Who ate all the pie?

The impact of rising pay inequality will be felt throughout the UK economy.

You probably won't be too surprised to hear that for a long time many workers have been receiving an ever smaller portion of the fruits of economic growth. But if we are to properly understand the 'trickle-up' tendencies of British capitalism we need to not only register the depressing headline but get under the surface of what brought it about.

A new report out today does exactly that: it shows that there has been a sharp fall in the share of GDP going to those in work on below average earnings at the same time as the highest earners have received an ever larger share of the national economic pie. This is not just about stagnant wages over recent years - though that has made matters worse. This runs deeper. Over a generation the wages of the bottom half of the working population have shrunk to 10 per cent of GDP, whist the top 1 per cent have seen a 50 per cent increase in their share.

A

Source: Resolution Foundation 2011

So far, so predictable, you may think. But the explanation of this challenges some popular assumptions. One view, firmly held by some on the left, is that the long-term decline in wages as a share of GDP is simply the flipside of more of our national income taking the form of corporate profit. There is some truth in this - it is estimated that it accounts for around 10 per cent of the long-term wage squeeze experienced by the bottom half of earners - but this is not nearly as much many people think. (And the share of 'profit' in national accounts is if anything over-stated as it also reflects payments to the growing army of the self-employed - which isn't really what most people think of 'capital').

Another view, more often heard from those on the right and from business, is that workers' wages have been under pressure because of rising burdens on employers, such as higher national insurance contributions, which have borne down on pay. These costs have certainly risen. But again, this can be overstated: it accounts for an estimated 15 per cent of the reduced share of GDP paid out in wages to those on below average earnings.

A more predictable, and potent, explanation of why the bottom half of workers have been losing out involves rising pay inequality: of the total sum paid out in wages, a far greater share is now going to the top half of earners than used to be the case -- and within the top half, it is the top 10 per cent that have done best, and within the top 10 per cent it is the richest 1 per cent who have really cleaned up. Not surprisingly if we focus on changes in wages since the late 1990s then the role of the finance sector is key, with a staggering proportion of all of the gains to the top 10 per cent of earners in Britain flowing to a small number of people in that sector.

A

Source: Resolution Foundation 2011

Take a longer view of pay inequality, going back to the 1970s, and a slightly different picture emerges. Part of the increase reflects the fact that jobs have gravitated over time from relatively 'equal' sectors like manufacturing into 'unequal' sectors like finance. But the bigger story is that almost all sectors have contributed to the rise in pay inequality: we can't pin it all on bankers. Regardless of where you work, the gap between the top and bottom is likely to have grown.

Shining a light on these trends helps focus minds on the long-term prospects for low-to-middle earners within our economy. Of course, some will just shrug their shoulders at all this. For them, growing economic inequality amongst the working population is simply what happens in advanced market economies - get over it. But many economists - and not just those on the left - are increasingly unsettled about where all this is headed. After all, you don't exactly have to be a class warrior (or even a social democrat) to believe that a country in which the wage share of the bottom half of earners is constantly falling is likely to be an increasingly volatile one: both in the economic sense, as ever more people consume all they earn, fail to save for the future, and rely on debt to try and ensure their living standards rise in line with the wider economy. And volatile in a wider political sense too. If a generation grows up believing that there is likely to be little personal gain from economic growth then they may not think the policies (and parties) that advocate the measures that generate higher prosperity are desirable or even legitimate.

Equally, you don't have to be a free-market fundamentalist to question the feasibility of the state doing ever more to compensate for escalating wage inequality through more redistributive tax and benefit policies. My own view is that there is very little prospect of the next Labour government -- or any other government for that matter - doing much more to reduce inequality via redistributive tax and benefit policies than was the case prior to 2010. This means that those who worry about inequalities in long-term living standards need to shift from a narrow focus on tax and benefit policies to the much thornier issues of achieving rising real wages and employment rates.

Anyone who claims to want a rising-tide economy, in which the gains from growth are widely shared, must recognise that this can't mean the bottom half of wage-earners being left with an ever smaller slice of the pie. Whatever tomorrow's much anticipated GDP figures turn out to be, this is the real economic question of our times. Business as usual won't do.

Gavin Kelly is chief executive of the Resolution Foundation.

Gavin Kelly is a former adviser to Downing Street and the Treasury. He tweets @GavinJKelly1.

Getty.
Show Hide image

Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.