The second Great Depression

If today's projections are right, this will be the longest-lasting recession in a century.

Thankfully, the MPC did the right thing and kept rates on hold, in contrast to the ECB, which raised rates to 1.5 per cent. There is no evidence in either the UK or the euro area of a wage-price spiral emerging and inflation is expected to fall in the euro area, as the effects of the recent oil and commodity price increases drop out. Therefore, the ECB's move looks to be a classic policy error, as this will exacerbate the growth problems experienced by all countries.

As background, I looked at the latest data from Eurostat and plotted data on wages, inflation and changes in producer prices, which are presented below. What stands out is that there is no evidence of substantial increases in nominal hourly wage costs in any country; the highest increase is a paltry 3.8 per cent in France. Greece has seen a fall of 6.8 per cent. For the euro area, the average is 2.6 per cent and it is 2.1 per cent in the UK. The story is similar on inflation, which did not increase at all in the euro area over the past month and fell in five countries including Germany. Producer prices fell by 0.2 per cent in the euro area and in nine of the 17 euro area countries. What inflation? As I said, the ECB has made a major policy error, just as it did in July 2008 when it raised rates. This move to raise rates is madness, as it will lower growth in the euro area. Well done, MPC.

 

Another piece of evidence supporting the MPC's decision to sit tight was NIESR's latest forecast for the UK economy, published today. Although I think it should have done more quantitative easing (QE) as the economy is slowing -- but that is for another day.

Buried in the data is a potential bombshell for George "Slasher" Osborne. NIESR's monthly estimates of GDP suggest that output grew by only 0.1 per cent in the three months ending in June after growth of 0.5 per cent in the three months ending in May. In part, this was because the effects of one-off events in April have depressed the overall quarterly growth rate. However, even accounting for these factors, the underlying rate of growth NIESR believes is still likely to be weak. This compares with the OBR's forecast of 0.8 per cent.

Commenting on the forecast, Simon Kirby at NIESR argued that: "Economic growth in the UK continues to be subdued. In our April forecast, we expected growth to pick up in the second half of this year to around 0.5 per cent per quarter. We expect the domestic economy to contract throughout this year, leaving net exports as the major positive contributor to economic growth. There will continue to be much talk of continued economic growth over the coming months but it certainly won't feel like it to most people. As with any forecast, there is uncertainty and risk around the outlook. At present, the risks to growth are firmly balanced on the downside."

NIESR goes on to argue in its report that: "These figures do not provide a picture of economic growth that would support a tightening of monetary policy at this juncture." This is a not-too-subtle dig at NIESR's previous director Martin Weale, who left to join the MPC in August 2010 and has voted for rate increases over the past six meetings and presumably did so again today. His recent claim that raising rates now means that they won't have to be increased as much in the future is abject nonsense with no basis in economics or common sense.

The biggest news in the NIESR forecast is contained in the attached graph. This shows for the current recession and the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, as well as the 1930s, the extent of the drop in output measured on the vertical axis and the length of time it takes for output to be restored. In the 1970s, recession output fell by 4 per cent and it took 36 months for output to get back to its starting level. In contrast, in the 1980s, output dropped 6 per cent and took 48 months to be restored. In the 1930s, output dropped by 6 per cent with a double-dip in the middle and also took 48 months to be restored.

GDP 

NIESR has kindly provided me with an updated version to the one it published, which also contains estimates of when the recession will be over, measured by the point at which output will reach the level it was at the start of the recession in 2008. That is the black diamond on the right of the graph. This suggests NIESR believes that this recession will be the longest-lasting in a century and output will not be restored for at least five years. This is based on NIESR's forecast for April but, given Simon Kirby's view that the risks are to the downside and the Q2 2011 forecast, then recovery could well take even longer than that. NIESR is, for example, forecasting growth of 0.5 per cent in both Q3 2010 and Q4 2010, which does look overly optimistic.

If NIESR is right, Osborne's policies will be responsible for the worst recession in a century -- and maybe it should be named the "Second Great Depression". This suggests an economic policy U-turn on the fiscal front must be in the offing. It also raises the prospect of the MPC doing more QE before the end of the year.

David Blanchflower is economics editor of the New Statesman and professor of economics at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire

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In the 1980s, I went to a rally where Labour Party speakers shared the stage with men in balaclavas

The links between the Labour left and Irish republicanism are worth investigating.

