High Court rejects Tony Nicklinson's plea to allow doctors to end his life

When does the right to life become a right to die?

Today the High Court rejected Tony Nicklinson's plea to allow doctors to end his life. Nicklinson is not terminally ill, but for the past seven years he has been "locked in" as a result of a stroke: fully conscious, but immobile, able to communicate only by blinking. With the full support of his family, he had asked the court to extend the defence of necessity to cover doctors who acceded to his request. As the law stands, any doctor who carried out his earnest request might have found themselves facing a charge of murder. He also hoped to establish that his human right to a private life (under Article 8 of the European Convention) included the right to choose the manner of his death.

The result isn't a surprise. Nor will it be the end of the matter: the family had already announced their intention to appeal should the decision go against them. In the end, though, even the highest court in the land might well conclude, as this hearing did, that such a profound change in the law could only be made by act of Parliament. "It is not for the court to decide," said Lord Justice Toulson this afternoon, "whether the law about assisted dying should be changed and, if so, what safeguards should be put in place." Yet there seems little immediate prospect of legislation. Despite decades of debate and the fact that public opinion has long been sympathetic to euthanasia (provided that there are strict safeguards to protect the vulnerable) Parliament has so far proved reluctant to act.

Instead, the law finds itself in a position of moral incoherence. On the one hand, it refuses to draw distinctions that most normal people would regard as obvious. As the Lord Chief Justice made clear in 2010, upholding the murder conviction of a mother who ended the life of her severely brain-damaged son, the law "does not distinguish between murder committed for malevolent reasons and murder motivated by familial love." A law that puts a loving mother in the same legal category as Ian Huntley, sentencing both to life imprisonment (albeit with different tariffs), is clearly deficient. Nor can the Crown Prosecution Service be relied upon to act with common sense and compassion in such cases. 

At the same time, the law draws distinctions that are, in moral terms, pedantic. For example, it makes what is taken to be a significant distinction between actively ending someone's life (for example, by administering a lethal cocktail of drugs) and passively doing so by withdrawing nutrition. The latter has, since the Tony Bland case twenty years ago, become an almost standard procedure in cases where a patient is assessed to be in a persistent vegetative state with no hope of recovery. The difference means almost nothing to the person concerned - who is unable to express a preference either way. Tony Nicklinson himself could choose to refuse nutrition. This would condemn him to a slow and agonising death, and increase the suffering of his wife and daughters who would be forced to look on helplessly. But it would be legally OK. Death by lethal drugs would be quicker, painless and dignified. But it would be murder. 

If Tony Nicklinson were a dog, it would not merely be legal to end his suffering, it would be a criminal offence not to do so. The RSPCA routinely prosecutes pet-owners who cannot bear to see their beloved animals put down. Perhaps the dog, if it could talk, would express a wish for its suffering to end; perhaps it would cling to life. Society assumes, though, that to be merciful and compassionate is to put the animal to sleep. Why should a fully conscious and intelligent adult human being be treated with less humanity and compassion than a dog? 

The usual answer is that the law exists to protect vulnerable people who might otherwise feel under pressure to choose death so as not to be a "burden" on their loved ones. But their must be other, less cruel, ways of protecting the vulnerable. And the current law risks imposing another sort of burden on the families of people in Tony Nicklinson's position: a stark choice of watching someone you love in agony and asking to die, or acceding to their request at the risk of being convicted of assisted suicide or even murder. 

It's also sometimes argued that to allow profoundly disabled people the right to euthanasia would undermine the value of the lives of all people with similar disabilities. This must be nonsense. To respect human life is to respect more than the continuance of bodily functions: it is to afford respect and dignity to individuals, and that means allowing people to make decisions about their own lives. Including the ultimate decision to end it. 

A civilised and compassionate society will allow, even encourage, people to make the most of life whatever physical or mental disabilities they may have. We will shortly see at the Paralympics a triumphant demonstration of the fact that disability is no bar to achievement. It's possible to have even Tony Nicklinson's level of disability and lead a positive and worthwhile, even successful, life: just look at Stephen Hawking. But forcing someone to live against their will, as a demonstration of society's attachment to the sanctity of life, is neither civilised nor compassionate.

There is, in fact, no real conflict between the sanctity of life and the right of someone in Tony Nicklinson's position to end it. If human life has any special meaning over and above any other sort of life, it is because human beings are capable of self-reflection, of mental anguish, of conscious suffering, which includes the knowledge that one's suffering will end only in death. In such a case as Tony Nicklinson's, such human characteristics only add to the predicament in which he finds himself. For him, the right to die has become indistinguishable from the right to life.

