Cameron's EU stance is unsustainable and the sceptics know it

The EU-lite deal he imagines to keep the best of both worlds can't be done.

David Cameron would not campaign for a “No” vote if the British people were asked in a referendum if they wanted to stay in the European Union. That is one of the main news items to come out of a wide-ranging interview the PM has given to the Daily Telegraph at the start of the long summer recess.

At one level, it isn’t that much of a surprise. In a long parliamentary debate after the last European Council summit, Cameron expressed, albeit in fairly delicate terms, the very same point. He indicated that he doesn’t want to hold a referendum now, because the nature of the EU is changing rapidly in response to the single currency crisis. He would rather wait to see what institutional adjustments and treaty changes emerge, use those amendments to negotiate a different, looser relationship with Brussels and then perhaps consult the nation on whether his preferred EU terms are acceptable.

It stands to reason that he expects his negotiations to be successful, or at least that he would only dare hold a referendum if he thought he had wangled a decent package, including “repatriation” of powers. So, by extension, he would be selling a deal with his name on it. Naturally he would then campaign for a “yes” vote.

The curious thing is that he has chosen to spell it out again now in black and white. Anyone familiar with or who cares about the way EU diplomacy actually works knows it would be an affront for an incumbent British PM to go around advertising in advance that he might campaign for complete exit. And those who think exit is the only serious and desirable option already suspect Cameron of being a bit of a Brussels quisling. So the only thing this interview line can achieve is rubbing the sceptics’ noses in the fact that they don’t have a friend in Number 10. An odd choice, given the difficulties Cameron already has with party management.

But the real problem Cameron has with all this stuff is the complacency (or naivete?) in thinking he will get a renegotiation deal that will satisfy the Tories. The argument usually deployed is that Britain is a desirable market for our European neighbours and a purchaser of their goods and services. Ergo, they will want to keep us on side and will acquiesce to our demands.

There are two problems. First, diplomacy can trump economics in Europe. Cameron has persistently underestimated how fed up the rest of the continent is with the UK’s half-hearted engagement – the in/out “hokey-cokey” approach. This goes back way further than the current government. The Germans in particular are said to be impatient and their appetite to meet London’s needs is diminished further by conspicuous Schadenfreude among Tories over the failings in the single currency project. The British message in Brussels at the moment boils down to: “We’re sorry that you’ve made a right hash of everything. We did warn you. It’s not really our problem, except when it impacts on our growth. So could you please sort it out. Follow policies of deeper integration, which we despise and would never pursue ourselves and then, when you’ve finished, could we please have a whole bunch of social policies back plus other yet-to-be named dispensations? Oh, and by the way, we’ll veto your treaties unless you give us what we want. And did we add that we won’t surrender any control over the terms of the single market. We must stay at the top table at all times. Is that ok?”

A Whitehall source, who has discussed these things with senior figures in Angela Merkel’s office, recently ran this proposition past German counterparts and reports that: “The answer is ‘no’”. Of course it is.
 
Second, even if Cameron negotiates some nominal repatriation of powers – a looser arrangement on paper – and even if he secures formal guarantees that our status in the single market is preserved, he can’t deliver that protection in practice. He can do nothing about “caucusing”. This is the process by which members of a new, ultra-integrated, consolidated Eurozone turn up at wider EU summits with pre-agreed positions that can be voted through, whether Britain likes it or not. In other words, Cameron could have a piece of paper saying the UK will not be disadvantaged in the single market and wave it around like crazy when he steps off the Eurostar, but it won’t matter because we’ll be marginalised when it comes to the detail of all subsequent rule changes. The sceptics understand this perfectly well and so won’t be fooled by any “renegotiation”. They will still want out.

So really Cameron’s message is that he can’t give his party what it really wants on Europe and he won’t pretend that he can. That is a brave line to take given the current mood of the Conservative benches.

PS. For further reading on UK relations with the EU, by far the best thing published recently is this excellent Centre for European Reform pamphlet by David Rennie of the Economist.

David Cameron said he would not campaign for a "no" vote in an EU referendum. Photograph: Getty Images.

