thrown out of the window at this point in his thinking and the imperative is simply ‘do not judge but be just’. Nietzsche is not yet ‘anti-Christ’; on the contrary, this Nietzsche says we should imitate Christ!

By the time of Beyond Good and Evil (1886) we have a quite different Nietzsche. There is not only representation; there is not simply mechanical necessity and causal determinism.

There is also the will to power, or the mechanical or material world seen from inside. The will to power for Nietzsche is the ‘primary’ cause of all things, the real cause, and it is a pathos (feeling), the most primal or primordial affect there is.

On the face of it, the will to power sounds completely and utterly human: what is more ‘human’ than to say that people want power?

The difficulty is that Nietzsche is not saying this, but trying to develop a theory or doctrine that goes against our ingrained habits of representation and valuation.

Nietzsche develops the will to power as a doctrine of psychology, physiology, morphology, and evolution, but in no sense is this to be understood in terms of a theory of human psychology which would give us the cardinal drive of human agency in terms of a subject (and I or ego: ‘will’) wanting an object it lacks, ‘power’.

This is what we have to try and think, and it is very difficult. It is difficult because of language: as Nietzsche says, we will not get rid of God until we get rid of grammar.

He holds that an appeal to something like the will to power needs to be made owing to the deficiencies of mechanism.

Mechanical events, he argues, are active only to the extent that energy is a feature of them, and, moreover, this energy cannot simply be construed as the effect of matter but only of ‘will’ (the will to life which is a will to power conceived as an insatiable desire to manifest power, a creative drive for growth and expansion, a releasing of force or energy, and so on).

This is not a monism but a radical pluralism. The will to power is essentially a principle of the synthesis of forces, functioning as a plastic principle in the sense that it is no wider than what it conditions, never separable from particular determined forces or from their quantities, qualities, and directions. It is always plastic and changing.

The fundamental prejudice of natural science is to think it has understood and explained the world when it has broken it down into discrete components such as atomic, quantifiable units.

But the idea that only a scientific (mechanistic) approach can comprehend the 'meaning' of things on account of its ability to calculate and weigh things, to see and touch them is, Nietzsche says, 'a crudity and naiveté, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy'.

A purely quantitative world – which is what mechanism gives us - would be 'rigid, unmoving, dead'.

Nietzsche is not seeking to restore the discredited idea of purpose or teleology. His point is rather that the world cannot be explained solely on the basis of a hypothesis which posits entirely passive events (all atomic motions and combinations are caused by impact from other atoms that happen to move).

This is to deprive natural events of sense or meaning, like reducing music to formulas and then claiming that on this basis we can ‘comprehend’ music.

Our habit of thinking in terms of a subject or ego is partly a result of the habit we have of taking a 'mnemonic' (an abbreviated formula) to be denoting a real entity and as a cause of action as when we say of lightning 'it flashes'; we do the same with the fiction of the will, the belief that every activity presupposes an agent (as something essential that does not vanish in the multiplicity of change).

When we speak of substances and faculties – the Ego, the Will, etc – we are engaged in fabrication. We are distorting and simplifying processes and events that are much more complex than our categories and established modes of thinking enable us to appreciate.

Nietzsche proposes we make the body and physiology the starting-point instead: “Essential to start from the body and use it as a guiding thread. It is the far richer phenomenon, and can be observed more distinctly”. The body has evolved in terms of “a prodigious alliance of living beings”.

It is a magnificent binding together of the most diverse life, the ordering and arrangement of the higher and lower activities, a thousand-fold obedience which is not blind, even less mechanical, but a shrewd, selecting, considerate, even resistant obedience.

Measured by intellectual standards, this whole phenomenon “body” is as superior to our consciousness, our “mind”, our conscious thinking, feeling, willing, as algebra is superior to the times tables.

Every living thing strives to be and become what it is: an augmentation of power in which pleasure is simply the symptom of the feeling of power achieved, or a consciousness of difference.

It is not really happiness we seek, for Nietzsche, but rather the pleasure to be had from power, that is, mastery and the overcoming of obstacles and resistances. Compared to the pre-human Nietzsche thinks that the human represents a tremendous quantum of power, not an increment of happiness.

Nietzsche thinks that the doctrine of the will to power has an intellectual integrity lacking in other accounts of the world: it probes deeper, it doesn’t offer a conception of the world and ourselves that will flatter us or appeal to our vanity.

Furthermore, something like the will to power can enable us to think ‘beyond good and evil’, that is, outside the simple-mindedness of moral judgement and moral fanaticism, allowing for a much richer – and more honest - appreciation of the economy of life and the full range of human affects that have made the human animal what it is.

