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"Twitter, at its worst, is a megaphone for lunatics"

Rob Brydon on Steve Coogan, Hackgate and the perils of celebrity.

Your new autobiography, Small Man in a Book, ends just as you become successful. Why?
It was a good dramatic point to end, at the age of 35, at the British Comedy Awards, which I used to watch year in, year out. When I first became successful, I was surprised people talked about my struggle. Being on the inside looking out, I didn't see it that way. Now I see it - with the way I was scraping along and how much debt I was in, if I were looking at it from the outside, I'd say, "Maybe it's not for you."

Was there a moment when it all went right?
I made the decision to leave college and work in radio, which sent me off that road. I often wonder where I would be now, if I'd not done that.

You starred in The Trip with Steve Coogan. Who had the harder role?
I think Steve's is more attractive - it's more dramatic, more introspective. But lightness is underestimated, in my opinion.

Why did that show work so well?
The age thing was very important; we were 45, starting to feel the effects of middle age on our body. And the slow pace - Michael [Winterbottom, director] is remarkable. Of all the creative people I've known, he has least regard for his audience, in a good way: he just tells his story.

Have you seen Coogan's campaign on phone-hacking and the tabloids - and his attacks on the Daily Mail's editor, Paul Dacre?
Of course. And the Mail followed it up, with the most awful photo of Steve it is possible to find. I love the choosing of photographs in newspaper articles. It's laughable, but people eat it up.

Did you see him thundering on Newsnight?
I did. Whatever you think of Steve, and I'd be the first to say he's objectionable on many levels, he stands up for what he believes in. It's remarkable to watch someone like [the ex-News of the World executive] Paul McMullan, who said: “If we catch a few corporate wrongdoers then you're a price worth paying." Whoa! What, a few innocents get killed? No! "You're happy to walk down the red carpet . . . you should be happy to be hacked." It's like saying: "You were happy to get into the taxi driver's car; he took you to Deptford where you wanted to go - yes, he assaulted you along the way, but it's a bit rich for you to complain." And there was so much envy in his tone. If you envy that, go and do it, Paul McMullan! Go and be an actor.

But some celebrities do play the system.
That's something else. We're talking about artists or performers. The others are marketing people, publicists, showmen. What I've never understood about some sections of the press [is] how you live with yourself knowing what you're doing is going to wilfully upset . . . people with feelings and families. We're not talking about war criminals here.

Do you ever wish you took more serious roles?
Not especially. I don't take that view of the dramatic inherently having more worth than the comic. I made a conscious decision about four years ago that I was just going to do what I liked.

Why is there snobbery about comedy?
Those people can fuck off. Only this morning I read on Twitter -

You don't read your @s, do you?
No. I stopped looking myself up. At its best, Twitter is a lovely community. At its worst, it's a megaphone for lunatics.

Are you tempted to reply?
I don't think I've ever succumbed. It comes back to not viewing you as a human being. You're that bloke on the telly; you're advertising breakfast cereal. The assumption is that you've got money coming out of your arse.

In the book, you talk about how the nature of laughter has changed since the 1970s and become more self-aware. Why has it?
Now, there are 57 channels and nothing on. Then, there was a gratitude that came from [knowing] we haven't got much choice here. That has to change the relationship to some degree between audience and performer, it has to.

Who are your influences?
I'm wary of someone who says, "I don't have any influences." Bollocks, you're just too up your own arse to admit that. We don't want to bang on about me, but certainly I can see all mine when I'm on stage: Ronnie Corbett, Barry Humphries, Dudley Moore, Jackie Mason, Woody Allen. Sometimes I feel like a big fraud.

Was there a plan for your career?
I wanted to be funny and entertain. That word's got a bad rap. I listened to Michael McIntyre talking about the stick he gets. People say, "Oh, he just points things out." Well, all right, you go and point things out.

Is there anything you regret?
Good lord, yes. A million things.

Are we all doomed?
Yes, we're all going to die. As a father, I feel bad saying that, as you always want to put a good face on for your kids. But it was ever thus.

Defining Moments

1965 Born in Swansea
1985 Leaves Royal Welsh College of Music and Drama for a job at Radio Wales
1989 Moves to London. Becomes presenter of a home-shopping channel
2000 Co-writes Human Remains for BBC. Takes role of Keith in Marion and Geoff
2006 Marries second wife, Claire Holland
2007 Returns to South Wales as Uncle Bryn in the breakthrough Gavin and Stacey
2010 Stars in The Trip with Steve Coogan

Helen Lewis is deputy editor of the New Statesman. She has presented BBC Radio 4’s Week in Westminster and is a regular panellist on BBC1’s Sunday Politics.

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.

 

 

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