Rafael Behr is political columnist at the Guardian and former political editor of the New Statesman

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The Taliban's succession crisis will not diminish its resilience

Haibatullah Akhunzada's appointment as leader of the Taliban may put stress on the movement, but is unlikely to dampen its insurgency. 

After 19 years under the guidance of the Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Omar, the group has now faced two succession crises in under a year. But although Haibatullah Akhunzada’s appointment as leader of the Taliban will likely put stress on the movement, it shows few signals of diminishing its renewed insurgency.

The news pretty much ends speculation about former leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s death in a US airstrike in Pakistan’s south-western Baluchistan province, which was criticised by Islamabad as a violation of its sovereignty.

The Taliban would have prepared extensively for this eventuality. The fast appointment, following days of intense council, appears to be a conspicuous act of decisiveness. It stands in contrast to the two-year delay the movement faced in announcing the death of the Mullah Omar. It will be not be lost on the Taliban that it was subterfuge around the death of Mullah Omar that caused the fracture within the movement which in turn led to the establishment of an ISIS presence in the country.

The appointment is a victory for the Taliban old guard. As former head of the Taliban's judiciary and Mullah Mansour’s deputy, in many ways, Haibatullah is a natural successor. Haibatullah, described by Afghanistan expert Sami Yousafzai as a “stone age Mullah,” demonstrates the Taliban’s inherent tendency to resort to tradition rather than innovation during times of internal crisis.

The decision taken by the Taliban to have an elder statesman of the group at the helm highlights the increasing marginalisation of the Haqqani network, a powerful subset within the Taliban that has been waging an offensive against the government and coalition forces in northwest Pakistan.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network who already has a bounty of 5 million dollars on his head, was touted in some Taliban circles as a potential successor, however the decision to overlook him is a conservative move from the Taliban. 

The Taliban’s leadership of the jihad against the Afghan government is hinged on their claims to religious legitimacy, something the group will hope to affirm through the Haibatullah’s jurisprudential credentials. This assertion of authority has particular significance given the rise of ISIS elements in the country. The last two Taliban chiefs have both declared themselves to be amir ul-momineen or ‘leader of the faithful,’ providing a challenge to the parallel claims of ISIS’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Any suggestions that Mansour’s death will lead to the unravelling of the Taliban are premature. The military targeting of prominent jihadi leaders within group structures has been seen in operations against the leadership of ISIS, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and other groups.

In recent research for the Centre on Religion & Geopolitics, we found that it is often less prominent jihadis that play an integral role in keeping the movement alive. Targeted killings do create a void, but this often comes at the expense of addressing the wider support base and ideological draw of militant outfits. This is particularly relevant with a relatively decentralised movement like the Taliban.

Such operations can spur activity. If the example of the Taliban’s previous leadership succession is to be heeded, we might expect renewed attacks across Afghanistan, beyond the group’s strongholds near the eastern border with Pakistan. The brief capture of Kunduz, Afghanistan's fifth-largest city, at the end of September 2015, was a show of strength to answer the numerous internal critics of Mullah Mansour’s new leadership of the movement.

In a news cycle dominated by reports of ISIS, and to a diminishing extent al-Qaeda, atrocities, it is important to comprehend the renewed brutality of the Afghan insurgency.  Data from the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics Global Extremism Monitor found a seventeen per cent rise in fatalities from March to April, marking the start of the Taliban’s spring fighting season. A suicide attack in central Kabul on the headquarters of an elite military unit that killed 64 people was the single most deadly act of terror around the world in the month of April, and the group’s bloodiest attack in the Afghan capital for years. Reports this morning of a suicide attack on a bus killing 10 staff from an appeal court west of Kabul, suggests that the violence shows no sign of diminishing under the new leadership.

All these developments come during a period of renewed impetus behind international peace talks. Last week representatives from Pakistan were joined by delegates from Afghanistan, the United States, and China in an attempt to restart the stalled negotiation process with the Taliban.

Haibatullah Akhunzada’s early leadership moves will be watched closely by these countries, as well as dissonant voices within the movement, to ascertain what the Taliban does next, in a period of unprecedented challenge for the infamously resilient movement. 

Milo Comerford is a South and Central Asia Analyst for the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics