The truth about Mervyn King

A new political cult forms.

"Who would have guessed in late 2007 or early 2008 that an answer to the banking crisis would be to hand more power to Mervyn King?" asks the Guardian's Nils Pratley. King has long been admired in Tory circles and so George Osborne's decision to give the Bank of England the linchpin role in regulating the UK's financial sector came as no real surprise.

I'm no fan of Merv. I think he long ago politicised and abused his position. Remember his public objection to the Labour government's fiscal stimulus? Remember his public approval for the coalition's deficit reduction plan?

He also has rather poor judgement. My colleague Professor David Blanchflower, a former external member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee and one of the few economists to see the crash coming, outlined King's failures in a devastating piece for the NS in September 2009 ("The story from the inside").

Blanchflower wrote:

So why did the committee get it so wrong? From my perspective, it was hobbled by "group think" -- or the "tyranny of the consensus". Governor Mervyn King, the old iron fist of the Bank of England, with his hawkish views on rates, dominated the MPC. Short shrift was given to alternative, dovish views such as mine. I focused on the empirical data suggesting Britain was heading for recession; Mervyn and the rest of the committee focused on their theoretical models and the (invisible) threat of inflation. In fact, the Bank of England may more suitably be called "the Bank of Economic Theory". Unfortunately, the economic theories failed just when we needed them most.

He added:

Clever as Mervyn King may be, he missed the crash and the subsequent recession, and hence, so did the consensual MPC on which I sat. In August 2008, the MPC's quarterly Inflation Report did not even contain the word "recession"; it saw the economy standing still over the next year. I very nearly quit the committee at that point. In an interview that month with Reuters, I called the forecast "wishful thinking". Mervyn called me into his office to admonish me for that one.

Blanchflower also criticised King's obsession with so-called moral hazard:

We were not told what was happening to British banks such as Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Bradford & Bingley or Alliance & Leicester. Or to US banks such as Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns. We weren't kept in the loop, but we should have been. With hindsight, Mervyn King's focus on moral hazard -- the idea that banks are encouraged to take more risks because they know they will be bailed out -- was a huge mistake.

He reminds us of King's unforgivable failure to foresee the explosion in unemployment:

In the summer of 2008, I warned the Commons Treasury select committee that "something horrible" was going to happen. I was becoming even more worried about recession, and in September I voted alone, as ever, for a cut of 50 basis points (bps) -- or 0.5 per cent -- to the Bank's base rate. At my September appearance before the select committee, King, who was sitting two seats from me at the time, was asked by the MP Andy Love: "On unemployment there have been some suggestions, and Mr Blanchflower has said -- and I think there are quite a lot of people out there who would agree with them -- that it may go up faster than the projections in the Inflation Report. Is that a worry to you?"King replied: "At least the Almighty has not vouchsafed to me the path of unemployment data over the next year. He may have done to Danny, but he has not done to me." To say the least, I was rather surprised.

Hail the King? I'd rather not.

Mehdi Hasan is a contributing writer for the New Statesman and the co-author of Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader. He was the New Statesman's senior editor (politics) from 2009-12.

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Who will win the Copeland by-election?

Labour face a tricky task in holding onto the seat. 

What’s the Copeland by-election about? That’s the question that will decide who wins it.

The Conservatives want it to be about the nuclear industry, which is the seat’s biggest employer, and Jeremy Corbyn’s long history of opposition to nuclear power.

Labour want it to be about the difficulties of the NHS in Cumbria in general and the future of West Cumberland Hospital in particular.

Who’s winning? Neither party is confident of victory but both sides think it will be close. That Theresa May has visited is a sign of the confidence in Conservative headquarters that, win or lose, Labour will not increase its majority from the six-point lead it held over the Conservatives in May 2015. (It’s always more instructive to talk about vote share rather than raw numbers, in by-elections in particular.)

But her visit may have been counterproductive. Yes, she is the most popular politician in Britain according to all the polls, but in visiting she has added fuel to the fire of Labour’s message that the Conservatives are keeping an anxious eye on the outcome.

Labour strategists feared that “the oxygen” would come out of the campaign if May used her visit to offer a guarantee about West Cumberland Hospital. Instead, she refused to answer, merely hyping up the issue further.

The party is nervous that opposition to Corbyn is going to supress turnout among their voters, but on the Conservative side, there is considerable irritation that May’s visit has made their task harder, too.

Voters know the difference between a by-election and a general election and my hunch is that people will get they can have a free hit on the health question without risking the future of the nuclear factory. That Corbyn has U-Turned on nuclear power only helps.

I said last week that if I knew what the local paper would look like between now and then I would be able to call the outcome. Today the West Cumbria News & Star leads with Downing Street’s refusal to answer questions about West Cumberland Hospital. All the signs favour Labour. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to British politics.