Crossing the Line of Control

Pakistan offered shelter to Kashmir’s dispossessed Muslims as they fled sectarian violence. But with

On a sunny Friday afternoon at Manak Piyan migrant camp for refugees in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Rizwan Ahmed, an ex-jihadi, sits in a classroom overlooking the River Neelum and holds forth among a group of elders. "Nobody wants to take responsibility for us. It's like we don't exist," says the bearded schoolteacher with a prosthetic leg, who, at the age of 37, is already regarded as something of a community leader. "We want to go back, but the governments of India and Pakistan won't allow us. They are violating our fundamental rights."

His audience murmurs in agreement. They belong to a group of people who migrated from Indian-administered Kashmir, fleeing torture and killings during the insurgency of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some, including Ahmed, openly admit that they fought against the Indian military. "It is our right under the United Nations Charter," he says. Though he fought in the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the main militant group in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and trained in Khost under the command of the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the watchful eye of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, Ahmed is not your average jihadi: he favours education for women and workers' rights, and says he was impressed by the relief efforts of Christian charities in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake that killed 80,000 people. He works at a school sponsored by the Read Foundation, funded jointly by the Foreign Office and Save the Children. Others contend that they had nothing to do with the fighting but were interrogated and tortured all the same.

Now, 20 years on, most of the 35,000 people who fled continue to live in makeshift camps and say they face discrimination at the hands of local Kashmiris. As second, third and even fourth generations are born in the camps, up to 40 per cent of the refugees lack the citizenship papers or ID cards that would entitle them to go to college or get government jobs. Unemployment rates in the community are even higher than the estimated 35-40 per cent for the region as a whole.

Some independent analysts argue that the migrants are hostages to the political disputes between India and Pakistan; they see Pakistan's reluctance to offer citizenship to the displaced people as a direct result of its insistence on holding a plebiscite to determine the future of the entire population of Kashmir, as envisaged in a 1948 UN Security Council resolution.

Rana Altaf was just five years old when, in the spring of 1993, he and his family were forced to flee their village in the Kupwara district of Indian-administered Kashmir. During the insurgency against the Indian authorities in the early 1990s, thousands of young men, including Rana's father and uncle, were arrested, beaten and tortured. Fearing for their lives, they eventually crossed the Line of Control, trekking on foot for three days across treacherous, snowy terrain. The threat of Indian landmines, designed to deter Pakistan-based militants, loomed large.

The group was 60-strong. “We knew that if we turned back, we faced certain death. They would have shot us," recalls Rana's father, Abdul Rasheed. He says he was arrested three times and interrogated by a man who threatened to have him killed if he didn't give the names of militants hiding in his village. He insists he had nothing to do with the armed struggle, in which an estimated 84,000 civilians lost their lives.

Get on the bus

Seventeen years on, the family lives in a make­shift shanty house on the outskirts of Muzaffarabad. Though they count themselves lucky to be alive, the family's dream of a welcoming Pakistan was short-lived.

“We're grateful to Pakistan, but we're always made to feel different. The people here don't like us, they don't mix with us and it's hard to get a job," says Rana, who has not yet received Pakistani citizenship or an identity card. Rana's mother, Sobia, complains that the family struggles for food each month as the men of the family find informal work only occasionally. Almost all the migrants continue to live in camps and subsist on government handouts of 1,500 rupees (£11) a month per person.

At Rana's residence, three families cram into two rooms and live on government welfare cheques. Not one of them possesses a Pakistani ID card.
“We left our land, our properties, our animals and businesses to come here," says Abdul, head of the family. "We want to go back home, but only after the Indian army has left. What business do they have in Kashmir?"

They say that the bus service between the two Kashmirs, launched as part of peace efforts between India and Pakistan in 2005, is "just for show" - bureaucratic hurdles make travel almost impossible. According to a recent poll by Chatham House, the London-based think tank, only 1 per cent of the total population of Kashmir has been able to visit friends or relatives on the other side in the past five years.

Ahmed finally got his identity card seven years ago, after a long struggle with an unrelenting bureaucracy. Some members of the community petitioned the high court in 2005 for citizenship rights, but the court's ruling extended only as far as a few dozen individual cases. Other migrants were granted citizenship in 2006 in the run-up to the state elections, in what they see as a cynical ploy by politicians to garner votes.

This article first appeared in the 23 August 2010 issue of the New Statesman, Pakistan

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.

 

 

This article first appeared in the 23 August 2010 issue of the New Statesman, Pakistan

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