The neo-cons are seizing on the crisis to vindicate their view that diplomacy is simply appeasement by other means

For a military conflict to cease, one of three factors must be in play. Superiority must be so overwhelming on one side for the other to decide that it is fruitless to continue; both combatants achieve rough parity and know they will not achieve a breakthrough; or outsiders exert such pressure for a resolution that the warring parties are unable to resist. In the current Middle East conflagration none of these factors pertains. That is why, at the time of writing, the prospects are so bleak.

Although many might seek solace or satisfaction in apportioning blame, on this occasion it seems pointless. The abduction of two Israeli servicemen by Hezbollah, which followed a similar act against Israeli soldiers by Hamas, was designed to provoke a reaction. It is doubtful whether a response of such magnitude was anticipated, notably bombing at the heart of Beirut. Now the Israeli government, egged on by right-wing forces in the United States, appears set on what it hopes will be a final showdown with the two radical groups.

It will not win, because there is no victory to be had.

This bald fact seems lost on the new Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, a man who seeks to mask his lack of political experience and military courage with personal belligerence. During a recent visit to London, before the latest flare-up, Olmert was contemptuous of the efforts by the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, to assert some control over Hamas in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Those same moderate Palestinian voices, such as Abbas, on whom many around the world pin hopes for peace, are denied the wherewithal to provide for their people and to convince them there is another way apart from violence. For each fighter killed, for each civilian casualty, another dozen suicide bombers are produced.

It might seem strange to say, but whatever the intentions of Ariel Sharon might have been - and we shall never know - at least the old bruiser seemed to show, with the withdrawal from Gaza, that he understood that occupation and bombardment would not guarantee peace and security for his people. These can be achieved only by an old-fashioned combination of diplomacy and outside enforcement.

The débâcle of Iraq put paid to the neoconservative doctrine of pre-emption and American primacy, or so it seemed. In the second Bush term, a return to diplomacy was attempted, albeit through gritted teeth, over the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and other problems. President Bush, as overheard at his "Yo Summit" in St Petersburg, does not know which way to turn, beyond using expletives. As Andrew Stephen argues (page 18), this is not surprising given that the US now has few people to talk to in the Middle East, and little to talk to them about.

Talking to adversaries has never been comfortable, but it is a necessary evil in any search for peace. Bush will eventually have to engage with the Syrians and Iranians - the main backers of the militant groups. As Zaki Chehab points out (page 14), at the core of the fighting is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The road map presented in 2002 by the quartet of the US, the EU, the UN and Russia remains the best, if imperfect, route to a solution. The danger of the moment is that all the sides are weak.

The neo-cons - depleted but still kicking - are seizing on the crisis as a vindication of their view that diplomacy is appeasement by other means. It is these people who call themselves the radical wing of Israel's Likud party. It was Vice-President Dick Cheney who previously undermined visits to Israel by Colin Powell, then US secretary of state, by advising Sharon beforehand of a tough line to take against him.

Things are not so different now. Bush stands cynically by, allowing the Israelis an extra few days or weeks to inflict more damage before urging them to call it off when it suits them. As ever, his hapless friend Tony Blair nods in unison.

The biggest of all the failures of Bush and Blair, however, is to have undermined the credibility and art of international diplomacy. The tragedy of the events in Lebanon and beyond is that they have made its revival all the more urgent.

Don't shed tears for these men

Contrary to the baleful predictions of their noisy supporters, the NatWest Three remain unmanacled, if not entirely free. No chain gang or three-to-a-cell squalor yet prevents them from trying to put together a defence against the charge that they fraudulently augmented their personal wealth via some strange financial transactions. A US judge has granted the three bankers bail and (unusually for their class, it is true) painlessly tagged them.

But what an extraordinary display of hypocrisy accompanied the extradition proceedings. Newspapers and politicians who for years barely squeaked over the most egregious abuses of human rights and breaches of international law in evidence at Guantanamo suddenly found loud voices to bellow their passionate regard for liberty. American justice could not be trusted. "Asymmetric" extradition laws put honest Brits at a disadvantage while a constitution protected Americans from similar treatment.

Two points. Would that the British courts could be trusted to deal as robustly with white-collar fraud as US courts do time and again. But they can't and don't. Think Guinness; think Conrad Black.

Yes, it is unfair that British citizens don't enjoy the same protections as Americans against summary arrest. But that is a lesser injustice than the custom of the UK legal system to proceed as though the rights of the privileged were somehow more "inalienable" than those of the rest.

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