Cameron-Harman love in as Labour prepares for a new leader

Though PM ducks questions on human trafficking and PMQs itself

There was a strangely jolly, almost flirtatious mood at Prime Minister's Questions today, as David Cameron paid tribute to Harriet Harman as a "credit" to her party. Facing Harman for the last time before the Opposition elects a new leader, Cameron joked that Labour's acting leader was the "most popular" of the three Labour leaders he has faced including Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. And he reminded the House that "it's au revoir" rather than "goodbye" as Harman remains elected as deputy leader, a role in which may well see her stand in at the despatch box in the future.

Harman expressed sympathy to Cameron over the death of his father, and congratulations over the birth of his new daughter, but asked some tough questions on human trafficking. Harman urged Cameron to opt in to an EU Directive on the issue, but Cameron refused, claiming it goes no further than the Government's own plans. Harman said "I know some in his party are irrationally hostile to Europe" but that she hoped Cameron would not let them get in the way of signing up to the EU Directive. Cameron later implied he would consider arguments from Labour MPs for signing up to the directive.

In a separate and more partisan exchange, Cameron said it was "the height of irresponsibility" for shadow ministers to go to the TUC and encourage strikes amid the need for cutting the budget deficit.

Finally, Harman asked Cameron if the Tories were still enthusiastic about returning PMQs to twice a week, as they sometimes argued while in Opposition. Unsurprisingly, Cameron said he favoured a once a week session, describing that as "one of the few things" with which he fully agreed with Tony Blair.

UPDATE: The Prime Minister is wrong to say that Britain does not need to sign the EU Sex Slave Trafficking Directive, says former Europe minister, Denis MacShane, secretary of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Trafficking.

"Last week Teresa May told me Britain would not opt in. Today the PM said he would examine the issue but claimed British laws covered all the problems. But the whole point of an EU directive is that it obliges cross-frontier cooperation and an obligation meet EU rules.

"Sex slave trafficking cannot be combatted on a nation-only basis. The Government is sending out the wrong signal by saying No to a European-wide coordinated campaign. It was sad to see Nick Clegg whispering in David Cameron's ear to provide arguments for traditional Tory Euroscepticism on EU directives.

"The campaign against sex slave trafficking will continue and many will be disappointed at the opposition of Mr Cameron to this important EU directive," MacShane added.

James Macintyre is political correspondent for the New Statesman.
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Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

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