With every day that passes, it becomes harder for Nato to extricate itself from its Balkan quagmire. One is inevitably reminded of the analysis, by the late American historian Barbara Tuchman, of the sources of all the great errors of history (the British war against the American colonies, the American war in Vietnam, for example): the denial of evidence that doesn't fit the original analysis of the problem; the belief that to admit any mistake is to hand a propaganda victory to the enemy; the dismissal of domestic critics as appeasers, cowards or enemy sympathisers; the lethal logic that makes each reversal an occasion for deeper involvement; the transition from limited aims to questions of honour; the growing investment of money, pride, emotion, political credibility (and usually blood) that demands a commensurate return in a clear-cut victory.
Nato is raising the stakes on all sides. It has put its own future on the line while warning Milosevic that he faces political annihilation at best, indictment as a war criminal at worst; thus the war becomes a matter of survival for him and, however mistakenly, his people may think their survival at stake, too. Very soon, Nato will be committed to policies from which there will be no turning back.
The problem with the war from the beginning was that, being waged on an issue of the purest principle, practicalities always took second place. Rather as the outpouring of national sentiment at the Princess of Wales's death made those who did not wish to take part feel somehow emotionally disabled, so the entirely justified public horror at the fate of the Kosovar Albanians has left the war sceptics open to accusations of indifference and cynicism. Far from allowing them to say "we told you so", the ever-growing catalogue of horrors from Kosovo makes opponents seem more stony-hearted than ever. The crimes of the Serbian forces cry out for punishment and retribution. Indeed, to secular, liberal opinion, intervention, as proof of humanity, seems all the more urgent, there being no longer a God in heaven to dispense judgement. To oppose a humanitarian war becomes inhumane. To take a coldly rational attitude looks unfeeling, almost indecent.
Nevertheless, five practical questions must now be raised. First, can the bombing work? So far, it appears not to have done so, in that Milosevic has shown no sign of weakness, the ethnic cleansing no sign of slacking, the Yugoslav forces no sign of withdrawing from any part of Kosovo. Nato insists that more bombing will do the trick - but in defiance of military history. Second, can we put in ground forces? British ministers now say they would invade if there were a "permissive environment", which is jargon for weak opposing forces, demoralised and disrupted by the bombing campaign. But no supporter of a ground invasion has given a clear idea of how troops are to be inserted into Kosovo, given its landlocked, mountainous nature. An invasion of Serbia itself from Hungary or Romania across the north Yugoslav plain is far more realistic militarily; whether it is a political practicality is quite another matter. Third, can we risk our own blood? So far, there have been no western casualties whatever, unless you count the three captured American servicemen. Only Serbs and ethnic Albanians have died and, until significant numbers of Britons and Americans are risked at quarters closer than 15,000 feet in the air, we cannot judge the strength of the western humanitarian commitment. Fourth, can Nato hold together? Its leaders are congratulating themselves on maintaining unity for a month. It would be a sorry story, particularly in the absence of casualties, if they had failed to do so - yet the Germans briefly broke ranks with a proposed peace deal. A decision to step up the war could strain the alliance to breaking-point and bring down the governments in Italy, Germany and France. Fifth, can we afford it? A prolonged war would not only be costly in itself but would commit the west to an expensive reconstruction of virtually the entire Balkan region, including Serbia itself, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania, as well as Kosovo and Bosnia. Yet the main western governments take it almost as axiomatic that their populations will not tolerate increased taxation. That, again, will be a true test of humanitarian commitment.
Only if the answers to all these questions are clearly "yes", should Nato press the war to a conclusion. If the answer to any one of them is "no", it should pursue a peace deal, based on the partition of Kosovo, at the earliest possible moment. To do otherwise would be not only irresponsible but also, since more Balkan lives would be sacrificed to no end, inhumane.
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