Egypt's liberals face the worst-case scenario

The country's first democratic elections have produced an unappealing run-off between the Islamist c

All eyes are on Egypt again, as the world marks the end to another Arab spring narrative with the country’s first genuine multi-candidate elections.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Hilton Clinton congratulated the people on “seizing the promise of last years’ uprising.” With ink-stained fingers, millions of Egyptians should have been celebrating being one step closer to the military junta handing over power to a civil authority.

When the results came in, Egypt was in shock. Two candidates will face each other in a runoff election on 16-17 June: the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Mursi and Mubarak’s last prime minister Ahmed Shafiq.

For many, in particularly the leftists and liberal movements, this was a worst-case scenario: a reactionary Islamist versus a former member of the Mubarak regime. Fears by protesters that their revolution has been hijacked by power-hungry political forces was sharply brought into focus.  This in turn has lead to the growth of a reactive activism. 

 “I voted for Hamdeen Sabbahi,” says Mustafa, 45, a taxi driver from Cairo, referring to one of the left-leaning presidential candidates. “Why? Because he’s not Feloul [remnant of Mubarak’s regime] or an Islamist and he has a better chance than the other secular contestants.”

When questioned about the policy specifics of this particular presidential contender, who ended up coming third in the running, Mustafa admitted he did not know or care. “Look,” he said to me, “my fear is being ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood who betrayed us or by a Mubarak man.  And I want the army to go.”

This would become the familiar response across the capital’s polling stations. Although the candidate choice may change, the resounding phrase was “ahsan il-wahsheen”: the best of the worst. A runoff between Mursi and Shafiq, for revolutionaries, is a worst of the worse scenario.

Power plays

The current political context of these elections is a telling indication of the trouble Egypt is in. The country still does not have a constitution, meaning the upcoming president has no job description. The ill-fated constituent assembly was suspended on 10 April, 2012, after elected members, including liberals, representatives of Egypt’s Islamic and Christian institutions and the judiciary, staged a mass walkout.  Attempts to revamp a Constitutional Declaration written by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in March last year, in order to tailor it to a civilian president failed.  

Consequently, according to the military document, the new president is assigned all the roles the SCAF have enjoyed minus two sub-points: the ability to author legislation and public policy.

This means presidential campaigns have been busy unveiling socio-economic programs for Egypt, that no one can hand-on-heart, say they are able to implement. The public, arguably, voted blind.

While the country’s emerging political forces continue to jockey for power and privileges, the ruling military council has throughout the year waged a counter-revolution campaign, violently putting down street protests.

One of the most worrying and overlooked developments was the single largest mass arrest of protesters since the start of the revolution on 4 May, as orchestrated by the SCAF. Hundreds are currently facing military trials, a practise illegal under International Human Rights law, where defendants, with practically no legal representation, are quickly handed harsh jail sentences by army judges.

As the country’s revolutionary forces continue to face marginalisation from the formal political arena, proponents of change wonder what happened to the informal community of Tahrir Square during the 18 days, where people imagined a new Egypt?

A reactive street

Street action has, arguably, become reactive, as typified by the 4 May clashes between the military police and protesters. That particular demonstration had been called in response to a thug attack on a separate sit-in in front of the defence ministry.

“We didn’t believe in the initial cause of the sit-in, many chose not to join us that Friday but what do you do when people die?” asks Ahmed, 25, an engineering student, whose friends were briefly detained. “Do you let blood be spilled?”

What ensued was a chain of kneejerk protests and multiple incidences of arrests, a recurring pattern in Egypt since November’s street battles with police.

The presidential elections similarly encouraged a reactive response to engagement in formal politics.

Minority groups, in particular felt the pressure.  As Coptic multimedia journalist Simon Hanna explained, churches called on Egypt’s Christians to throw their support behind former-regime figure Ahmed Shafiq.  Escalating violence against the Christian community, including recent burning of churches, he explained, is perceived by many to have become more prevalent after the ouster of Mubarak.

“They feel very vulnerable right now, they believe Shafiq as president is going to be strong enough to counteract the Islamists, which is a tangible fear.” 

Revolutionaries began to change tack, when opinion polls declared former regime members and Islamist candidates were the presidential frontrunners. “I boycotted the November parliamentary elections, I thought it was the right thing to do at the time,” says Nadim Amin, a protester who became part of labour lawyer Khalid Ali’s presidential campaign.

“But not now – we could not afford to not to get involved. When there is fighting people come to the streets, when there is an election people head to the ballot box,” Nadim explained.

In an unexpected turn of events, high-profile revolutionaries, such as Ahmed Harara, an iconic figure of the revolution who lost both his eyes in street battles with the police, came out in support of “middle way” presidential candidates such as Hamdeen Sabbahi.

Growth on the ground

The very decision to field a “revolutionary candidate”, a reformist action, Mohamed Waked, member of the National Front for Citizens and Democracy, believes could have aborted revolution had they succeeded in assuming power.

“The elections are a corrupt process, if you get into it, it will corrupt you – the military are going to control all the upcoming president’s mandates,” said Waked, explaining how it will be impossible for the next president to separate himself from the autocratic state.

At the same time, Waked says “the army would be able to say: look, you had the revolution, you got your man in power, now go home.”

As musician and producer Omar Kamal, who boycotted the elections, put it: “You have got the same APCs that ran protesters over in the October 2011 Maspero violence, driving around Tahrir Square with military personal on top asking people to do their ‘national duty’ and vote.”