What such a situation reflects, perhaps, is a continuing desire on the part of the law (or of its defenders) to want to punish suicide. A nominally secular society continues to see suicide not as a viable option - even an affirmation of life, because it is an affirmation of autonomy - but as a moral and personal failure, an admission of defeat. This was the mentality that for centuries refused suicides burial in consecrated ground. It is an attitude that ultimately limits human dignity, while at the same time pretending to exult it.

 

Tony Nicklinson's wife Jane comforts him as he reacts to the High Court decision. Photograph: Getty Images
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Why the Liberal Democrats by-election surge is not all it seems

The Lib Dems chalked up impressive results in Stoke and Copeland. But just how much of a fight back is it?

By the now conventional post-Brexit logic, Stoke and Copeland ought to have been uniquely inhospitable for the Lib Dems. 

The party lost its deposit in both seats in 2015, and has no representation on either council. So too were the referendum odds stacked against it: in Stoke, the so-called Brexit capital of Britain, 70 per cent of voters backed Leave last June, as did 62 per cent in Copeland. And, as Stephen has written before, the Lib Dems’ mini-revival has so far been most pronounced in affluent, Conservative-leaning areas which swung for remain. 

So what explains the modest – but impressive – surges in their vote share in yesterday’s contests? In Stoke, where they finished fifth in 2015, the party won 9.8 per cent of the vote, up 5.7 percentage points. They also more than doubled their vote share in Copeland, where they beat Ukip for third with 7.3 per cent share of the vote.

The Brexit explanation is a tempting and not entirely invalid one. Each seat’s not insignificant pro-EU minority was more or less ignored by most of the national media, for whom the existence of remainers in what we’re now obliged to call “left-behind Britain” is often a nuance too far. With the Prime Minister Theresa May pushing for a hard Brexit and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn waving it through, Lib Dem leader Tim Farron has made the pro-EU narrative his own. As was the case for Charles Kennedy in the Iraq War years, this confers upon the Lib Dems a status and platform they were denied as the junior partners in coalition. 

While their stance on Europe is slowly but surely helping the Lib Dems rebuild their pre-2015 demographic core - students, graduates and middle-class professionals employed in the public sector – last night’s results, particularly in Stoke, also give them reason for mild disappointment. 

In Stoke, campaign staffers privately predicted they might manage to beat Ukip for second or third place. The party ran a full campaign for the first time in several years, and canvassing returns suggested significant numbers of Labour voters, mainly public sector workers disenchanted with Corbyn’s stance on Europe, were set to vote Lib Dem. Nor were they intimidated by the Brexit factor: recent council by-elections in Sunderland and Rotheram, which both voted decisively to leave, saw the Lib Dems win seats for the first time on massive swings. 

So it could well be argued that their candidate, local cardiologist Zulfiqar Ali, ought to have done better. Staffordshire University’s campus, which Tim Farron visited as part of a voter registration drive, falls within the seat’s boundaries. Ali, unlike his Labour competitor Gareth Snell and Ukip leader Paul Nuttall, didn’t have his campaign derailed or disrupted by negative media attention. Unlike the Tory candidate Jack Brereton, he had the benefit of being older than 25. And, like 15 per cent of the electorate, he is of Kashmiri origin.  

In public and in private, Lib Dems say the fact that Stoke was a two-horse race between Labour and Ukip ultimately worked to their disadvantage. The prospect of Nuttall as their MP may well have been enough to convince a good number of the Labour waverers mentioned earlier to back Snell. 

With his party hovering at around 10 per cent in national polls, last night’s results give Farron cause for optimism – especially after their near-wipeout in 2015. But it’s easy to forget the bigger picture in all of this. The party have chalked up a string of impressive parliamentary by-election results – second in Witney, a spectacular win in Richmond Park, third in Sleaford and Copeland, and a strong fourth in Stoke. 

However, most of these results represent a reversion to, or indeed an underperformance compared to, the party’s pre-2015 norm. With the notable exception of Richmond’s Sarah Olney, who only joined the Lib Dems after the last general election, these candidates haven’t - or the Lib Dem vote - come from nowhere. Zulfiqar Ali previously sat on the council in Stoke and had fought the seat before, and Witney’s Liz Leffman and Sleaford’s Ross Pepper are both popular local councillors. And for all the excited commentary about Richmond, it was, of course, held by the Lib Dems for 13 years before Zac Goldsmith won it for the Tories in 2010. 

The EU referendum may have given the Lib Dems a new lease of life, but, as their #LibDemFightback trope suggests, they’re best understood as a revanchist, and not insurgent, force. Much has been said about Brexit realigning our politics, but, for now at least, the party’s new normal is looking quite a lot like the old one.