The Plus One policy

Japan's rapidly falling population has sparked an anguished debate: should the country open itself u

By mid-century, the UN predicts, the population of Japan will have dropped from nearly 130 million to 100 million. This is the largest decline for any developed nation. Japan is not an aberration, but a trailblazer. How it is coping with a shrinking population is being scrutinised by other countries across Asia and Europe that have embarked on the same journey.

In Japan, depopulation has triggered a debate about national priorities. If the country is to continue with business as usual and pursue industrial growth, then the trend needs to be reversed. Yet many have grown weary of the treadmill of economic competitiveness and are using this new demographic shift as an opportunity to discuss a different vision of Japan’s future.

Most politicians are of the opinion that population decline is economically dysfunctional and needs to be corrected, even if they are not sure how. The deputy chief cabinet secretary, Haku­bun Shimomura, has pointed an accusing finger at Japanese women: if only they would “stay at home and raise their children”.

What alarms Shimomura is that Japanese women have, on average, only 1.3 children each. Today Japan’s fertility average is lower than China’s (with an average of 1.6 children), although not quite as low as Taiwan’s (1.1 children). The corresponding figure for the UK is 1.9; while at the other end of the spectrum, women in Afghanistan, Angola and Liberia have an average of 6.8 children. Since the Japanese have one of the highest life expectancies in the world, the country is facing a withering at one end of the life cycle, but a boom at the other. By 2050, there will be more than three times as many people aged 65 or over as there will be those under 14. It is also predicted that there will be 500,000 ­people aged 100 or over.

The obvious solution is immigration. One can read in the Japan Times of the need to “throw the country open to the millions of poor Asians, Africans and Latin Americans who would certainly come if invited”. However, Japan has no history of being a country of immigration; only about 1.5 per cent of workers are foreign. Even in Tokyo, the figure rises to just

3 per cent. The Japanese myth of racial homogeneity is deep-rooted, insular and very protective. The Japanese look at societies, such as the United States and Britain, where immigrants have settled in large numbers, and see fractured ­societies in which an ill-treated caste of foreign labour fill low-paid jobs. For many, it is not an appealing vision of their own future.

According to the UN, if Japan wants to prevent a fall in its working-age population, it will need to take in as many as 650,000 immigrants every year until 2050. This would mean that by mid-century about a third of the population would be of non-Japanese heritage. Is Japan ready for this?

Another option is to encourage women to have more babies. Small bribes are on offer. Child benefit paid to families is modestly pro-natalist. Local encouragement is also available. In the town of Yamatsuri, parents receive $4,600 (£3,264) for the birth of a child, with an additional $460 a year for ten years. It doesn’t sound much – and it ­isn’t. In fact, from whatever source, state cash for parents remains pal­­try. It is more a symbolic sign of goodwill than a serious form of practical

help. The Japanese may worry

about population decline, but

their efforts to reverse the

trend look gestural and

perfunctory.

Predictably, the government has announced a raft of initiatives to get people breeding. The “Angel Plan” and the “New Angel Plan” were both designed to make having children an easier and more attractive option. The latest idea, the “Plus One Proposal”, is directed towards encouraging families to grow by “plus one”. The scheme aims to create parent-friendly working conditions, with funds to be allocated for the construction of 50,000 new day-care facilities.

Yet these initiatives still leave Japan far behind most countries in western Europe in the provision of “pro-parent” state welfare and employment law. And since European countries are also facing population decline, it seems unlikely that the Japanese government’s belated efforts will turn the tide.

There are other options. Two of the more popular are additional automation in the labour market and wider economic participation among old people. Japan leads the world in both. If Japan wants to reverse its declining population, policy levers are at hand. But it seems what the country is going through today cannot be understood simply as a dilemma about which policies to apply. The issue of population decline has brought to the surface long-suppressed questions about the point and purpose of ceaseless growth.

Increasingly the message from Japan is not about how to buck the population trend, but how to adapt to it. One of the country’s national newspapers, Asahi Shimbun, argues that “from the standpoint of quality of life, this is actually a good opportunity to reassess our growth-­oriented post-Second World War values and ask ourselves how we really want to live”.

Urban planners anticipate the end of suburban sprawl, and the emergence of more compact and greener towns and cities. For the demographer Toru Suzuki, of the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Japan’s contraction throws up issues that have for too long been avoided in the rush to compete and consume. “It brings you to a very tough question,” he says. “What is happiness? Can we be happy without economic growth?”

