The ADgenda: this week's most offensive advert

Fat binder tablets.

With the waistband of Britain tightening as obesity statistics grow, it’s
only understandable that adverts quietly confront us with solutions to
shrink our shameful stomachs. It’s nicer than being told off by news
articles! But, when the news lectures us about children wider than they are
tall and our imminent deaths at the hands of the Big Mac, the underlying
message is, above all, health (and maybe Britain not being picked last in
the PE class of the world). XLS Medical’s advert for their fat binder
tablets remarkably omits all possible health benefits for whatever the
cartoon science says their product does.

Of course, health isn’t their main selling point. Why would it be? It’s not
as if the name of their brand features the word “medical”, a word pointing
directly towards health in all possible uses. Marching under this universal
“medical” flag, it must be difficult to segregate your market so harshly,
but they manage it. This advert’s target is so fixed on women it’s like an
insecurity-seeking missile. The central figure, our heroine, laments at
gaining weight until she doesn’t feel like herself anymore. The images
accompanying this claim are indeed shocking deviations from being oneself:
she happily holds a baby and eats a sandwich at her desk. But the straw
that breaks the camel’s back is when she struggles to zip up her
tightly-squeezing clothes – and the penny drops. The only reason XLS
Medical would ever expect anyone to buy this is because of insecurity about
their image – insecurity which their adverts help to create.

Are men not in need of help with dieting? Or is it expected that,
since they don’t wear red dresses like on the Special K box, they’ll just
do the Manly Thing and keep drinking their beer-bellies gargantuan, sucking
in their gut when a pretty lady walks by? Targeting diet products at women
is not just perpetuating a worn-out ad stereotype like women as homemakers
or sex objects; it’s stretching the gender gap beyond repair. When men
barely get tutted for being an above-average size, women are so fervidly
encouraged to look like models that some can end up starving themselves.
And defining beauty under “medical”? Maybe the advertising world just holds
different definitions to the real world: New Medical Special K: now more
effective in keeping you presentable!

 

XLS Medical’s advert. Photograph: youtube.com
Getty
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Brexit has opened up big rifts among the remaining EU countries

Other non-Euro countries will miss Britain's lobbying - and Germany and France won't be too keen to make up for our lost budget contributions.

Untangling 40 years of Britain at the core of the EU has been compared to putting scrambled eggs back into their shells. On the UK side, political, legal, economic, and, not least, administrative difficulties are piling up, ranging from the Great Repeal Bill to how to process lorries at customs. But what is less appreciated is that Brexit has opened some big rifts in the EU.

This is most visible in relations between euro and non-euro countries. The UK is the EU’s second biggest economy, and after its exit the combined GDP of the non-euro member states falls from 38% of the eurozone GDP to barely 16%, or 11% of EU’s total. Unsurprisingly then, non-euro countries in Eastern Europe are worried that future integration might focus exclusively on the "euro core", leaving others in a loose periphery. This is at the core of recent discussions about a multi-speed Europe.

Previously, Britain has been central to the balance between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, often leading opposition to centralising eurozone impulses. Most recently, this was demonstrated by David Cameron’s renegotiation, in which he secured provisional guarantees for non-euro countries. British concerns were also among the reasons why the design of the European Banking Union was calibrated with the interests of the ‘outs’ in mind. Finally, the UK insisted that the euro crisis must not detract from the development of the Single Market through initiatives such as the capital markets union. With Britain gone, this relationship becomes increasingly lop-sided.

Another context in which Brexit opens a can of worms is discussions over the EU budget. For 2015, the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget, after its rebate and EU investments, accounted for about 10% of the total. Filling in this gap will require either higher contributions by other major states or cutting the benefits of recipient states. In the former scenario, this means increasing German and French contributions by roughly 2.8 and 2 billion euros respectively. In the latter, it means lower payments to net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds - a country like Bulgaria, for example, might take a hit of up to 0.8% of GDP.

Beyond the financial impact, Brexit poses awkward questions about the strategy for EU spending in the future. The Union’s budgets are planned over seven-year timeframes, with the next cycle due to begin in 2020. This means discussions about how to compensate for the hole left by Britain will coincide with the initial discussions on the future budget framework that will start in 2018. Once again, this is particularly worrying for those receiving EU funds, which are now likely to either be cut or made conditional on what are likely to be more political requirements.

Brexit also upends the delicate institutional balance within EU structures. A lot of the most important EU decisions are taken by qualified majority voting, even if in practice unanimity is sought most of the time. Since November 2014, this has meant the support of 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the population is required to pass decisions in the Council of the EU. Britain’s exit will destroy the blocking minority of a northern liberal German-led coalition of states, and increase the potential for blocking minorities of southern Mediterranean countries. There is also the question of what to do with the 73 British MEP mandates, which currently form almost 10% of all European Parliament seats.

Finally, there is the ‘small’ matter of foreign and defence policy. Perhaps here there are more grounds for continuity given the history of ‘outsourcing’ key decisions to NATO, whose membership remains unchanged. Furthermore, Theresa May appears to have realised that turning defence cooperation into a bargaining chip to attract Eastern European countries would backfire. Yet, with Britain gone, the EU is currently abuzz with discussions about greater military cooperation, particularly in procurement and research, suggesting that Brexit can also offer opportunities for the EU.

So, whether it is the balance between euro ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, multi-speed Europe, the EU budget, voting blocs or foreign policy, Brexit is forcing EU leaders into a load of discussions that many of them would rather avoid. This helps explain why there is clear regret among countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, at seeing such a key partner leave. It also explains why the EU has turned inwards to deal with the consequences of Brexit and why, although they need to be managed, the actual negotiations with London rank fairly low on the list of priorities in Brussels. British politicians, negotiators, and the general public would do well to take note of this.

Ivaylo Iaydjiev is a former adviser to the Bulgarian government. He is currently a DPhil student at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford

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