The Friday Arts Diary

Our cultural picks for the week ahead.

Art

Tate Britain, London SW1 - Another London: International Photographers Capture City Life 1930 – 1980, 27 July–16 September 

Tate Britain explores the capital city through the eyes of some of the most significant names in international photography, from Henri Cartier-Bresson to Eve Arnold. Bringing together 180 classic photographs, Another London explores the city’s rich complexity.

Talk

Raven Row, London E1 – The Real Truth – A World’s Fair, 28 July–19 August

Suzanne Treister’s project at Raven Row is spread over four weekends with speeches from a global futurist, an anarcho-primitivist and a US security agency insider within a specially designed theatre. A World’s Fair also hosts an exhibition including three unique libraries, two video lounges and designs for a virtual world’s fair. On 28 July Robert Rydell, the international expert on the power of world’s fairs to define the modern world, delivers a keynote speech.

Theatre

The Africa Centre, London WC2 – And Crocodiles Are Hungry At Night, 31 July–18 August

Bilimankhwe Arts and Nanzikambe Theatre present the UK premiere of And Crocodiles Are Hungry At Night - the award-winning dissident poet Jack Mapanje’s prison memoir, adapted and directed by Kate Stafford. Mapanje was imprisoned in Malawi’s Mikuyu prison in 1987 without charge and remained there for over three years despite a prolonged international outcry.

Film

BFI Southbank, London SE1 - The Genius of Hitchcock, 1 August–31 October

The BFI stages its biggest project to date - a complete retrospective of the 58 surviving Hitchcock feature films, with on-stage interviews including Tippi Hendren, the ultimate “Hitchcock Blonde”. The project opens on 1 August with two different screenings of Hitchcock’s Blackmail – a rare silent version with live musical accompaniment and a sound version.

Music

Wigmore Hall, London W1 – Ian Bostridge, 28 July

Ian Bostridge concludes his Ancient & Modern series at the Wigmore Hal, a season-long residency which has seen the tenor explore influences, musical visions and period instrumentation. This closing recital concentrates on modernity with works by Benjamin Britten, his contemporary Hans Werner Henze and the American pioneer John Cage alongside Schubert lieder. The Chinese guitarist Xuefei Yang joins the evening’s journey through drifting soundscapes.

BFI Southbank launches its Hitchcock retrospective (Photo: Getty)
Getty
Show Hide image

The world has entered a new Cold War – what went wrong?

Peter Conradi’s Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War traces the accumulation of distrust between the West and Russia.

In March 1992 an alarmist “secret” memo written by Richard Nixon found its way on to the front page of the New York Times. “The hot-button issue of the 1950s was, ‘Who lost China?’ If Yeltsin goes down, the question ‘Who lost Russia?’ will be an infinitely more devastating issue in the 1990s,” the former US president wrote.

Nixon’s point was well made. At that time, Boris Yeltsin, who had acted as the wrecking ball of the Soviet Union, was desperately struggling to hold the splintering new Russian Federation together. An empire, a political system, an ideology and a planned economy had all been shattered in a matter of weeks. Western diplomats in Moscow feared that millions of starving people might flood out of the former Soviet Union and that the country’s vast nuclear arsenal might be left unguarded. Yet the West seemed incapable of rising to the scale of the historic challenge, providing only meagre – and often misguided – support to Yeltsin. Between 1993 and 1999, US aid to Russia amounted to no more than $2.50 per person. The Marshall Plan II it was not.

Even so, and rather remarkably, Russia was not “lost” during the 1990s. Yeltsin succeeded in stumbling through the decade, creating at least some semblance of a democracy and a market economy. Truly it was a case of “Armageddon averted”, as the historian Stephen Kotkin put it.

It seems hard to remember now, but for many Russians 1991 was a moment of liberation for them as much as it was for those in the Soviet Union’s other 14 republics. The Westernising strand of Russian thought briefly flourished. “Democratic Russia should and will be just as natural an ally of the democratic nations of the West as the totalitarian Soviet Union was a natural opponent of the West,” the country’s first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, proclaimed.

When Vladimir Putin emerged on the political scene in Moscow in 1999 he, too, made much of his Westernising outlook. When my editor and I went to interview him as prime minister, there was a portrait of Tsar Peter the Great, who had founded Putin’s home city of St Petersburg as Russia’s window on the West, hanging proudly on his office wall. President Putin, as he soon became, was strongly supportive of Washington following al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in 2001. “In the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people – we are with you,” he declared. Russian generals instructed their US counterparts in the lessons they had learned from their doomed intervention in Afghanistan.

Yet the sediment of distrust between the West and Russia accumulated steadily. The expansion of Nato to former countries of the Warsaw Pact, the bombing of Serbia, the invasion of Iraq and the West’s support for the “colour” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine had all antagonised Moscow. But Putin’s increasing authoritarianism, hyperactive espionage and propaganda activities abroad drove the West away, as did his interventionism in Georgia and Ukraine.

Given the arc of Russian history, it was not surprising that the pendulum swung back so decisively towards the country’s Slavophiles. As a veteran foreign reporter for the Sunday Times and former Moscow correspondent, Peter Conradi is a cool-headed and even-handed guide to the past 25 years of Western-Russian relations. So much of what is written about Russia today is warped by polemics, displaying either an absurd naivety about the nature of Putin’s regime or a near-phobic hostility towards the country. It is refreshing to read so well-written and dispassionate an account – even if Conradi breaks little new ground.

The book concludes with the election of Donald Trump and the possibility of a new rapprochement between Washington and Moscow. Trump and Putin are indulging in a bizarre, if not grotesque, bromance. But as both men adhere to a zero-sum view of the world, it seems unlikely that their flirtation will lead to consummation.

For his part, Conradi does not hold out much hope for a fundamental realignment in Russia’s outlook. “Looking back another 25 years from now, it will doubtless be the Westward-looking Russia of the Yeltsin years that is seen as the aberration and the assertive, self-assured Putin era that is the norm,” he writes.

But the author gives the final word to the US diplomat George Kennan, a perpetual source of wisdom on all things Russian. “Of one thing we may be sure: no great and enduring change in the spirit and practice of Russia will ever come about primarily through foreign inspiration or advice,” Kennan wrote in 1951. “To be genuine, to be enduring, and to be worth the hopeful welcome of other peoples such a change would have to flow from the initiatives and efforts of the Russians themselves.”

Perhaps it is fanciful to believe that Russia has ever been “lost” to the West, because it has never been fully “won”.

John Thornhill is a former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times

Peter Conradi appears at the Cambridge Literary Festival, in association with the NS, on 23 April. cambridgeliteraryfestival.com

Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War by Peter Conradi is published by One World (384pp, £18.99​)

This article first appeared in the 16 February 2017 issue of the New Statesman, The New Times