In January 2002, George W Bush declared that America "will not allow the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons". His State of the Union address, in which he invoked "an axis of evil", is now much lampooned.

Of the three objects of his ire, one - Iraq - did not in the event possess weapons of mass destruction, but went on to become a centre of global terrorism that it was not before. Another, Iran, seems determined to develop technology for military purposes. The third - North Korea - has just become, amid tragicomic hubris, the world's ninth and most dangerous nuclear state.

One of the many deceptions, and possibly self-deceptions, underpinning the decision to go to war in Iraq was the assertion that it would instil fear in miscreant leaders. It now seems clear that both Iran and North Korea concluded that only by hastily increasing their nuclear capability would they stand a chance of deterring a conventional, asymmetrical military attack by the US. In other words, the White House created a powerful incentive for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

That is part of the answer to the "could it have been avoided?" question, but not the entire answer. It is just as likely that Kim Jong-il would have proceeded anyway. He has, to put it mildly, form. Just as threats have had the reverse effect, so there is little evidence that the carrot has achieved much either. A deal with the Clinton government a decade ago to suspend nuclear activity in return for $5bn in fuel and two safe light-water reactors was unpicked. South Korea's "sunshine" policy, based around family reunions and other attempts to normalise relations, has not produced the opening-up expected.

As for China, as Lindsey Hilsum notes on page 22, the world overestimated Beijing's ability to rein in the Dear Leader.

The immediate prospects do not bode well. The UN Security Council will talk the talk, safe in the knowledge that its measures will make little difference. Sanctions do not work against countries that export virtually nothing and import even less.

According to Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there are roughly three dozen countries "with civil nuclear power, who have the technologies and understanding to develop nuclear weapons in a short period of time". The parameters have changed since the big five declared themselves nuclear powers in the 1950s and 1960s and deemed other nations unworthy of such weaponry. The aim of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was to embed that settlement. Nothing in the treaty bans uranium enrichment to provide fuel for nuclear power plants. The problem is that the same technology can also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. This is a loophole that Iran appears keen to exploit. North Korea has gone one step further. In any case, proliferators can simply quit the treaty whenever they wish.

Last year's NPT review conference ended in disarray, with posturing by key countries ruining five years' work. ElBaradei, an able figure whose re-election the US is trying to prevent, wants to look afresh at the whole approach. The nuclear powers have put the emphasis on reducing proliferation - in other words, other countries' entry into their club. The new, if unrecognised, members want more emphasis on mutual disarmament. Neither group is achieving its ends. The only point on which all agree is the need to do more to prevent materials getting into the hands of terrorist groups.

Pressing questions need to be resolved. With so many states now nuclear-capable, should the emphasis switch to managing the risk? If so, what criteria should be used to determine that risk? What about consistency? Does the argument used by governments during the cold war, that mutually assured destruction can have a stabilising effect, pertain to countries such as India and Pakistan, both of which tested their first nuclear weapons in 1998?

Established and emerging nuclear states alike must agree a new set of controls to manage the risks better. Continued faith in an old order that died some years ago will compound the dangers already present.

More than a mere journalist

The NS has recently unveiled two global lists. Last month, we produced our world's worst dictators (in which the aforementioned Kim Jong-il featured prominently). Shortly before that we collated our readers' nominations for Heroes of Our Time. One of these was Anna Politkovskaya - an intrepid journalist largely unsung outside her own country but a beacon of hope in her native Russia, where press freedoms have been steadily dismantled in recent years.

The murder of Politkovskaya at the hands of a professional hit squad is alarming in itself, and was alarmingly predictable. She knew far more than she was supposed to know, and wrote far more than she was supposed to write. She was fearless in uncovering the true horror of the Russian military assault on Chechnya and the torture and butchery carried out by the puppet governments installed by the Kremlin. She would not stop, no matter how much she was threatened, beaten, or, as she returned on a flight after covering the Beslan siege in 2004, drugged. She would talk of her own demise, but some dared to believe that her prominence might ensure her survival.

In countries such as ours, where journalism is often held in low repute, it is salutary to note that Politkovskaya often pursued cases long after they had dropped from the headlines. She realised that facts speak loudest. Getting them often requires getting one's feet dirty and taking risks - and caring about outcomes.

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