Who ate all the pie?

The impact of rising pay inequality will be felt throughout the UK economy.

You probably won't be too surprised to hear that for a long time many workers have been receiving an ever smaller portion of the fruits of economic growth. But if we are to properly understand the 'trickle-up' tendencies of British capitalism we need to not only register the depressing headline but get under the surface of what brought it about.

A new report out today does exactly that: it shows that there has been a sharp fall in the share of GDP going to those in work on below average earnings at the same time as the highest earners have received an ever larger share of the national economic pie. This is not just about stagnant wages over recent years - though that has made matters worse. This runs deeper. Over a generation the wages of the bottom half of the working population have shrunk to 10 per cent of GDP, whist the top 1 per cent have seen a 50 per cent increase in their share.

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Source: Resolution Foundation 2011

So far, so predictable, you may think. But the explanation of this challenges some popular assumptions. One view, firmly held by some on the left, is that the long-term decline in wages as a share of GDP is simply the flipside of more of our national income taking the form of corporate profit. There is some truth in this - it is estimated that it accounts for around 10 per cent of the long-term wage squeeze experienced by the bottom half of earners - but this is not nearly as much many people think. (And the share of 'profit' in national accounts is if anything over-stated as it also reflects payments to the growing army of the self-employed - which isn't really what most people think of 'capital').

Another view, more often heard from those on the right and from business, is that workers' wages have been under pressure because of rising burdens on employers, such as higher national insurance contributions, which have borne down on pay. These costs have certainly risen. But again, this can be overstated: it accounts for an estimated 15 per cent of the reduced share of GDP paid out in wages to those on below average earnings.

A more predictable, and potent, explanation of why the bottom half of workers have been losing out involves rising pay inequality: of the total sum paid out in wages, a far greater share is now going to the top half of earners than used to be the case -- and within the top half, it is the top 10 per cent that have done best, and within the top 10 per cent it is the richest 1 per cent who have really cleaned up. Not surprisingly if we focus on changes in wages since the late 1990s then the role of the finance sector is key, with a staggering proportion of all of the gains to the top 10 per cent of earners in Britain flowing to a small number of people in that sector.

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Source: Resolution Foundation 2011

Take a longer view of pay inequality, going back to the 1970s, and a slightly different picture emerges. Part of the increase reflects the fact that jobs have gravitated over time from relatively 'equal' sectors like manufacturing into 'unequal' sectors like finance. But the bigger story is that almost all sectors have contributed to the rise in pay inequality: we can't pin it all on bankers. Regardless of where you work, the gap between the top and bottom is likely to have grown.

Shining a light on these trends helps focus minds on the long-term prospects for low-to-middle earners within our economy. Of course, some will just shrug their shoulders at all this. For them, growing economic inequality amongst the working population is simply what happens in advanced market economies - get over it. But many economists - and not just those on the left - are increasingly unsettled about where all this is headed. After all, you don't exactly have to be a class warrior (or even a social democrat) to believe that a country in which the wage share of the bottom half of earners is constantly falling is likely to be an increasingly volatile one: both in the economic sense, as ever more people consume all they earn, fail to save for the future, and rely on debt to try and ensure their living standards rise in line with the wider economy. And volatile in a wider political sense too. If a generation grows up believing that there is likely to be little personal gain from economic growth then they may not think the policies (and parties) that advocate the measures that generate higher prosperity are desirable or even legitimate.

Equally, you don't have to be a free-market fundamentalist to question the feasibility of the state doing ever more to compensate for escalating wage inequality through more redistributive tax and benefit policies. My own view is that there is very little prospect of the next Labour government -- or any other government for that matter - doing much more to reduce inequality via redistributive tax and benefit policies than was the case prior to 2010. This means that those who worry about inequalities in long-term living standards need to shift from a narrow focus on tax and benefit policies to the much thornier issues of achieving rising real wages and employment rates.

Anyone who claims to want a rising-tide economy, in which the gains from growth are widely shared, must recognise that this can't mean the bottom half of wage-earners being left with an ever smaller slice of the pie. Whatever tomorrow's much anticipated GDP figures turn out to be, this is the real economic question of our times. Business as usual won't do.

Gavin Kelly is chief executive of the Resolution Foundation.

Gavin Kelly is a former adviser to Downing Street and the Treasury. He tweets @GavinJKelly1.

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Should London leave the UK?

Almost 60 per cent of Londoners voted to stay in the EU. Is it time for the city to say good by to Brexit Britain and go it alone?