This co-opting of the revolution by the military regime is another threat the revolutionary movement is facing. Tahrir square, the bastion of Egypt’s uprising, became a problematic space when in February, the police and military began telling protesters they were “allowed” to protest in the space.

The co-opting of the revolutionary symbol is indicative of several attempts by the military junta to appropriate, and therefore abort, revolutionary campaigns and movements. 

All is not lost though, believes Waked. Since the people took Tahrir on January 25, the country has developed a “revolutionary condition”, he explains. When things are not right, people, however problematically, come to streets.

“This state of rebellion stretches across Egypt and transcends so many different political spaces now, from strikes to neighbourhood politics,” Waked emphasises, arguing that gauging the pulse of the revolution via Tahrir is misleading.

Although, the iconic downtown square is not defunct. “The language of politics in Egypt means that every now and then, protesters must come and present their case in Tahrir, it signals something wrong.”

Industrial action, Waked believes is the future of the uprising. Fatma Ramadan, of the Workers movements agrees.

“The workers will save the revolution,” she says, “if the labour movement continues to independently unionise and become politicised, then we would be able to affect production inside of Egypt thereby affecting change in the country.”

She went on to say that the future of the revolution is bound up with the future of the workers movement: “you can’t talk about them separately.  We will only be successful if we can marry social forces with political forces.”

There has been much criticism of the workers movement, particularly after the failed February 11, 2012 general strike. The hodgepodge of a student-called day of civil disobedience, boycotts and a call for a general strike flopped. Although the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions lent their signature to the student-led initiative, only one factory staged a strike.

Nevertheless, Ramadan explains that it showed the start of an important connect. The fledgling student movement, which has been effectively challenging oppressive university bylaws, was reaching out. The students, recognised, Ramadan said, if not a bit naively, the strength in working together and the vital role of the labour movement has in the ongoing revolution. These connections have also started to happen with the farmers.

The fellahin (peasants) and trade unions, for the first time in Egyptian history are working together, by drafting articles for Egypt’s constitution. Shahinda Maqlad, head of the Independent Farmers Federation, paints a grim picture of Egypt’s agricultural sector prior to the January 25 Revolution, characterised by poor government planning, oppressive policies and general apathy towards the plight of the fellahin.

Farmers, who are beginning to unionise, are now calling for substantial policy changes, highlighting the need for subsistence agricultural policies in their proposed constitutional articles.

 “To be independent you have to find a way to make your own living and so Egypt needs to be able to feed itself," Maqlad explains. She sees the farmers’ demands as being bound up with the gradual rebuilding of Egypt as a key player in the region.“ Once revolutionaries begin to draw connections between their grievances and those of the fellahin and workers – across every sector of society -we will have strength to truly to realise our demands,” Maqlad believes.

After all, she stresses, echoing Waked, “The revolution is not just in the square, it is everywhere.“

Egypt’s presidential elections did not offer the attractive photo finish that international media would have wanted but there is a danger of becoming too reductively pessimistic.

While the political elite continues to play a short-term game, grassroots initiatives are laying the groundwork to affect real change. Historically change is a long and hard process: “This is a two to three year long battle,” concludes Waked, “If you know understand and appreciate that we have a much longer fight, much of the depression and the panic will go away.”

Ukip's Nigel Farage and Paul Nuttall. Photo: Getty
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Is the general election 2017 the end of Ukip?

Ukip led the way to Brexit, but now the party is on less than 10 per cent in the polls. 

Ukip could be finished. Ukip has only ever had two MPs, but it held an outside influence on politics: without it, we’d probably never have had the EU referendum. But Brexit has turned Ukip into a single-issue party without an issue. Ukip’s sole remaining MP, Douglas Carswell, left the party in March 2017, and told Sky News’ Adam Boulton that there was “no point” to the party anymore. 

Not everyone in Ukip has given up, though: Nigel Farage told Peston on Sunday that Ukip “will survive”, and current leader Paul Nuttall will be contesting a seat this year. But Ukip is standing in fewer constituencies than last time thanks to a shortage of both money and people. Who benefits if Ukip is finished? It’s likely to be the Tories. 

Is Ukip finished? 

What are Ukip's poll ratings?

Ukip’s poll ratings peaked in June 2016 at 16 per cent. Since the leave campaign’s success, that has steadily declined so that Ukip is going into the 2017 general election on 4 per cent, according to the latest polls. If the polls can be trusted, that’s a serious collapse.

Can Ukip get anymore MPs?

In the 2015 general election Ukip contested nearly every seat and got 13 per cent of the vote, making it the third biggest party (although is only returned one MP). Now Ukip is reportedly struggling to find candidates and could stand in as few as 100 seats. Ukip leader Paul Nuttall will stand in Boston and Skegness, but both ex-leader Nigel Farage and donor Arron Banks have ruled themselves out of running this time.

How many members does Ukip have?

Ukip’s membership declined from 45,994 at the 2015 general election to 39,000 in 2016. That’s a worrying sign for any political party, which relies on grassroots memberships to put in the campaigning legwork.

What does Ukip's decline mean for Labour and the Conservatives? 

The rise of Ukip took votes from both the Conservatives and Labour, with a nationalist message that appealed to disaffected voters from both right and left. But the decline of Ukip only seems to be helping the Conservatives. Stephen Bush has written about how in Wales voting Ukip seems to have been a gateway drug for traditional Labour voters who are now backing the mainstream right; so the voters Ukip took from the Conservatives are reverting to the Conservatives, and the ones they took from Labour are transferring to the Conservatives too.

Ukip might be finished as an electoral force, but its influence on the rest of British politics will be felt for many years yet. 

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