Why Obama could still lose in November

Worsening jobs figures, Romney's ad blitz and low approval ratings are reasons for Obama not to be complacent.

A somewhat blithe consensus has built up around the view that Mitt Romney is destined to lose the US presidential election. Prediction markets Intrade and Iowa Electronic Markets have the incumbent on 70.3% and 72.4% respectively to win, whilst Nate Silver, a superstar election seer, has Obama a huge 76.1% favourite. But for all the President’s advantages, and they are admittedly formidable, a good deal of uncertainty remains going into the final six weeks of the campaign. Here are three reasons why the race is more unpredictable than most pundits appreciated.

1. The economy, stupid. Long before the Clinton campaign coined that famous maxim, politicos have known that the single most important factor in presidential elections is the state of the economy. Ronald Reagan’s question to the nation in 1980, "do you feel better off than you did four years ago?" was widely thought to have skewered the hapless incumbent Jimmy Carter. Romney is clearly looking for the same tactic to work in 2012. The irony of Carter’s predicament was that in fact about ten million jobs had been created during his presidency – his misfortune was that the recession began in his re-election year, creating the impression of failure at the worst possible time. Obama’s job creation numbers are far worse than Carter’s: the economy has (narrowly) lost jobs since his election and only 4m of the 9m jobs lost in the recession have been recovered. Moreover, no president since Roosevelt has been re-elected with unemployment at more than 7.2% (it is currently 8.1%). But, like Roosevelt, Obama inherited a horrendously underperforming economy and, as with Roosevelt, the economy appears to be improving as his re-election approaches.

The danger for Obama, however, lies in the precariousness of the jobs growth figures. Some point out that the unemployment rate has been flattered by discouraged workers dropping out of the labour market. And the weak jobs growth figures from September – along with the current level of the ISM - have set up a tense end-game for the Obama administration. With two more months of data to come, Obama could be hugely damaged should those figures turn negative in the run-up to polling day.

Chart 1: US unemployment

2. This is the year of the super-PAC The incumbent funding advantage in presidential elections usually works in two ways: firstly the incumbent simply raises more money in most years due to their greater familiarity with donors and the tendency of backers to prefer a proven winner over an insurgent challenger; secondly, they generally avoid the costly battle for their party’s nomination that drains the challenger of cash before the real contest has ever begun. Both these advantages hold this year too (Obama had raised $600m in total to Romney’s $335m by the end of July), but they should be greatly mitigated following 2010’s controversial Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v. the FEC. This ruling essentially eliminates the restrictions that existed on individual and corporate donations to "political action committees"; as a result, deep-pocketed donors, of which the Republicans seem to have rather more than the Democrats, will be able to target unlimited ads at the key swing states in the final weeks of the campaign.

The impact of these super-PACs was huge during the Republican primary, with Mitt Romney’s Restore Our Future super-PAC vastly outspending his rivals and destroying big poll leads, like Newt Gingrich’s 20-point lead in Florida, with a deluge of negative ads. Of course, it won't be so easy for Romney to squash President Obama in this manner. For one, he has his own super-PAC, albeit one less well-funded. It also remains unclear whether the Republican super-PACs have raised anything like the kind of funds some were predicting (data going up to 31 July showed a relatively modest $140m between them). But their eventual impact is impossible to predict, which leaves open the possibility they could make a critical difference in the crucial swing states like Florida and Ohio come November.

3. Approval ratings still dangerously low. Obama’s approval ratings are nowhere near high enough at this stage to justify complacency. Most analysts expect the bump he enjoyed following the Democratic Convention to fade by the end of September, which should erode much of the lead that appears to have excited prediction markets. Chart 2 shows the difficulty Obama has had in maintaining his approval ratings at levels comparable to those of the last four Presidents to enjoy re-election in the US.

Chart 2: Presidential approval

My view is not that Romney is more likely to win the Presidency - I don’t think he will. Obama’s approval ratings may be relatively low but they are significantly higher than those of Presidents Carter and Bush at this point in their unsuccessful re-election campaigns. He is also leading to varying degrees in states worth 332 electoral college votes (270 are needed to win). However, once one adjusts the current polls for the convention bounces and allows for the not inconsiderable likelihood of more disappointing economic news between now and the election, Romney’s task is not quite the Herculean labour that many seem to think.