A spat between Jeremy Corbyn’s henchfolk and Conor McGinn, the MP for St Helens North, caught my ear the other evening. McGinn was a guest on BBC Radio 4’s Westminster Hour, and he obligingly revisited the brouhaha for the listeners at home. Apparently, following an interview in May, in which McGinn called for Corbyn to “reach out beyond his comfort zone”, he was first threatened obliquely with the sack, then asked for a retraction (which he refused to give) and finally learned – from someone in the whips’ office – that his party leader was considering phoning up McGinn’s father to whip the errant whipper-in into line. On the programme, McGinn said: “The modus operandi that he [Corbyn] and the people around him were trying to do [sic], involving my family, was to isolate and ostracise me from them and from the community I am very proud to come from – which is an Irish nationalist community in south Armagh.”

Needless to say, the Labour leader’s office has continued to deny any such thing, but while we may nurture some suspicions about his behaviour, McGinn was also indulging in a little airbrushing when he described south Armagh as an “Irish ­nationalist community”. In the most recent elections, Newry and Armagh returned three Sinn Fein members to the Northern Ireland Assembly (as against one Social Democratic and Labour Party member) and one Sinn Fein MP to Westminster. When I last looked, Sinn Fein was still a republican, rather than a nationalist, party – something that McGinn should only be too well aware of, as the paternal hand that was putatively to have been lain on him belongs to Pat McGinn, the former Sinn Fein mayor of Newry and Armagh.

According to the Irish News, a “close friend” of the McGinns poured this cold water on the mini-conflagration: “Anybody who knows the McGinn family knows that Pat is very proud of Conor and that they remain very close.” The friend went on to opine: “He [Pat McGinn] found the whole notion of Corbyn phoning him totally ridiculous – as if Pat is going to criticise his son to save Jeremy Corbyn’s face. They would laugh about it were it not so sinister.”

“Sinister” does seem the mot juste. McGinn, Jr grew up in Bessbrook during the Troubles. I visited the village in the early 1990s on assignment. The skies were full of the chattering of British army Chinooks, and there were fake road signs in the hedgerows bearing pictograms of rifles and captioned: “Sniper at work”. South Armagh had been known for years as “bandit country”. There were army watchtowers standing sentinel in the dinky, green fields and checkpoints everywhere, manned by some of the thousands of the troops who had been deployed to fight what was, in effect, a low-level counter-insurgency war. Nationalist community, my foot.

What lies beneath the Corbyn-McGinn spat is the queered problematics of the ­relationship between the far left wing of the Labour Party and physical-force Irish republicanism. I also recall, during the hunger strikes of the early 1980s, going to a “Smash the H-Blocks” rally in Kilburn, north London, at which Labour Party speakers shared the stage with representatives from Sinn Fein, some of whom wore balaclavas and dark glasses to evade the telephoto lenses of the Met’s anti-terrorist squad.

The shape-shifting relationship between the “political wing” of the IRA and the men with sniper rifles in the south Armagh bocage was always of the essence of the conflict, allowing both sides a convenient fiction around which to posture publicly and privately negotiate. In choosing to appear on platforms with people who might or might not be terrorists, Labour leftists also sprinkled a little of their stardust on themselves: the “stardust” being the implication that they, too, under the right circumstances, might be capable of violence in pursuit of their political ends.

On the far right of British politics, Her Majesty’s Government and its apparatus are referred to derisively as “state”. There were various attempts in the 1970s and 1980s by far-right groupuscules to link up with the Ulster Freedom Fighters and other loyalist paramilitary organisations in their battle against “state”. All foundered on the obvious incompetence of the fascists. The situation on the far left was different. The socialist credentials of Sinn Fein/IRA were too threadbare for genuine expressions of solidarity, but there was a sort of tacit confidence-and-supply arrangement between these factions. The Labour far left provided the republicans with the confidence that, should an appropriately radical government be elected to Westminster, “state” would withdraw from Northern Ireland. What the republicans did for the mainland militants was to cloak them in their penumbra of darkness: without needing to call down on themselves the armed might of “state”, they could imply that they were willing to take it on, should the opportunity arise.

I don’t for a second believe that Corbyn was summoning up these ghosts of the insurrectionary dead when he either did or did not threaten to phone McGinn, Sr. But his supporters need to ask themselves what they’re getting into. Their leader, if he was to have remained true to the positions that he has espoused over many years, should have refused to sit as privy counsellor upon assuming his party office, and refused all the other mummery associated with the monarchical “state”. That he didn’t do so was surely a strategic decision. Such a position would make him utterly unelectable.

The snipers may not be at work in south Armagh just now – but there are rifles out there that could yet be dug up. I wouldn’t be surprised if some in Sinn Fein knew where they are, but one thing’s for certain: Corbyn hasn’t got a clue, bloody or otherwise. 

Will Self is an author and journalist. His books include Umbrella, Shark, The Book of Dave and The Butt. He writes the Madness of Crowds and Real Meals columns for the New Statesman.

This article first appeared in the 25 August 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Cameron: the legacy of a loser