New Hampshire primary: what to look out for

Mitt Romney needs to prove that he can win big but South Carolina may be the real ticket.

Following his narrowest of victories in the Iowa caucus last week, Republican front-runner Mitt Romney is under pressure to prove the strength of his presidential bid in the New Hampshire primary on Tuesday. But according to a tracking poll of Granite State voters his support is slipping here too, however probably not enough to deny him victory.

The six Republican candidates took to the stage together this weekend for the second round of debates. They started in Saint Anselm College, Manchester on Saturday followed by a second debate on Sunday sponsored by NBC News, just 12 hours later. The dialogue quickly turned from policy -- the economy and same-sex marriages -- to personal jibes.

Newt Gingrich, who came fourth in the Iowa race, attempted to embarrass Romney by telling him to "drop the pious baloney" when challenging him about his political history. The former house speaker himself came under fire after Ron Paul called him a "chicken hawk" for not serving in the military during the Vietnam war.

Gingrich -- who is currently placed in fourth in the national opinion polls once again -- has attempted to reach out to minorities during his campaigning in New Hampshire saying in Manchester yesterday:

I think it is very important for us to make a case that we are in favour of many people from many places having the opportunity to become Americans.

He added that while visas should be made easier for "legal people", deportation should also be made easier for people who "are dangerous to the whole community and who threaten the whole community".

Despite the dip, Romney remains a clear winner in the polls, making this a second and third place contest for the other candidates.

Politico's Jonathan Martin argues that New Hampshire is just a stepping stone towards the much more significant South Carolina vote later this month. In a post published this morning, Martin writes:

New Hampshire still matters. But its 2012 relevance is chiefly in how the results will shape South Carolina on Jan. 21.
With Mitt Romney enjoying a wide lead in Granite State polls, the key outcome Tuesday isn't who will finish on top. Rather, it's whether Jon Huntsman places strongly enough to keep going to South Carolina and whether Rick Santorum can outperform Newt Gingrich.

The key is to rally party supporters, and while Romney attempted to show that he had the party's support in Iowa, the eight vote difference between him and Rick Santorum proved otherwise. Santorum's candidacy provides the right with a strong alternative to Romney; if the former Pennsylvania senator can outperform the other candidates again tomorrow night, a strong case can be made in South Carolina that he's the one the right should rally around to stop Romney.

Meanwhile Jon Hunstman, who finished second to last in Iowa, seems to be gaining support following his better-than-usual performance during Sunday morning's debate. According to the New York Times Caucus Blog, Huntsman, the former governor of Utah, is counting on last minute voters tomorrow. The latest WMUR New Hampshire poll, gives Huntsman 11 per cent of the vote, tying him in third place with Santorum.

Ron Paul, who is currently second in the polls with 17 per cent, also reached out to undecided voters stating that he believed he appealed to "independent people who are sick and tired of the two-party system". When asked how he would bridge the partisan divide as president Paul answered:

With difficulty, but with a new approach, completely new... Everybody knows what I'm talking about is different, because I have such a strange, new idea. It's obeying the Constitution.

Rick Perry is almost certainly out of the race with a mere one per cent of the vote, but a last minute confidence burst during the debates may swing some votes in his favour.

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Why Russia holds the key to resolving the North Korea crisis

China is propping up North Korea’s economy, but it seems to get little influence in return.

For more than half a century, China has seen North Korea as a dangerous irritant as much as an asset. It might be useful for keeping the United States off guard, and regarded as an essential buffer by the military establishment, but China would happily ditch it if there were a better option.

The North Korean regime has tended to be characterised as uniquely irrational and unpredictable. From its perspective, however, its behaviour makes eminent sense: in fact, its argument for developing a nuclear capability closely echoes the rationale of the great powers. It has no declared intent to launch a first strike, but as long as others have nuclear weapons, North Korea reasons they serve a deterrent function. The regime also argues, as others have, that there are associated benefits with civil nuclear power.  

