What Hollande should do now

How the new French president can oblige the Germans to play their part in Europe's growth strategy.

Francois Hollande comes to power at an interesting conjuncture, with Europe in crisis and the political mood on the move. It is a shift of mood not just amongst the electorate - most of whom have long been opposed to austerity (all we saw last Sunday was their chance to express their views in elections) - but amongst the political class and the technocratic elites. Voices arguing that Europe needs a growth strategy as well as a fiscal consolidation strategy are finally emerging from the IMF, from the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, as well as from a growing number of European leaders.  Angela Merkel swept everyone before her when she demanded a new European Fiscal Compact only months ago, but today is beginning to look surprisingly isolated with calls for a re-think coming not just from Greece and France, but also from Belgium, Spain and Italy.

Politically, Hollande therefore has more potential clout than might initially appear. Despite this the reality remains that, financially, virtually all the economic power in Europe lies in German hands and, hardly surprisingly, the German Chancellor has rapidly stated that as far as she is concerned, austerity rules. At the same time Hollande can hardly go off on a spending spree of his own. The markets would pulverise him. 

What then can Hollande do?  Pre-election, he was hardly a radical on curbing the calls for deficit reduction, merely saying that France should go slower and have a further year to consolidate. But there is one significant other possibility. In consultation with like-minded colleagues, he should turn the discussion on its head and say to Germany: we fully support the need for fiscal consolidation, but, as good Europeans, we all expect equality of treatment. In particular, you will understand that 2+2 must equal 4 and so if there are to be no deficits there must be no surpluses either.

More precisely, he should direct attention to the current text of the Fiscal Pact. Title III, Article 3, sub-clause 1 (a) reads as follows:

the budgetary position of the general government of the Contracting Parties shall be balanced or in surplus*

*[emphasis added]

The removal of these last three words would make a fundamental difference. Not only is it the case that, economically, the removal of deficits will in any case require the removal of surpluses - but more importantly, it would place on Germany the obligation to play its part in financing the growth strategy without which such fiscal consolidation is impossible.

To underline his point, Hollande might add some history. The error in the current European Fiscal compact is identical to that made at Bretton Woods in 1944. That discussion was about balance of payments surpluses and deficits, but apart from this shift of focus, the problem is identical. Those at Bretton Woods insisted on countries acting to correct deficits but without placing a reciprocal obligation on surplus countries. There is still the widespread view that Bretton Woods worked smoothly from the start. It did not. It was massively breached by the UK in 1947, when as the Bretton Woods arrangements required, we liberalised capital flows - but then, against the rules, had to re-impose them virtually straight away to prevent a forced devaluation. The system was only saved when in 1948 the US launched Marshall Aid, a stimulus of a kind not even contemplated by the Bretton Woods agreement.

Reminding Germany of this history would be salutary; at least some of their current prosperity stems from how their post-war recovery was financed. And Hollande’s pressure in this direction can hardly be too uncomfortable for the German Chancellor. Asking for less taxation and more spending is not the most difficult of messages to deliver to a politician – even in Germany.

 

Photo: Getty Images

 

Andrew Graham is the former Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and from 1988 to 1994 was Economic Adviser to the shadow Chancellor and Labour leader, John Smith.

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The SNP thinks it knows how to kill hard Brexit

The Supreme Court ruled MPs must have a say in triggering Article 50. But the opposition must unite to succeed. 

For a few minutes on Tuesday morning, the crowd in the Supreme Court listened as the verdict was read out. Parliament must have the right to authorise the triggering of Article 50. The devolved nations would not get a veto. 

There was a moment of silence. And then the opponents of hard Brexit hit the phones. 

For the Scottish government, the pro-Remain members of the Welsh Assembly and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland, the victory was bittersweet. 

The ruling prompted Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, to ask: “Is it better that we take our future into our own hands?”

Ever the pragmatist, though, Sturgeon has simultaneously released her Westminster attack dogs. 

Within minutes of the ruling, the SNP had vowed to put forward 50 amendments (see what they did there) to UK government legislation before Article 50 is enacted. 

This includes the demand for a Brexit white paper – shared by MPs from all parties – to a clause designed to prevent the UK reverting to World Trade Organisation rules if a deal is not agreed. 

But with Labour planning to approve the triggering of Article 50, can the SNP cause havoc with the government’s plans, or will it simply be a chorus of disapproval in the rest of Parliament’s ear?

The SNP can expect some support. Individual SNP MPs have already successfully worked with Labour MPs on issues such as benefit cuts. Pro-Remain Labour backbenchers opposed to Article 50 will not rule out “holding hands with the devil to cross the bridge”, as one insider put it. The sole Green MP, Caroline Lucas, will consider backing SNP amendments she agrees with as well as tabling her own. 

But meanwhile, other opposition parties are seeking their own amendments. Jeremy Corbyn said Labour will seek amendments to stop the Conservatives turning the UK “into a bargain basement tax haven” and is demanding tariff-free access to the EU. 

Separately, the Liberal Democrats are seeking three main amendments – single market membership, rights for EU nationals and a referendum on the deal, which is a “red line”.

Meanwhile, pro-Remain Tory backbenchers are watching their leadership closely to decide how far to stray from the party line. 

But if the Article 50 ruling has woken Parliament up, the initial reaction has been chaotic rather than collaborative. Despite the Lib Dems’ position as the most UK-wide anti-Brexit voice, neither the SNP nor Labour managed to co-ordinate with them. 

Indeed, the Lib Dems look set to vote against Labour’s tariff-free amendment on the grounds it is not good enough, while expecting Labour to vote against their demand of membership of the single market. 

The question for all opposition parties is whether they can find enough amendments to agree on to force the government onto the defensive. Otherwise, this defeat for the government is hardly a defeat at all. 

 

Julia Rampen is the editor of The Staggers, The New Statesman's online rolling politics blog. She was previously deputy editor at Mirror Money Online and has worked as a financial journalist for several trade magazines.