Richard Mylles is a political analyst at Absolute Strategy Research, an independent consultancy based in London.

Barack Obama meets with supporters at OMG Burgers on 20 September in Miami, Florida. Photograph: Getty Images.

Richard Mylles is a political analyst at Absolute Strategy Research, an independent consultancy based in London.

Getty
Show Hide image

Everyone's forgotten the one issue that united the Labour party

There was a time when Ed Miliband spoke at Momentum rallies.

To label the row over the EU at Thursday’s Labour leadership hustings "fireworks" would be to endow it with more beauty than it deserves. Owen Smith’s dogged condemnation of John McDonnell’s absence from a Remain rally – only for Corbyn to point out that his absence was for medical reasons – ought to go down as a cringing new low point in the campaign. 

Not so long ago, we were all friends. In the course of the EU referendum, almost all of the protagonists in the current debacle spoke alongside each other and praised one another’s efforts. At a local level, party activists of all stripes joined forces. Two days before polling day, Momentum activists helped organise an impromptu rally. Ed Miliband was the headline speaker, and was cheered on. 

If you take the simple version of the debate, Labour’s schism on the EU appears as an aberration of the usual dynamics of left and right in the party. Labour's left is supposedly cheering a position which avoids advocating what it believes in (Remain), because it would lose votes. Meanwhile, the right claims to be dying in a ditch for its principles - no matter what the consequences for Labour’s support in Leave-voting heartlands.

Smith wants to oppose Brexit, even after the vote, on the basis of using every available procedural mechanism. He would whip MPs against the invocation of Article 50, refuse to implement it in government, and run on a manifesto of staying in the EU. For the die-hard Europhiles on the left – and I count myself among these, having run the Another Europe is Possible campaign during the referendum – there ought to be no contest as to who to support. On a result that is so damaging to people’s lives and so rooted in prejudice, how could we ever accept that there is such a thing as a "final word"? 

And yet, on the basic principles that lie behind a progressive version of EU membership, such as freedom of movement, Smith seems to contradict himself. Right at the outset of the Labour leadership, Smith took to Newsnight to express his view – typical of many politicians moulded in the era of New Labour – that Labour needed to “listen” to the views Leave voters by simply adopting them, regardless of whether or not they were right. There were, he said, “too many” immigrants in some parts of the country. 

Unlike Smith, Corbyn has not made his post-Brexit policy a headline feature of the campaign, and it is less widely understood. But it is clear, via the five "red lines" outlined by John McDonnell at the end of June:

  1. full access to the single market
  2. membership of the European investment bank
  3. access to trading rights for financial services sector
  4. full residency rights for all EU nationals in the UK and all UK nationals in the EU, and
  5. the enshrinement of EU protections for workers. 

Without these five conditions being met, Labour would presumably not support the invocation of Article 50. So if, as seems likely, a Conservative government would never meet these five conditions, would there be any real difference in how a Corbyn leadership would handle the situation? 

The fight over the legacy of the referendum is theatrical at times. The mutual mistrust last week played out on the stage in front of a mass televised audience. Some Corbyn supporters jeered Smith as he made the case for another referendum. Smith accused Corbyn of not even voting for Remain, and wouldn’t let it go. But, deep down, the division is really about a difference of emphasis. 

It speaks to a deeper truth about the future of Britain in Europe. During the referendum, the establishment case for Remain floundered because it refused to make the case that unemployment and declining public services were the result of austerity, not immigrants. Being spearheaded by Conservatives, it couldn’t. It fell to the left to offer the ideological counter attack that was needed – and we failed to reach enough people. 

As a result, what we got was a popular mandate for petty racism and a potentially long-term shift to the right in British politics, endangering a whole raft of workplace and legal protections along the way. Now that it has happened, anyone who really hopes to overcome either Brexit, or the meaning of Brexit, has to address the core attitudes and debates at their root. Then as now, it is only clear left-wing ideas – free from any attempt to triangulate towards anti-migrant sentiment– that can have any hope of success. 

The real dividing lines in Labour are not about the EU. If they were, the Eurosceptic Frank Field would not be backing Smith. For all that it may be convenient to deny it, Europe was once, briefly, the issue that united the Labour Party. One day, the issues at stake in the referendum may do so again – but only if Labour consolidates itself around a strategy for convincing people of ideas, rather than simply reaching for procedural levers.