Where do house prices go from here?

The figures tell us that house prices are unsustainable at current levels and are likely to head dow

A big question is: where do house prices go from here? According to Halifax, house prices peaked in December 2007 and have fallen 17 per cent since then. Real house prices have fallen even further -- by around 27 per cent. Homeowners on trackers have done really well. Their payments fell sharply as interest rates fell to historically low levels after the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cut the Bank of England rate to 0.5 per cent. This has kept delinquencies down but it is unlikely to continue when interest rates rise. This will inevitably have a downward impact both on house prices themselves and, inevitably, on consumption also.

Based on house-price-to-earnings ratios (HPE), a measure of affordability, it does look as if house prices are unsustainable at current levels and hence still have quite a long way to fall.

graph

Chart 1 (click here for a bigger version) illustrates this, using data from the Halifax. The index stands at 4.45, compared with a peak of 5.81 in July 1987 and a long-run average from 1983 to 2000 -- prior to the house price boom -- of 3.64. The question is by how much. These numbers suggests that house prices have another 20 per cent or so to go, with the concern that, as has occurred in other house price corrections, there is a bigger overshooting before prices return to the long-run equilibrium. Interestingly, a comparison of gross rental yields, relative to a long-run average, also indicate that housing is at least 20 per cent overvalued.

But claims about the sustainability of HPEs come up against the counter-claim that low interest rates have made valuation metrics less useful as a guide to the sustainability or otherwise of prevailing house prices. Compelling new work by Paul Diggle from Capital Economics sheds some light on this issue. He argues that comparing house prices to equity prices, which should also have benefited from low interest rates, still suggests that house prices are about 15 per cent too high.

There are similarities, he suggests, between how equities and property "should" be priced. As a claim on a company's future earnings, the price of a share, he claims, should equal the present discounted value of the expected earnings to which it entitles the owner, with a suitable allowance for risk. An equivalent way of determining the "fair value" price for property is by using the present discounted value of the future stream of rental income, adjusted for risk and the costs of owning and maintaining property. So, Diggle argues, by lowering the rate at which future income is discounted, low interest rates should have benefited both asset classes. Even so, relative to a simple long-run average, the ratio between house prices and equity prices seems to suggest that either equities are around 15 per cent too cheap or housing is around 15 per cent too expensive. (See Chart 2 -- click here for bigger version).

graph 2

Given that the FTSE all share price/earnings ratio indicates that stock market valuations are very close to average historical levels, Diggle argues, there is little evidence for the former. The house-price-to-equities ratio seems to imply that house prices are higher than can be justified by low interest rates.

It is significant that the extent to which housing is overvalued on this new measure is similar to other measures, such as the HPE and rental values. The house-price-to-equities ratio adds to the case that a downward adjustment in prices is required. House prices look to be headed down.

David Blanchflower is economics editor of the New Statesman and professor of economics at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire

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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.