Amid the shocked dismay of Brexit on Friday morning, there was some small, vindictive consolation to be had from the discomfort of Boris Johnson as he left his handsome home in EU-loving Islington to cat-calls from inflamed north London europhiles. They weren’t alone in their displeasure at the result. Soon, a petition calling for “Londependence” had gathered tens of thousands of names and Sadiq Khan, Johnson’s successor as London mayor, was being urged to declare the capital a separate city-state that would defiantly remain in the EU.

Well, he did have a mandate of a kind: almost 60 per cent of Londoners thought the UK would be Stronger In. It was the largest Remain margin in England – even larger than the hefty one of 14 per cent by which Khan defeated Tory eurosceptic Zac Goldsmith to become mayor in May – and not much smaller than Scotland’s. Khan’s response was to stress the importance of retaining access to the single market and to describe as “crucial” London having an input into the renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, alongside Scotland and Northern Ireland.

It’s possible to take a dim view of all this. Why should London have a special say in the terms on which the UK withdraws from the EU when it ended up on the wrong side of the people’s will? Calling for London to formally uncouple from the rest of the UK, even as a joke to cheer gloomy Inners up, might be seen as vindicating small-town Outer resentment of the metropolis and its smug elites. In any case, it isn’t going to happen. No, really. There will be no sovereign Greater London nation with its own passport, flag and wraparound border with Home Counties England any time soon.

Imagine the practicalities. Currency wouldn’t be a problem, as the newborn city-state would convert to the euro in a trice, but there would be immediate secessionist agitation in the five London boroughs of 32 that wanted Out: Cheam would assert its historic links with Surrey; stallholders in Romford market would raise the flag of Essex County Council. Then there is the Queen to think about. Plainly, Buckingham Palace could no longer be the HQ of a foreign head of state, but given the monarch’s age would it be fair to turf her out?

Step away from the fun-filled fantasy though, and see that Brexit has underlined just how dependent the UK is on London’s economic power and the case for that power to be protected and even enhanced. Greater London contains 13 per cent of the UK’s population, yet generates 23 per cent of its economic output. Much of the tax raised in London is spent on the rest of the country – 20 per cent by some calculations – largely because it contains more business and higher earners. The capital has long subsidised the rest the UK, just as the EU has funded attempts to regenerate its poorer regions.

Like it or not, foreign capital and foreign labour have been integral to the burgeoning of the “world city” from which even the most europhobic corners of the island nation benefit in terms of public spending. If Leaver mentality outside the capital was partly about resentment of “rich London”, with its bankers and big businesses – handy targets for Nigel Farage – and fuelled by a fear of an alien internationalism London might symbolise, then it may prove to have been sadly self-defeating.

Ensuring that London maintains the economic resilience it has shown since the mid-Nineties must now be a priority for national government, (once it decides to reappear). Pessimists predict a loss of jobs, disinvestment and a decrease in cultural energy. Some have mooted a special post-Brexit deal for the capital that might suit the interests of EU member states too – London’s economy is, after all, larger than that of Denmark, not to mention larger than that of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland combined – though what that might be and how that could happen remain obscure.

There is, though, no real barrier to greater devolution of powers to London other than the political will of central government. Allowing more decisions about how taxes raised in the capital are spent in the capital, both at mayoral and borough level, would strengthen the city in terms of managing its own growth, addressing its (often forgotten) poverty and enhancing the skills of its workforce.

Handing down control over the spending of property taxes, as set out in an influential 2013 report by the London Finance Commission set up by Mayor Johnson, would be a logical place to start. Mayor Khan’s manifesto pledged to campaign for strategic powers over further education and health service co-ordination, so that these can be better tailored to London’s needs. Since Brexit, he has underlined the value of London securing greater command of its own destiny.

This isn’t just a London thing, and neither should it be. Plans are already in place for other English cities and city regions to enjoy more autonomy under the auspices of directly elected “metro mayors”, notably for Greater Manchester and Liverpool and its environs. One of the lessons of Brexit for the UK is that many people have felt that decisions about their futures have been taken at too great a distance from them and with too little regard for what they want and how they feel.

That lesson holds for London too – 40 per cent is a large minority. Boris Johnson was an advocate of devolution to London when he was its mayor and secured some, thanks to the more progressive side of Tory localism. If he becomes prime minister, it would be good for London and for the country as a whole if he remembered that.  

Dave Hill writes the Guardian’s On London column. Find him on Twitter as @DaveHill.