Miliband doesn’t want to sack Balls – he just wants to steal the Treasury’s power

The Labour leader's plans for government can factor in the prospect of having Balls as his chancellor, but in a shrunken empire.

For three stagnant years, Labour failed to convince people that the country’s economic troubles were George Osborne’s fault. Now, Ed Miliband and Ed Balls want to persuade voters that the Chancellor has cooked up the wrong sort of recovery. The strength of this argument is that optimistic headlines belie household experiences of on­going hardship. The weakness is that Labour can’t prove that things would have been any better if it had been in charge. Opinion polls suggest that many think they would have been worse.

There is also a sound argument that the growth in Britain’s economy is uneven and unsustainable. The coalition promised a nationwide, export-driven manufacturing renaissance. Instead, we have a sugar rush of cheap credit, house-price inflation and consumer spending in the south-east. Again, that doesn’t help the opposition if it can’t be proved that Ed Balls would have presided over a higher-spec recovery.

Labour’s top team affects confidence that the coalition will be punished by the majority of people who will still feel worse off in 2015 than they did in 2010. But nerves are fraying. Privately, senior shadow cabinet ministers admit that the economy could hit a “sweet spot” for Osborne in time for the general election. The Tories don’t need voters to feel jubilant about their personal circumstances as long as they sense that things are moving in the right direction and think that it still feels a bit dicey to gamble on regime change.

Miliband is running out of time to persuade people that he knows how to secure a brighter tomorrow. The urgency breeds resentment in the leader’s office of time wasted by the shadow chancellor touting his “five-point plan for jobs and growth” – the abandoned recipe for a brighter yesterday.

That isn’t the only source of frustration with Ed Balls. He is resented by the left of the party for failing to hold the line against austerity. Activists smell treason in every move to reassure less partisan voters that an incoming Labour government wouldn’t go on a spending spree. Balls has accepted a public-sector pay freeze and a cap on social security spending. He has launched a “zero-based” spending review with an instruction to shadow ministers to identify cuts in their prospective departments. He has offered to have his plans vetted by the Office for Budget Responsibility. He has pledged to run a Budget surplus by 2020.

Balls gets little credit for those vows of frugality. The Tories are good at drowning out actual Labour policy with attacks on what they want the policy to be. And the opposition sounds its media horn louder when steering to the left: restoring the 50p tax rate or controlling energy prices. It also doesn’t help that Balls lacks friends in the corner of the party that was calling for more fiscal rigour back in 2010. This is the tribe that fashions itself as “Labour modernisers” since “Blairite” has become a term of abuse.

They want Labour to say more about failures of the state as the counterpart to Miliband’s attacks on failed markets. In that context, Balls is seen as a repository of risk-averse Treasury orthodoxy; an obstacle to public-sector reform. That perception fuels suspicion of the zero-based spending review. In theory, it is pro-reform, because it invites shadow ministers to consider innovative ways to deliver services without spending more money. Yet it gives Balls a licence to meddle in every nook of Labour’s agenda. Viewed from the leader’s office, this looks like empire-building. Enough Labour people see Balls as an encumbrance to sustain a constant level of chatter about his prospects of being sacked. It is a theme loved by Tories who like to imagine his relationship with the Labour leader as a B-list sequel to the blockbuster Blair-Brown schism.

It is no secret that Balls was not Miliband’s first choice. The appointment was made in January 2011, when the Labour leader’s authority was at a low ebb. Since then, he has shored up his position, managing rival factions, co-opting Balls’s old allies where necessary. Last October’s shadow cabinet promotions of Michael Dugher to a roving Cabinet Office brief and Vernon Coaker to the Defence portfolio are widely interpreted this way. The need to signal beyond doubt which of the Eds is in charge has been a routine preoccupation in the leader’s office.

