Would Newcastle have to pay back £4bn if its Wonga sponsorship was a loan?

Interest is tricky.

When Wonga announced their intention to sponsor Newcastle United FC, it generated no small amount of opprobrium. Despite the company's best attempts to generate a positive image for itself, it is still largely seen as a payday loan company, preying on the poor for a quick buck. So it was no surprise that smart a demonstration of that fact very quickly made the rounds:

Anything with over 2,000 retweets is going to get fact-checked a lot, and debates soon broke out over whether the number was accurate. Is it?

Wonga's "representative APR" is 4214 per cent. When you take out a loan with it, it decides at the beginning of the period what your interest is, and charges it to you on the total amount of capital borrowed over that period. In other words, it doesn't compound the interest - which makes sense, because it would be hard to compound anything over a loan as short month. As a result, if you were charged an annual interest rate of 4214 per cent, then at the end of a four year period you would have to pay back: 

£24,000,000 + £24,000,000 x 42.14 x 4 = £4,069,440,000.00                                 

(That's the capital, plus four years interest.) A shade over £4bn. So James Dixon is correct.

Except that the 4214 per cent APR is already compounded. As Wonga explains, industry regulations require it to present interest at an annual rate even if it doesn't make annual loans. To do this, it is required to take the amount of interest you would pay on its longest loan, a month-long one, and act as though you rolled it over, taking out larger and larger loans to pay off the interest as you go along. If we compounded Newcastle's loan similarly, then after four years it would owe:

£24,000,000 x (1+42.14)^4 = £83,125,028,034,051.84                                 

That is £83 quadrillion. It's over one hundred times world GDP, and in the ballpark for the total value of everything on earth.

But Wonga would maintain that using that interest rate is unfair. Although they are required to present their representative APR in that manner, they have never, and would never, charge it to a customer. The annual rate of interest which they actually charge is "just" 360 per cent, and the rest is made up of the compounding which they are forced to assume. If Newcastle's loan was taken out at that rate, it would have to pay back:

£24,000,000 + £24,000,000 × 3.6 x 4 = £369,600,000.00                                 

£370m is still quite a lot to pay for £24m, but it's nowhere near billions. And in actual fact, Newcastle wouldn't even pay that much. It's not a person, it's a business, and Wonga have - controversially - launched a division exclusively for lending to businesses. The largest and longest loan it offers is £15,000 for a year, which costs £19,350 to pay back, implying an APR of 29 per cent. If Newcastle borrowed £24m for four years at that rate, then if the interest compounded, it would equal:

£24,000,000 × (1+0.29)^4 = £66,461,491.44                                 

And if it was charged in one lump sum, it would equal:

£24,000,000 + £24,000,000 × 0.29 x 4 = £51,840,000.00                                 

The root of the problem is that Wonga isn't actually in the business of making multi-year, multi-million-pound loans. The assumptions we make in trying to squeeze their business model into a shape that lets us make that comparison are important, because they're the difference between paying back £52m and £83qdrn.

Front page of Wonga.com

Alex Hern is a technology reporter for the Guardian. He was formerly staff writer at the New Statesman. You should follow Alex on Twitter.

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The problems with ending encryption to fight terrorism

Forcing tech firms to create a "backdoor" to access messages would be a gift to cyber-hackers.

The UK has endured its worst terrorist atrocity since 7 July 2005 and the threat level has been raised to "critical" for the first time in a decade. Though election campaigning has been suspended, the debate over potential new powers has already begun.

Today's Sun reports that the Conservatives will seek to force technology companies to hand over encrypted messages to the police and security services. The new Technical Capability Notices were proposed by Amber Rudd following the Westminster terrorist attack and a month-long consultation closed last week. A Tory minister told the Sun: "We will do this as soon as we can after the election, as long as we get back in. The level of threat clearly proves there is no more time to waste now. The social media companies have been laughing in our faces for too long."

Put that way, the plan sounds reasonable (orders would be approved by the home secretary and a senior judge). But there are irrefutable problems. Encryption means tech firms such as WhatsApp and Apple can't simply "hand over" suspect messages - they can't access them at all. The technology is designed precisely so that conversations are genuinely private (unless a suspect's device is obtained or hacked into). Were companies to create an encryption "backdoor", as the government proposes, they would also create new opportunities for criminals and cyberhackers (as in the case of the recent NHS attack).

Ian Levy, the technical director of the National Cyber Security, told the New Statesman's Will Dunn earlier this year: "Nobody in this organisation or our parent organisation will ever ask for a 'back door' in a large-scale encryption system, because it's dumb."

But there is a more profound problem: once created, a technology cannot be uninvented. Should large tech firms end encryption, terrorists will merely turn to other, lesser-known platforms. The only means of barring UK citizens from using the service would be a Chinese-style "great firewall", cutting Britain off from the rest of the internet. In 2015, before entering the cabinet, Brexit Secretary David Davis warned of ending encryption: "Such a move would have had devastating consequences for all financial transactions and online commerce, not to mention the security of all personal data. Its consequences for the City do not bear thinking about."

Labour's manifesto pledged to "provide our security agencies with the resources and the powers they need to protect our country and keep us all safe." But added: "We will also ensure that such powers do not weaken our individual rights or civil liberties". The Liberal Democrats have vowed to "oppose Conservative attempts to undermine encryption."

But with a large Conservative majority inevitable, according to polls, ministers will be confident of winning parliamentary support for the plan. Only a rebellion led by Davis-esque liberals is likely to stop them.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

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