This article first appeared in the 09 March 2009 issue of the New Statesman, Planet Overload

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The New Times: Brexit, globalisation, the crisis in Labour and the future of the left

With essays by David Miliband, Paul Mason, John Harris, Lisa Nandy, Vince Cable and more.

Once again the “new times” are associated with the ascendancy of the right. The financial crash of 2007-2008 – and the Great Recession and sovereign debt crises that were a consequence of it – were meant to have marked the end of an era of runaway “turbocapitalism”. It never came close to happening. The crash was a crisis of capitalism but not the crisis of capitalism. As Lenin observed, there is “no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation” for capitalism, and so we discovered again. Instead, the greatest burden of the period of fiscal retrenchment that followed the crash was carried by the poorest in society, those most directly affected by austerity, and this in turn has contributed to a deepening distrust of elites and a wider crisis of governance.

Where are we now and in which direction are we heading?

Some of the contributors to this special issue believe that we have reached the end of the “neoliberal” era. I am more sceptical. In any event, the end of neoliberalism, however you define it, will not lead to a social-democratic revival: it looks as if, in many Western countries, we are entering an age in which centre-left parties cannot form ruling majorities, having leaked support to nationalists, populists and more radical alternatives.

Certainly the British Labour Party, riven by a war between its parliamentary representatives and much of its membership, is in a critical condition. At the same time, Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership has inspired a remarkable re-engagement with left-wing politics, even as his party slumps in the polls. His own views may seem frozen in time, but hundreds of thousands of people, many of them young graduates, have responded to his anti-austerity rhetoric, his candour and his shambolic, unspun style.

The EU referendum, in which as much as one-third of Labour supporters voted for Brexit, exposed another chasm in Labour – this time between educated metropolitan liberals and the more socially conservative white working class on whose loyalty the party has long depended. This no longer looks like a viable election-winning coalition, especially after the collapse of Labour in Scotland and the concomitant rise of nationalism in England.

In Marxism Today’s “New Times” issue of October 1988, Stuart Hall wrote: “The left seems not just displaced by Thatcherism, but disabled, flattened, becalmed by the very prospect of change; afraid of rooting itself in ‘the new’ and unable to make the leap of imagination required to engage the future.” Something similar could be said of the left today as it confronts Brexit, the disunities within the United Kingdom, and, in Theresa May, a prime minister who has indicated that she might be prepared to break with the orthodoxies of the past three decades.

The Labour leadership contest between Corbyn and Owen Smith was largely an exercise in nostalgia, both candidates seeking to revive policies that defined an era of mass production and working-class solidarity when Labour was strong. On matters such as immigration, digital disruption, the new gig economy or the power of networks, they had little to say. They proposed a politics of opposition – against austerity, against grammar schools. But what were they for? Neither man seemed capable of embracing the “leading edge of change” or of making the imaginative leap necessary to engage the future.

So is there a politics of the left that will allow us to ride with the currents of these turbulent “new times” and thus shape rather than be flattened by them? Over the next 34 pages 18 writers, offering many perspectives, attempt to answer this and related questions as they analyse the forces shaping a world in which power is shifting to the East, wars rage unchecked in the Middle East, refugees drown en masse in the Mediterranean, technology is outstripping our capacity to understand it, and globalisation begins to fragment.

— Jason Cowley, Editor 

Tom Kibasi on what the left fails to see

Philip Collins on why it's time for Labour to end its crisis

John Harris on why Labour is losing its heartland

Lisa Nandy on how Labour has been halted and hollowed out

David Runciman on networks and the digital revolution

John Gray on why the right, not the left, has grasped the new times

Mariana Mazzucato on why it's time for progressives to rethink capitalism

Robert Ford on why the left must reckon with the anger of those left behind

Ros Wynne-Jones on the people who need a Labour government most

Gary Gerstle on Corbyn, Sanders and the populist surge

Nick Pearce on why the left is haunted by the ghosts of the 1930s

Paul Mason on why the left must be ready to cause a commotion

Neal Lawson on what the new, 21st-century left needs now

Charles Leadbeater explains why we are all existentialists now

John Bew mourns the lost left

Marc Stears on why democracy is a long, hard, slow business

Vince Cable on how a financial crisis empowered the right

David Miliband on why the left needs to move forward, not back

This article first appeared in the 22 September 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The New Times