A Married Man in Edinburgh

The author of the blog A Gay Girl in Damascus has been revealed to be a middle-aged American man bas

On Monday evening last week, Tom MacMaster, a 40-year-old Middle East activist studying for a masters at Edinburgh University wrote a post on the homepage of his fictional blog about a lesbian Syrian woman claiming that "Amina Arraf" had been abducted by Syrian security services.

The revelation sparked a flurry of media interest across the world (including in The Staggers) and exploded with the predictability of a hand grenade in the virtual arena of internet activism, where Amina had gained a significant following in the months since the current uprising began in Syria.

But Amina's popularity proved to be MacMaster's downfall. Once it emerged that the photographs purported to be of the American-Syrian woman were actually of Jelena Lecic, a Croatian woman living in London, the hunt was on to unravel the mystery of Amina Arraf.

Then, last night, a new post appeared on the homepage of A Gay Girl in Damascus entitled "Apology to readers".

In this post, MacMaster admitted that he was "the sole author of all posts on this blog", but maintained that "the events [in the Middle East] are being shaped by the people living them on a daily basis. I have only tried to illuminate them for a western audience."

"I do not believe I have harmed anyone -- I feel that I have created an important voice for issues that I feel strongly about... This experience has sadly only confirmed my feelings regarding the often superficial coverage of the Middle East and the pervasiveness of new forms of liberal Orientalism."

"However, have been deeply touched by the reactions of readers," he added

Sami Hamwi, the pseudonym for the Damascus editor of GayMiddleEast.com, has responded with outrage on behalf of the LGBT community in Syria: "To Tom MacMaster, I say shame on you!!! There are bloggers in Syria who are trying as hard as they can to report news and stories from the country....What you have done has harmed many, put us all in danger, and made us worry...Your apology is not accepted."

Emanuelle Degli Esposti is a freelance journalist currently living and working in London. She has written for the Sunday Express, the Daily Telegraph and the Economist online.

Emanuelle Degli Esposti is the editor and founder of The Arab Review, an online journal covering arts and culture in the Arab world. She also works as a freelance journalist specialising in the politics of the Middle East.

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The problems with ending encryption to fight terrorism

Forcing tech firms to create a "backdoor" to access messages would be a gift to cyber-hackers.

The UK has endured its worst terrorist atrocity since 7 July 2005 and the threat level has been raised to "critical" for the first time in a decade. Though election campaigning has been suspended, the debate over potential new powers has already begun.

Today's Sun reports that the Conservatives will seek to force technology companies to hand over encrypted messages to the police and security services. The new Technical Capability Notices were proposed by Amber Rudd following the Westminster terrorist attack and a month-long consultation closed last week. A Tory minister told the Sun: "We will do this as soon as we can after the election, as long as we get back in. The level of threat clearly proves there is no more time to waste now. The social media companies have been laughing in our faces for too long."

Put that way, the plan sounds reasonable (orders would be approved by the home secretary and a senior judge). But there are irrefutable problems. Encryption means tech firms such as WhatsApp and Apple can't simply "hand over" suspect messages - they can't access them at all. The technology is designed precisely so that conversations are genuinely private (unless a suspect's device is obtained or hacked into). Were companies to create an encryption "backdoor", as the government proposes, they would also create new opportunities for criminals and cyberhackers (as in the case of the recent NHS attack).

Ian Levy, the technical director of the National Cyber Security, told the New Statesman's Will Dunn earlier this year: "Nobody in this organisation or our parent organisation will ever ask for a 'back door' in a large-scale encryption system, because it's dumb."

But there is a more profound problem: once created, a technology cannot be uninvented. Should large tech firms end encryption, terrorists will merely turn to other, lesser-known platforms. The only means of barring UK citizens from using the service would be a Chinese-style "great firewall", cutting Britain off from the rest of the internet. In 2015, before entering the cabinet, Brexit Secretary David Davis warned of ending encryption: "Such a move would have had devastating consequences for all financial transactions and online commerce, not to mention the security of all personal data. Its consequences for the City do not bear thinking about."

Labour's manifesto pledged to "provide our security agencies with the resources and the powers they need to protect our country and keep us all safe." But added: "We will also ensure that such powers do not weaken our individual rights or civil liberties". The Liberal Democrats have vowed to "oppose Conservative attempts to undermine encryption."

But with a large Conservative majority inevitable, according to polls, ministers will be confident of winning parliamentary support for the plan. Only a rebellion led by Davis-esque liberals is likely to stop them.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

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