Celebrations fade as constitutional crisis edges closer in Cairo

An unlikely coalition has formed between the Brotherhood and left-leaning revolutionary groups.

Jubilant scenes on Tahrir Square, as the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi was announced Egypt’s first post-Mubarak president, were dulled as the future of the country’s recently-dissolved parliament and the constitution-drafting body were left hanging in the balance after crucial rulings were postponed on Tuesday.

Consequently, thousands have remained on Cairo’s flashpoint square.

“Of course Tahrir’s sit-in is celebratory but it’s a victory that is soured by the recent wave of strong actions from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF),” explained former Brotherhood member Mohamed Farouk. He is member of the Board of Trustees of the Revolution, a collation of revolutionary and political forces currently manning Tahrir’s central stage.

The ruling military junta controversially dismantled parliament on 14 June after the High Constitutional Court ruled Parliamentary Elections Law unconstitutional. As the Constituent Assembly was elected by the now defunct legislative body, it too was expected to be disbanded.

In the midst of these contentious decisions, on 18 June, the SCAF issued amendments to the military-authored Constitutional Declaration, which took the place of Mubarak’s now-abrogated 1971 constitution on 30 March last year.

The addendum saw presidential powers significantly reduced and the junta awarded some legislative and executive powers – which many dubbed a “military coup”.

Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court was expected to announce on Tuesday whether these actions were in fact legal but instead adjourned the session until July for the parliament and Constitutional Declaration decision, and September for the future of the Constituent Assembly.

Subsequently an improbable coalition of the Brotherhood and left-leaning revolutionary groups, including the April 6 Youth Movement and the Revolution Youth Coalition, continue to protest against the recent actions.

Quranic verses blend in with football-styled protest chants, as revolutionaries, ultra-conservative Salafists, leftist groups, hardcore football supporters and ordinary families vow to uphold the sit-in.

“We are not leaving the square until our demands, like the reinstatement of the parliament and keeping the Constituent Assembly as is, are achieved,” said Farouk.

“The weight of Tahrir, the Brotherhood organisation and Mohamed Morsi as president we’re hoping will be enough to help us reach our goals,“ added Shaima’ Abul-Leil, communications officer of the Board of Trustees of the Revolution.

Morsi and the organisation backing him seem to be the unlikely figureheads of Egypt’s continued revolutionary struggle against military power.

Just five months ago secular groups bemoaned the significant 43 per cent win by the Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections, their closed-door meetings with the SCAF, and the Islamist majority dominating the constitution-drafting assembly.

“I cannot believe I’m in the streets fighting alongside a conservative Islamist organisation which repeatedly abandoned us during clashes [with the police and military] last year and in 2012,” says Sara, 20, a political sciences student.  

Never have the stakes been so high, or the demands so aligned, for both the Brotherhood and the secular revolutionary forces.

Poisoned chalice

Morsi has inherited a seemingly-impossible task as Egypt's new president.

In the contentious amendments to the Constitutional Declaration, the SCAF ensured that it was untouchable and ungovernable by the president.

Contrary to the now-defunct 1971 Constitution, the SCAF would become the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, its incumbent members could not be changed and it would decide on all issues relating to the military.

Even the defence minister would remain unchanged, even though the president is allowed to appoint the cabinet.

In practice, this makes the SCAF a fourth arm of government, with, as the amended document ensured, super-presidential powers.

The SCAF has the right to appoint a constituent assembly, should the current assembly, whose very existence is under threat due to July’s expected court ruling, “face any obstacles preventing it from completing its work.” It can also reject constitutionals articles.

This would allow the military to have a serious hand in the drafting of the constitution, which will outline the president’s job description.

In the absence of parliament the military council awarded itself powers to legislate in the addendum.

In addition, key decisions were made by the military before the presidential election results were even announced.

For example, Egypt’s 2012/13 annual state budget, which was drafted by the military-appointed cabinet and signed off by the SCAF, will be applied on the first day of the presidency.

Despite the amendment and approval of the budget being a parliamentary privilege, the legislative authority only received the “austerity” budget, which was submitted two months late, a week before parliament was dissolved.

This sparked mass uproar amongst the MPs, particularly from the Brotherhood’s political party, who called the action a “conspiracy” ensuring the “downfall” of the coming government.

Legal experts claim that there may be re-elections after the new constitution is drafted, as the presidential mandate, Morsi will swear to, will have changed.

There is even money in the new budget assigned to the electoral commission to cover this, despite the fact that at the time of drafting the financial document, the parliament was still in place, and the presidential elections in the pipeline.

Undermining democracy

Tuesday’s postponement of the court rulings is a damning blow to the parliament, the constitution and consequently to the presidency as well.

The ruling on whether the current Constituent Assembly will remain in its current formation has been delayed until 4 September, at the very end of the constitution-drafted process.

It could be argued that should the military decide that the new constitution is not to its liking, the administrative court, which is very much in the pocket of the regime, would rule the assembly unconstitutional. This would make the constitution it drafted null and void as well.

Just three days before the ruling on the Assembly, another lawsuit is due to take place determining the legality of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation.

Therefore, by 4 September Egypt could see the parliamentary-elected Constituent Assembly dissolved, the draft constitution rejected and the Muslim Brotherhood dismantled: a massive blow to Morsi and Egypt.

Without the re-establishment of parliament, the only legal authority that Morsi can swear his presidential oath to is the High Constitutional Court, as outlined in the addendum.

By swearing to uphold the constitution as is, in front of the court, Morsi automatically legitimises the amendments as well as the dissolution of parliament. 

By postponing the verdict until after the president has sworn the oath and assumed office, the Administrative Court has ensured Morsi must swear to the amendments, or risk direct confrontation with the SCAF – something the Brotherhood is loathe to do.

“We do not want to break the back of the SCAF – in fact, we would like to revive the slogan “the army and the people are one hand’,” says, Dr. Mahmoud Khalil a Brotherhood member who jointly authored Morsi’s presidential “renaissance” programme.

“However, we will not stand for judicial corruption. If the ruling doesn’t go our way then we will get five million people in the streets as well as the upper and lower houses of parliament,” Khalil added, “Morsi will swear an oath in Tahrir to them. This will be massive escalation on the Brotherhood’s part against the SCAF – something we hope to avoid.”

He predicts this will not happen, and instead the Administrative Court will rule in favour of the parliament. The Brotherhood is “a firm believer in the institutions,” Khalil added.

These sentiments will not sit well with the leftist revolutionaries the Brotherhood are trying to court, who came to Tahrir on 25 January 2011 to re-imagine a new Egypt.
 

Post-election celebrations in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Photograph: Getty Images
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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.