A eurozone recovery could tear the Conservatives apart

A successful fiscal union, as supported by Cameron, would force the party to choose between re-engagement and isolation.

When the financial crash erupted in 2008, the eurozone was at first a haven of stability. The epicentre of the storm was in London and New York, and it seemed for a time that the European economies might be only mildly affected. The financial crisis, however, mutated into first a fiscal crisis and then a sovereign debt crisis which gripped the eurozone economies from 2010. The eurozone was exposed as the weakest link in the international economy, because unlike the US or the UK there was no central bank to act as lender of last resort, no political authority standing behind the single currency to take decisive action to defend it. In its conception the euro was a federal project, but it was established without the federal institutions needed to sustain it. As some of the architects of the euro foresaw, at some stage eurozone members would be forced to choose, between a move to fiscal union and the creation of a political authority to stand behind the currency, or an abandonment of the currency and a return to national currencies.

At this stage it is still impossible to know how and on what terms the eurozone crisis is likely to be resolved. However, there are three plausible scenarios: eurozone disintegration, continuing stalemate, or eurozone fiscal union and recovery.

Britain has so far chosen to distance itself from the eurozone crisis, most notably at the summit in December 2011 when David Cameron refused to join the other members of the EU in backing measures to resolve the crisis. But as the government urging the eurozone to move quickly to a full fiscal union.

The first scenario, eurozone disintegration, is the one which many eurosceptics predict, and which many anticipate with relish, since it would mark a major setback for the European project from which it might not recover. But since its consequences are likely to be dire for the British economy it is not something any responsible British government is likely to wish for or actively promote. The current slowdown in the European economy is already blamed for Britain's double-dip recession by the chancellor. If there were to be major defaults by Greece, followed by Spain, Portugal and Italy, there would be serious consequences for UK banks and UK exporters. The belief held by many eurosceptics that Britain can swiftly replace its European markets with markets in east Asia and Latin America is fanciful. The British economy would be plunged into a deep depression. This, rather than any love of the euro itself, explains why British ministers urge Germany to do the responsible thing and agree to a full fiscal union, creating the kind of unified political authority in continental Europe which it has been British policy to oppose for the last 300 years.

The second scenario, continuing impasse, implies that the eurozone will continue making small adjustments which will be sufficient to avoid the single currency's implosion, but never enough to resolve the crisis definitively and prevent its recurrence. The European economy remains stagnant, with grinding austerity, high unemployment and little prospect of growth. Somehow, governments manage to contain the unhappiness of their citizens and also to keep the markets at bay, but there is no reason to expect a final resolution. The impact on British politics of this scenario would be to reinforce the negative images of the euro and the EU which have flourished in the last 20 years. It would add to the growing pressure for an in-or-out referendum, and it would be difficult for party leaders to find convincing arguments as to why Britain should remain tied to a EU which is becoming so dysfunctional and seemingly unable to solve its own problems.

The third scenario is fiscal union. Against the odds and widespread expectations, the eurozone halts at the brink and decides after all that the costs of collapse outweigh the costs of reform. The members agree to a major pooling of their sovereignty, which creates a serious federal power to govern the economy of the eurozone and stand behind the euro. The main obstacle to this is how to ensure its legitimacy. It would need to be accompanied by an imaginative plan, a European version of Marshall Aid, to lift the European economy into growth, ease the burden of austerity, and give the citizens of Europe some hope. The political difficulties of doing this are immense, which is why many remain sceptical as to whether it can be achieved by the European political class, without a major new popular endorsement of the European project. But if this or something like it were to come about, it would place Britain in a very awkward position.

In the first two scenarios, Britain continues to be disengaged from Europe, and even more disposed to exit the EU altogether, treating the EU as dysfunctional and failing. In this third scenario, with the EU now succeeding, Britain would be more isolated than ever. Only the Czech Republic is an ally at present. All the other non-eurozone countries have made it clear that they would work with this new emerging federal power. In this situation, Britain would either have to do as Count Lambsdorff, the former German FDP politician, suggested and withdraw from the EU and negotiate associate status (like Norway), or it would have to find a way to re-engage with Europe.

A re-engagement will not be easy, but there are precedents. In the 1980s, Nigel Lawson decided that the best hope of financial stability was for Britain to start shadowing the deutschmark. Leading members of Margaret Thatcher's cabinet supported Britain's membership of the exchange rate mechanism, against her opposition. The same pragmatic voices could be expected to re-emerge again in the Conservative party if the eurozone proved itself a success. The UK is too big to be just an offshore financial centre, and the political necessity of retaining privileged access to European markets could become overwhelming. There has always been a strong strain of euro-realism in all parties which acknowledges that Britain might eventually have to swallow hard and integrate.

Circumstances in the 2010s are, however, very different from the 1980s. Positions on Europe have hardened, and the Conservative party in particular has moved in an increasingly eurosceptic direction. A successful fiscal union would create an embryonic European state, from which Britain would be largely excluded. Many Conservatives would want to avoid this isolation, but any hint of the re-emergence of a new pro-European grouping would divide the party and might well lead to a formal split. So passionate is the euroscepticism of a large part of the Conservative party and the Conservative media that any form of serious re-engagement with the EU would be very hard to accomplish.

One conclusion, then, from this assessment is that Cameron's government is currently urging Europe towards the very approach which might lead to the greatest problems for his party in the long term. Because the government sees serious negative consequences for the British economy of eurozone disintegration or stalemate, it is rational to want fiscal federalism to succeed. Yet, if the eurozone does survive and recover this would pose deep dilemmas for the Conservatives, with a large section of the party being unable to stomach the pro-European policy that would be required for a future re-engagement with Europe.

Andrew Gamble is professor of politics at the University of Cambridge.

A longer version of this piece appears in IPPR's journal Juncture.

Cameron is urging Europe towards the very approach which might lead to the greatest problems for his party. Photograph: Getty Images.
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Bertie Carvel's diary: What would the French think about infidelity to Doctor Foster?

The joy of debuting a new series, Rupert Murdoch's squeamishness and a sting in the tail.

According to the adage, the first thing an actor does when he gets a job is to go on holiday. And so, having finished our sold-out run of James Graham’s Ink at the Almeida and with the show (in which I play a young Rupert Murdoch) about to transfer into the West End, I’m packing my bags.

But before I can skip town, I’ve one more professional engagement: the press launch of series two of the BBC drama Doctor Foster, which we finished filming at Christmas. I’ve now seen the final cut of all five episodes, and I’m excited to share it with an audience. There’s no substitute for seeing other people’s reactions at first hand, especially with a show that got people talking so much first time around, and it’s electric to sit in a cinema full of expectant journalists and commentators and feel the room respond. Nothing beats this: to put so much into making a thing and then experience an audience’s unmediated, reflexive reaction. When it goes well, you feel that you’ve shared something, that you’ve all recognised something together about how things are. It’s a unifying feeling. A sort of bond.

Cheating spouses

Handling the interviews has been tricky, when there’s so little one can say without giving the plot away. (The first series began with Suranne Jones’s character Gemma, a GP, suspecting her husband Simon of having an affair.) What’s more, lots of the questions invite moral judgements that I’ve tried my best to avoid; I always think it’s really important not to judge the characters I play from outside, but simply to work out how they feel about themselves, to zero in on their point of view. There’s a sort of moral bloodlust around this show: it’s extraordinary. People seem to want to hear that I’ve been pilloried in the street, or expect me to put distance between myself and my character, to hang him out to dry as a pariah.

While I’m not in the business of defending Simon Foster any more than I’m in the business of attacking him, I am intrigued by this queer mixture of sensationalism and prurience that seems to surface again and again.

Shock horror

Oddly enough, it’s something that comes up in Ink: many people have been surprised to find that, in a story about the re-launch of the Sun newspaper in 1969 as a buccaneering tabloid, it’s the proprietor who considers dropping anchor when the spirit of free enterprise threatens to set his moral compass spinning.

I’ve never given it much thought before, but I suppose that sensationalism relies on a fairly rigid worldview for its oxygen – the SHOCKERS! that scream at us in tabloid headlines are deviations from a conventional idea of the norm. But what’s behind the appetite for this sort of story? Do we tell tales of transgression to reinforce our collective boundaries or to challenge them?

For me there’s a close kinship between good journalism and good drama. I’m reminded of the words of John Galsworthy, who wrote Strife, the play I directed last summer, and who felt that the writer should aim “to set before the public no cut-and-dried codes, but the phenomena of life and character, selected and combined, but not distorted, by the dramatist’s outlook, set down without fear, favour, or prejudice, leaving the public to draw such poor moral as nature may afford”.

So when it comes to promoting the thing we’ve made, I’m faced with a real conundrum: on the one hand I want it to reach a wide audience, and I’m flattered that there’s an appetite to hear about my contribution to the process of making it; but on the other hand I think the really interesting thing about the work is contained in the work itself. I’m always struck, in art galleries, by how much more time people spend reading the notes next to the paintings than looking at the paintings themselves. I’m sure that’s the wrong way around.

Insouciant remake

En route to the airport the next morning I read that Doctor Foster is to be adapted into a new French version. It’s a cliché verging on racism, but I can’t help wondering whether the French will have a different attitude to a story about marital infidelity, and whether the tone of the press coverage will differ. I wonder, too, whether, in the home of Roland Barthes, there is as much space given to artists to talk about what they’ve made – in his 1967 essay, “The Death of the Author”, Barthes wrote that “a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination”.

No stone unturned

Touring the villages of Gigondas, Sablet and Séguret later that evening, I’m struck by the provision of espaces culturels in seemingly every commune, however small. The French certainly give space to the work itself. But I also notice a sign warning of a chat lunatique, so decide to beat a hasty retreat. Arriving at the house where I’m staying, I’ve been told that the key will be under a flowerpot. Lifting each tub in turn, and finally a large flat stone by the door, I find a small scorpion, but no key. I’m writing this at a table less than a yard away so let’s hope there won’t be a sting in this tale.

Ink opens at the Duke of York Theatre, London, on 9 September. More details: almeida.co.uk

This article first appeared in the 17 August 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Trump goes nuclear