The lesson Cameron needs to learn from Birgitte Nyborg

Our Scandinavian friends have much to teach us.

David Cameron has been in Stockholm this week, expressing his love for all things Nordic from economic openness, to free schools, and the Danish TV series The Killing.

Based on his pronouncements today he's doubtless also been attracted to Borgen, the political drama in which a female prime minister juggles coalition politics and the demands of a young family at the same time as driving through her commitment to equality in the corporate boardroom.

It's a welcome sign as we have a lot to learn from our Scandinavian friends -- and not just about increasing the number of female directors. We could also learn a lot when it comes to supporting the vast majority of working mothers.

As a new report from the Resolution Foundation today shows, motherhood in modern Britain still carries a heavy price in the workplace. More than nine out of ten of those surveyed, switched from full-time to part-time work since having children. Of course, for many women this is a positive choice with mothers wanting the flexibility to work fewer hours, especially when their children are young.

But here's the rub: it also shows that even when making a positive choice, working part-time still carries a very heavy cost. An incredible 44 per cent of women reported that they'd had to take a lower-skilled job when switching to part-time work.

 

By working part-time, do you feel you've had to take a lower skilled job than you would have if you worked full-time?

Working part-time

 

And while these trade-offs affect people in all income groups, those on low to middle incomes are far more likely to face constrained choices and tougher penalties. Compared to more affluent women, those on low to middle incomes are almost twice as likely to feel that they have no choice but to work part-time, and when they do they are 33 per cent more likely to be forced to take a lower skilled job.

Millions feel constrained, having to choose between a more fulfilling and well paid career and family life. As one respondent put it: "I guess just have to accept that career progression is impossible now because I chose to work part-time, employers won't admit it but this is the reality for part-time working mums."

And we're not just constraining parents' choices, we're also harming our economy. Overall the UK ranks 15th in the OECD in terms of levels of female employment. If we caught up with the highest performing countries, up to one million more women would be in the workplace.

The chart below shows the gap between our female employment rate and better performing countries for women of different ages. The story is clear -- it's at the peak years of childbirth that we really fall behind, with mothers having to drop out of the workforce.

 

Female employment gap between UK and better performing countries

Female employment

Given that the UK has the second most expensive childcare in the OECD this is hardly a surprise - nor is the fact that almost half of working mothers say that the lack of affordable and quality childcare is a key barrier preventing them from increasing their working hours.

Here's hoping that there is a sequel to Borgen in which Birgitte decides to highlight the plight of ordinary working mothers and the role that universal childcare plays in enabling them to work: and that someone makes David Cameron watch the box-set.

 

Gavin Kelly is a former adviser to Downing Street and the Treasury. He tweets @GavinJKelly1.

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Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

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