3 comments

Juno's picture

I find the relationship between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche very fascinating. Both are attempting to explain human nature by recourse to a "will"; on the one hand, Schopenhauer's is a blind, irrational, unintelligent force and underlying reality, manifesting itself in all types of representations, including humans; and on the other hand, Nietzsche's interpretation of this "will" is an almost teleological force at work in the world.

Schopenhauer sees this Will as the source of all suffering (not dissimilar to the Buddha) and recommends an almost ascetic life in order to find peace. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees the positive side, so to speak, of this Will, and believes that both the suffering and satisfaction that this Will engenders is to be embraced in order to live life to the fullest.

Obviously, Schopenhauer was the pessimist and Nietzsche the optimist; but I can't help thinking that Schopenhauer is being the more honest - or authentic, if you like - with regard to the reality of nature and of human nature.

Do you think Nietzsche argues convincingly for his interpretation?

Best,
Juno

Keith Pearson1's picture

I very much appreciate your comment and also find the relation between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche fascinating. Nietzsche certainly has a huge debt to Schopenhauer and continued to admire aspects of his thinking even when he breaks from him in his later philosophy. He says he admires his 'Englishness' and lack of German philosophical style, that is, his sense for hard facts and his penchant for clarity and reason. And he admires him for his honest atheism. However, I think understanding the reasons why Nietzsche takes issue with Schopenhauer's metaphysics and pessimism contains a most valuable lesson that is still worth learning. For Niietzsche, Schopenhauer's thinking still responds to 'the metaphysical need', a need Nietzsche think we are better off renouncing, giving up on 'the first and last things' and devoting our energies and knowledge to the 'closest things. In short, Schopenhauer's philosophy typifies for Nietzsche where we go astray in our thinking, and I agree with him on this: the concepts and problems, such as the unprovable doctrine of the 'One' will, the denial of the individual (at bottom all lions are one lion, Nietzsche says!), and the simple-minded nature in which Schopenhauer advocates an ethics of compassion (as a 'moral mircale' Nietzsche says), are too large. We cannot digest them, let alone think or prove them. Nietzsche wants us to develop a new taste, a taste for modest propositions against the immodest ones of metaphysics and 'morality'. Nietzsche thinks we cannot in fact disavow the 'will', which is why he says that pessmists and Buddhists would rather will nothingness than not will at all. Nietzsche does not believe Schopenhauer when he says that the effort is to renounce the will - or maybe it comes by an act of grace and saintliness (which is not credible for Nietzsche) - and attain nothingness. His criticism is a psychological one, as well as physiological. It's not then simply a question of assessing whether Schopenhauer's philosophy is true or correct; this would be too simple. We need to ask other kinds of questions of it, and for Nietzsche these come from philology, physiology, psychology, and the historical sense. Schopenhauer, and those who think like him, seem to want salvation or at least a resolution to the questionable character of existence. Nietzsche understand this need, but recommends we see it for what it is and give it up. Nietzsche simply takes joy from dwelling in the question or the questionable character, being equal to it, and living the difficulty or complexity of the human condition. To attain nothingness - supposing such a state is psychologically plausible or credible - would be to turn one's back on existence, to disavow the human, and Nietzsche thinks this is nihilism at its worst and most despicable. Is it not an easy way out of the problem? For Nietzsche what we are denying is what we are: our weddedness to the earth, to the body, to the senses, to transience, to growth, to decay, to mortality, to finitude, etc. Nietzsche applauds the move Schopenhauer tried to make with his doctrine of the will in this key respect: that it cannot be given the traditional names of the good and the blessed. However, he thinks Schopenhauer then makes the wrong move. If this will to life cannot be said anymore to be God, does it follow that it is bad, stupid, and reprehensible (which is what Schopenhauer teaches in his doctrine of the denial of this will)? Schopenhauer remains entangled in the Christian-moral ideal for Nietzsche and failed to see that there are a variety of ways in which we can deify this will or life force/energy (there are a variety of ways he says of being 'god'). Nietzsche's god, of course, is Dionysus, the eternal return of life, or the yes to life over and above death and change, the future heralded and conscerated in the past. I don't, finally, think it's correct to say Nietzsche is an optimist. His advocates a 'pessimism of strength' in contrast to the nihilistic and pessmistic devaluation of life he thinks Schopenhauer provides of existence. So his philosophy remains a 'tragic' one even in its later developments, a tragic affirmation. The serenity or cheerfulness of the free spirit comes from the depths. As Nietzsche says, remain true to the earth, that is, true to the human. Even the overhuman or superhuman needs to do this, must do it.

my best wishes, Keith Pearson

davef's picture

I'm sorry - I'm not quite sure about what you mean by 'pessimism of strength'.

Latest tweets