The long history of North Korea’s nuclear programme follows a recognisable path, previously trodden by Israel, India and Pakistan. It goes from the ambition, formed in the mind of North Korea’s founding dictator, Kim Il-sung, through the long years of a clandestine programme, to the gradual revelation of a reasonably mature, if relatively small, nuclear capability. Signalling is also an element in deterrence. The regime is certainly unpleasant and destabilising, but it is a mistake to imagine that there is no clear purpose and no plan.

The dynasty began life as a Soviet puppet, sandwiched between a powerful USSR and a weak China. But from the start, Kim Il-sung’s muscular nationalism and concern for regime survival suggested that he was unlikely to be a docile dependent of either. His attempt to unify the peninsula by force in 1950 led to a bloody war in which Mao Zedong was obliged to come to his rescue. In the course of that war, “fire and fury” did indeed rain down on North Korea: the US dropped as much ordnance on North Korea as it had during the whole of the Second World War Pacific theatre, including the carpet bombing of Japan. To this day, any building site in Pyongyang is likely to turn up some unexploded ordnance. North Korea was born in a rain of fire, which it has incorporated into its national story.

The regime succeeded in maintaining relations with both its patrons through the dramas and tensions of the Sino-Soviet split to the end of the Cold War. But as Kim Il-sung contemplated the future survival of his regime, he concluded that a nuclear programme was essential insurance, both against his major enemies (the US and South Korea) and any territorial ambitions or excessive demands from China or Russia.

China was and remains North Korea’s major ally, but that does not make North Korea obedient. Their bilateral history is a story of growing defiance and increasing alienation: Kim Il-sung ignored Mao Zedong’s attempt to dissuade him from naming his eldest son, Kim Jong-il, as his successor. He had visited Beijing once a year and had promised that his son would follow suit, but Kim Jong-il only visited Deng Xiaoping’s China once, in 1983. His next visit came three years after Deng’s death, a death for which Kim had offered no formal condolences, as even the most minimal protocol required. 

On that visit, Kim heard the unwelcome news that China, already closer to the United States than he would have wished, was to open relations with his bitter rival, South Korea. When the third dynastic leader, the young Kim Jong-un, took power in 2011, relations with China slid further. Tellingly, Kim Jong-un has not visited Beijing at all, nor has China’s leader, President Xi Jinping, visited Pyongyang, although he has held four summit meetings with South Korea.

Kim Jong-un has made his defiance publicly evident. Not only has he chosen to test his missiles and weapons, but he has selected such highly sensitive moments as last year’s G20 summit in Hangzhou to do so.

China is propping up North Korea’s economy, but it seems to get little influence in return, and the value of the relationship has long been openly questioned by China’s foreign policy analysts. China has had little success in encouraging the regime to loosen controls on the economy and make limited market reforms.

 In the current crisis, China has consistently urged restraint, while co-operating with the tightening of UN sanctions. Beijing’s attitude, however, remains ambivalent: it doubts that sanctions will be effective, and is highly sensitive to US suggestions that Chinese companies that breach sanctions would be subject to punitive measures.  For China, the dangers of bringing North Korea to the edge of collapse are greater than the difficulties of seeking another solution.

Today, North Korea’s relations with Russia are warmer than those with Beijing and if President Trump is serious in his search for someone to solve his North Korea problem for him, he could do worse than to call his friend Mr Putin. No doubt there would be a price, but perhaps Trump would have less difficulty in appeasing Russia than in making concessions to Kim Jong-un. 

In July this year, China and Russia put forward a proposal that both sides should make concessions. North Korea would suspend its nuclear and its missile testing in return for a suspension of South Korea’s annual military exercises with the United States. Buried in the joint statement was the assertion that third parties should not negatively affect the interests of other countries.

Both China and Russia aim to reduce US influence in Asia, an ambition greatly aided to date by Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, conceived as a vehicle of US influence; his treatment of long-standing US allies; and his decision to withdraw the US from the Paris agreement on climate change.

Today the US seems poised between demanding that China solve the North Korea problem and beginning a trade war with Beijing. China’s challenge on the Korean peninsula, always difficult, has grown even greater.

Isabel Hilton is the CEO of the China Dialogue Trust

This article first appeared in the 17 August 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Trump goes nuclear