No one who has closely observed the way Miliband operates doubts his capacity to be ruthless. Shadow cabinet ministers speculate that he would get rid of Balls without hesitation if he believed it was a condition of getting over the threshold of No 10. For the time being, the calculation must be that sacrificing the party’s most experienced political economist would signal panic and allow the Tories to boast that Labour’s capitulation to the Osborne plan was complete. Even shadow ministers who don’t much like Balls say his contributions are usually the most insightful in shadow cabinet meetings.

That doesn’t mean the Labour leader trusts his shadow chancellor to run the party’s economic policy. The case that Miliband wants to make flows from his conviction that insecurity and uneven reward are hard-wired into British capitalism. He wants to “rewrite the rules” – an ambition that ranges far beyond fiscal management to cover an interventionist industrial policy, corporate governance reform and devolution of power to local level. A notable feature of that agenda is how thoroughly it would dilute the dominance of the Treasury. In other words, Miliband’s plans for government can factor in the prospect of having Balls as his chancellor, but in a shrunken empire.

It has taken three years for Miliband to win the right to decide what Labour’s economic offer should be. It has taken skilful, subtle manoeuvring. Now control of the message is his. The challenge is getting anyone beyond the party to listen.
 

Ed Miliband and Ed Balls at the Labour conference in Brighton last year. Photograph: Getty Images.

Rafael Behr is political columnist at the Guardian and former political editor of the New Statesman

This article first appeared in the 29 January 2014 issue of the New Statesman, The seven per cent problem

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Theresa May gambles that the EU will blink first

In her Brexit speech, the Prime Minister raised the stakes by declaring that "no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain". 

It was at Lancaster House in 1988 that Margaret Thatcher delivered a speech heralding British membership of the single market. Twenty eight years later, at the same venue, Theresa May confirmed the UK’s retreat.

As had been clear ever since her Brexit speech in October, May recognises that her primary objective of controlling immigration is incompatible with continued membership. Inside the single market, she noted, the UK would still have to accept free movement and the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). “It would to all intents and purposes mean not leaving the EU at all,” May surmised.

The Prime Minister also confirmed, as anticipated, that the UK would no longer remain a full member of the Customs Union. “We want to get out into the wider world, to trade and do business all around the globe,” May declared.

But she also recognises that a substantial proportion of this will continue to be with Europe (the destination for half of current UK exports). Her ambition, she declared, was “a new, comprehensive, bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement”. May added that she wanted either “a completely new customs agreement” or associate membership of the Customs Union.

Though the Prime Minister has long ruled out free movement and the acceptance of ECJ jurisdiction, she has not pledged to end budget contributions. But in her speech she diminished this potential concession, warning that the days when the UK provided “vast” amounts were over.

Having signalled what she wanted to take from the EU, what did May have to give? She struck a notably more conciliatory tone, emphasising that it was “overwhelmingly and compellingly in Britain’s national interest that the EU should succeed”. The day after Donald Trump gleefully predicted the institution’s demise, her words were in marked contrast to those of the president-elect.

In an age of Isis and Russian revanchism, May also emphasised the UK’s “unique intelligence capabilities” which would help to keep “people in Europe safe from terrorism”. She added: “At a time when there is growing concern about European security, Britain’s servicemen and women, based in European countries including Estonia, Poland and Romania, will continue to do their duty. We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe.”

The EU’s defining political objective is to ensure that others do not follow the UK out of the club. The rise of nationalists such as Marine Le Pen, Alternative für Deutschland and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) has made Europe less, rather than more, amenable to British demands. In this hazardous climate, the UK cannot be seen to enjoy a cost-free Brexit.

May’s wager is that the price will not be excessive. She warned that a “punitive deal that punishes Britain” would be “an act of calamitous self-harm”. But as Greece can testify, economic self-interest does not always trump politics.

Unlike David Cameron, however, who merely stated that he “ruled nothing out” during his EU renegotiation, May signalled that she was prepared to walk away. “No deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain,” she declared. Such an outcome would prove economically calamitous for the UK, forcing it to accept punitively high tariffs. But in this face-off, May’s gamble is that Brussels will blink first.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.